Canada’s Prevention Approaches: Exploring Contributing Factors of Radicalization to Violence

Shawn Tupper, ICPC Colloquium Palermo, Italy November 17-19, 2014
Presentation Outline

- Canadian Context: Crime and Social trends
- Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy
- Overview of the Threat
  - Recent charges and convictions
  - Extremist Traveler's Issue and case studies
- Preventing Violent Extremism Framework
- Type of Current Prevention Programs
  - Percentage of Projects Addressing a Violence Attribute
  - Potential Prevention Interventions to Radicalization
  - 2 Approaches to Prevent Radicalization
- Next Steps in Prevention
With a population of just over 35 million, Canada’s population is disperse with a number of larger metropolitan centers across the country;
  - Largest cities are Toronto (close to 6M); Montreal (close to 4M); Vancouver (2.4M);

- In 2013, the police-reported crime rate reached 5,190 per 100,000 population—the lowest since 1969.;

- Violent crimes continue to account for one-fifth (21%) of all police-reported Criminal Code offences in 2013;

- Homicide continued to be a relatively rare event in Canada in 2013, representing less than 1% of all violent crime;

- Canada welcomes over a quarter million immigrants annually with the number of new permanent residents ranging from 261,000 to 267,000 between 2009 and 2014; and

- Income inequalities based on the Gini coefficient indicated that in 2010 Canada was the third lowest among the G7 countries.
Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy includes four elements:

- **Prevent**
- **Resilience**
- **Detect**
- **Deny**

**AIM**
To counter domestic and international terrorism in order to protect Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests.

**PRINCIPLES**
1. Building resilience
2. Terrorism is a crime and will be prosecuted
3. Adherence to the rule of law
4. Cooperation and partnerships
5. Proportionate and measured response
6. A flexible and forward-looking approach
Canadian Context: Radicalization to Violence

- Radicalization to violence – the process in which people ultimately embrace violence in pursuit of political, ideological or religious goals – is a critical component of that threat.

- This phenomena is often referred to as “homegrown terrorism” because it involves citizens and residents who may target their own countries.

- The threat is evolving rapidly from “large” events to “single and dual actors” – although the risks remain.

- Canada is also part of the global “Foreign Fighters” phenomenon
  - Terrorist Travelers may evolve into domestic threats
Canada’s CVE Focus and Priorities

● In the 2014 Public Threat Report, three priorities have been identified in Canada’s approach to CVE and extremist travel abroad:
  
  • **Building prevention capacity in communities.**
  • Increasing law enforcement awareness through training.
  • Developing targeted intervention programs in communities.

● At the international level:
  
  - Bilateral cooperation with US and UK
  - Multilateral cooperation through GCTF

● Research
  
  - Kanishka funded projects on terrorism and violent extremism issues to assist in building capacity and support for CVE priority activities.
Pathways to Radicalization Narratives - Storytelling Initiative:

- Public Safety has developed a novel approach to community engagement through a series of first-person radicalization-to-violence narratives, based on actual Canadian cases.

- The narratives are used to initiate conversations with community groups, to discuss violent extremism in the context of people’s life experiences, and to identify opportunities for individual and community intervention in the radicalization-to-violence process.

- Currently, there are 6 narratives: AQ inspired (three variations), right-wing extremist, eco-terrorist and Sikh extremist. Only half the stories are “about” Muslims.

- A number of other stories are currently under development.
Counter-terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) initiative provides first responders and frontline police officers with terrorism awareness training so they can identify national security threats at the earliest possible stage, as early detection is vital to prevent terrorist attacks.

Over the past 3-4 years, presentations on indicators of violent radicalization have been delivered to several dozen CTIO courses. Approximately 1,250 candidates have been trained to date.

Canada plays an advisory function to the International Association of Chiefs of Police on development of CVE modules.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe community policing, CVE and HR.
The *Prevent* element of the Counter-terrorism Strategy aims to identify the risk factors and contributing factors to terrorism by actively engaging with individuals, communities and international partners.

**Desired outcomes:**

- To enhance the resilience of communities to violent extremism and radicalization
- Violent extremist ideology is effectively challenged by producing effective communication strategies to counter it; and
- The risk of individuals succumbing to violent extremism and radicalization is reduced.

- Since 2008, Canada has become a leader in development of evidence-based crime prevention knowledge of what works and how in Canada – that expertise is now looking at risk factors and intervention points counter violent extremism.
### What Type of Prevention Programs Do We Currently Implement?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Fund</th>
<th>Area of Focus</th>
<th># of Interventions Funded Since 2008/09</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention Action Fund</td>
<td>Youth 12-17 at risk of being involved in the justice system</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Aboriginal Crime Prevention Fund</td>
<td>Building crime prevention capacity in the North and Aboriginal communities</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Knowledge Development Fund</td>
<td>Research to enhance the evidence – based nature of the interventions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Gang Prevention Fund</td>
<td>Gang prevention and Exiting</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Infrastructure Program</td>
<td>Prevention of hate-motivated crime</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## What Percentage of Projects Address Violence?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Funded Interventions</th>
<th>% of projects that have violence as an Attribute</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime Prevention Action Fund</td>
<td>47.3% (105 projects out of 222)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern and Aboriginal Crime Fund</td>
<td>69.4% (25 projects out of 36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research Knowledge Development Fund</td>
<td>38.5% (5 projects out of 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Gang Prevention Fund</td>
<td>48.3% (29 projects out of 60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Infrastructure Program</td>
<td>100% of the attributes relate to hate</td>
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</table>
Preventing CVE: Current Status

- PS crime prevention analysts have reviewed the CVE literature to determine what risk factors and project elements could be potentially piloted in a Canadian context;

- PS crime prevention analysts have compared radicalization pre-indicators with risk factors for gang and at-risk youth to identify how unique risk factors for extremism can be addressed.

- A preliminary assessment of potential interventions indicates that the following models could be considered appropriate for piloting and evaluation in a Canadian context:
  - Model 1: Preventing and Interrupting
  - Model 2: Diminishing Opportunities (DOVE)
Prevention Model 1: Preventing and Interrupting

- Developed in Calgary and in consultation with Muslim groups this intervention focuses on preventing and interrupting at key intervention points in the cycle of violence. The “model” has not been rigorously evaluated at this time.

- **Primary Prevention**
  - Provides mentoring and empowerment to at risk groups prior to youth developing radicalized ideology

- **Secondary Prevention**
  - Focuses on interrupting at the ideation stage using appropriate risk assessment tools and “first responder and authentic actors”:
    - Provides access to opportunity structures and outlets to vent frustration

- **Tertiary Prevention**
  - Works with disengaged individuals who have returned to Canada after joining a terrorist group
    - Applies cognitive based therapy techniques to change attitudes is prioritized
Prevention Model 2: Diminishing Opportunities for Violence

- The DOVE model used an ethnography approach involving consultations with stakeholders in the 57 Somali-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

- The findings suggest that the following 3 areas are risks that need to be mitigated to prevent radicalization:
  - Monitor at risk youth frequently and in spaces where parents have limited access;
  - Assess the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and
  - Monitor youth contact with recruiters or associates that encourage radical ideology.

- This model supports current frameworks that we use for gang prevention projects to ensure that individual, school and community-based interventions are contributing to prevention.
Next Steps in Prevention

• Continue to build multilateral partnerships to improve coordination, information flow and capacity building through bilateral and multilateral collaboration;

• The development a *Compendium on Good Practices or Lessons Learned in Measurement and Evaluation of CVE Programs* (Winter, 2014);

• Develop a better understanding of the trajectories of youth involved in extremism with a specific focus on gender analysis; and

• Complete an assessment of the feasibility of various risk assessment tools and feasibility of piloting prevention models in the Canadian context;
Thank You

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