Preventing Residential Burglaries and Home Invasions

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ABSTRACT

Residential burglaries affect approximately 2% of all Canadian households every year, creating losses, pain, and some level of disillusionment with the justice system. They are among the most frequent crimes, and Canada occupied the unenviable position of ranking first among industrial nations for this crime. Home invasion incidents, a version of burglary involving threat or violence against the occupants, have raised concern in some Canadian cities recently. In both cases, the response is essentially reactive, an approach that has done little to reduce residential burglaries and their associated economic costs, as well as the number of victims and the consequences for them.

In recent years, there has emerged a call for a more integrated approach balancing better prevention and reaction. This is based on a growing international consensus on risk factors and effective intervention targeting these factors, as well as on the elements of a rigorous process to enhance community safety and reduce crime.

In the area of residential burglary, knowledge of key risk factors and successful interventions make clear the specific types of actions that will be required to effectively reduce this problem. Effective approaches must be geared to: helping suitable targets ensure the security of their homes and families; reducing the motivation of potential offenders through action on social development factors and focussed deterrence; and enhancing capable guardianship through targeted and problem-oriented policing and natural surveillance in neighbourhoods. In each of these three areas, actions have been rigorously evaluated, showing their ability to reduce residential burglary by as much as 75%.

What is also clear is that to be successful a preventive approach must involve action focusing on all three sets of risk factors and make use of knowledge accumulated internationally. Furthermore, it must involve a rigorous process of diagnosis of the specific nature of the problems, development and concerted implementation of an action plan, and evaluation, based on a strong local coalition of all partners. Key to this process is the capability to enlist the support and co-operation of agencies and institutions that are best able to act on identified risk factors. A local agency capable of fostering and sustaining this process and of mobilizing citizens should support the work of the local coalition.

This knowledge base provides clear directions for Canada. It is possible to effectively reduce the number and costs of residential burglary and home invasions through the implementation of a national platform of action to stimulate integrated intervention in those cities most affected by these problems.
INTRODUCTION

Among the various forms of crime, breaking and entering (B&E) is one of the most common and affects a relatively high proportion of the population: historically, about one quarter of all property crimes reported to the police are B&Es. One particular variation of residential B&E is home invasions, a relatively new phenomenon in Canada. Though not precisely defined as a category in the Canadian Criminal Code, home invasions are typically characterized by forced entry into a private residence while the occupants are at home, combined with the threat or use of violence against the occupants. This report will deal specifically with these two crimes.

Residential burglaries and home invasions involve significant economic and social costs. Among the economic costs are the costs of police services, insurance coverage to compensate for losses, and locksmiths and alarm companies to install equipment. Despite being a property-related offence, B&Es have personal and psychological consequences: they involve an invasion of home privacy, thereby potentially creating fear. They also involve the pain due to loss of personal, sometimes cherished or irreplaceable property.

In developing strategies to counter B&Es and home invasions, many commentators advocate the use of tougher sentences against offenders (and home invasion offenders especially) such as the use of mandatory minimum prison sentences. However, limiting the strategy to a reactive approach is questionable for a number of reasons. First, typically fewer than 20% of residential burglaries are solved by police and no more than 5% of the incidents lead to a court conviction of any sort. Second, it is now generally accepted that incarceration alone is expensive and does little to prevent the further occurrence of burglaries, including recidivism by the same offenders. Third, reactive approaches do not alleviate the harm and trauma for victims and the criminal justice approach may at times make them worse. And finally, for all these reasons, a reactive approach appears to be far from cost-effective (see for example Greenwood et. al. 1996).

In recent years, many have questioned over-reliance on reactive strategies and advocate the use of preventive approaches to match effective enforcement and sanctioning. Despite a strong knowledge base about risk factors and growing knowledge about the effectiveness of preventative approaches, few have access to systematic information on how B&Es can be successfully prevented and even fewer have attempted to implement rigorous and systematic strategies to prevent residential burglaries.

As in other areas of crime and public safety, what is required is an integrated strategy. In addition to making use of effective sanctions against offenders, such a strategy should rely on a comprehensive and rigorous approach characterized by concerted action to tackle both social development and victimization risk factors. Concerted action should also be undertaken to engage the public through public education about the nature and magnitude of the problem and provide information on practical countermeasures. This is the very purpose of this paper prepared for the Canadian National Crime Prevention Centre. It first defines the extent and magnitude of the problem in Canada and comparatively to other developed countries. The second section examines known risk factors for burglary-related situations and potential offenders. The third section reviews cost-effective actions capable of reducing residential burglaries by tackling these risk factors. The last section proposes some paths for effective and sustainable strategic action.
1 - THE EXTENT AND MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

Residential B&E and Robbery in Canada

Drawing from a synthesis on B&E in Canada (see: Kong, 1998b) and other sources, we can detail a considerable amount about B&Es in this country. However, the limited available data allows us to provide only sparse insight into home invasion problems. As shown in Figure 1, after adjusting for population growth between 1975 and 1997, reported crime rose by nearly 31% for the residential B&E rate and 5% for the robbery rate.

In 1996, there were 396,085 incidents of B&E reported by police, with nearly two-thirds being residential B&Es, a figure representing a rate of at least 1 of every 50 residences or 2% of Canadian households (Kong, 1998b).

In 1997, there were 233,844 residential B&Es representing a rate of 772 incidents per 100,000 population or about 2% of Canadian households.

From 1991 through to 1996, British Columbia had the highest reported rate of residential B&E among the provinces. In 1996, the rates per 100,000 of reported residential B&E were, respectively: British Columbia (1,154); Saskatchewan (1,113); Quebec (1,016); Manitoba (829); Ontario (643); Nova Scotia (578); Alberta (568); New Brunswick (502); Prince Edward Island (393).

Among major Canadian cities, Vancouver recorded the highest rates of residential B&E. The rates per 100,000 for cities with over 500,000 population for 1996 were, respectively: Vancouver (1,387); Quebec City (1,058); Montreal (1,055); Ottawa-Hull, Ontario part (1,016); Winnipeg (889); Calgary (657); Hamilton (609); Edmonton (605); Toronto (489). Vancouver’s rate of residential B&E in 1996 was more than 283% higher than the rate in Toronto, and more than 31% higher than the rate in Quebec City.

Items most frequently stolen during the course of residential B&E included: audio/video equipment (32%); jewellery (13%); money, cheques or bonds (11%); personal accessories such as clothing (6%); machinery and equipment (5%); office equipment such as computers (4%); and bicycles (3%).

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**Figure 1 – Break & Enter and Robbery in Canada: 1975 - 1997**

In 1996, 16% of B&E incidents were cleared by laying a charge against an accused or were cleared otherwise (i.e., usually not charged as police are pursuing another more serious charge). Of the 46,200 persons caught and charged for B&E in 1996, 60% were adults and 40% were youths aged 12 to 17 years. The majority of persons charged with B&E were male (93%).

Fully 43% of youth court B&E cases that resulted in conviction in 1995-1996 involved repeat offenders (i.e., being a youth convicted of B&E in 1995-1996 with previous convictions of any kind, not just limited to B&Es). While the majority of first-time offenders received probation as their most serious sentence (76%), repeat offenders convicted of B&E were more likely to receive custody as their most serious sentence (59%). For both open and secure custody, the median length of sentence for those convicted of B&E was 90 days.

A sample of adult provincial courts that dealt with B&E cases revealed that almost seven in ten adults convicted of B&E received imprisonment as the most serious sentence (67%), while just under one-third received probation as the most serious sentence. The median length of prison sentences was 180 days.

**Home Invasions**

In the countries surveyed for the purposes of this paper (Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, The Netherlands, South Africa, and the United States), residential B&E is an all too common form of crime victimization experienced by citizens. Home invasions, on the other hand, are a very rare occurrence and, as such, statistical data and analyses are non-existent or not readily available in most cases.

Newspaper accounts of home invasion incidents have been particularly frequent in Vancouver, Calgary, Saskatoon and Winnipeg. In Vancouver, British Columbia, for example, some 31 cases have been reported since 1995. Police reported data from 1996 reveals that there were 2,470 recorded home invasion incidents, representing 1% of total B&Es with nine of ten violent B&Es occurring at a place of residence (Kong, 199b).

The risk of being a victim of home invasions is small. However, the very low risk of becoming a victim of home invasion, while it may provide some comfort to the general public, may do little to console those who are fearful of or have fallen victim to this frightening offence.

In most jurisdictions, home invasions are not recorded as such. Often they are treated and recorded as B&Es (Hurley, 1995) and, where violence occurs, they tend to be treated as residential robberies. In Belgium, England, and The Netherlands, home invasion incidents are almost unheard of and data were not readily available for this study. Analysis of home invasion problems in this paper will, therefore, be restricted to experiences in Australia, Canada, the United States and other countries as appropriate. Police recorded statistics used below will, therefore, only provide some insight into the extent of the home invasion problem.
Readers should be cautious about drawing comparative assumptions from the data presented below as reporting and recording practices in each country may vary considerably — the data are provided as preliminary indicators of the extent of home invasion problems. For the purposes of the present paper, residential robberies are depicted to give some comparative insight into the extent of home invasion problems.

- **United States (1996):** residential robberies account for 13.5% of all robberies (377,335 recorded robbery incidents at a rate of 142 incidents per 100,000 population);
- **Australia (1997):** residential robberies account for approximately 7% of all robberies (21,261 recorded robbery incidents at a rate of 115 per 100,000 population);
- **Canada (1997):** residential robberies account for approximately 3.6% of all robberies (29,590 recorded robbery incidents at a rate of 98 incidents per 100,000 population).

**B&E and robbery in perspective**

In order to better understand the extent and nature of the phenomenon, this section does two things. First, it compares break and enter and robbery to overall crime rates in Canada in a historical perspective. Second, it compares rates in Canada to those of other countries.

From 1962 to 1997, reported crime in Canada soared (see Figure 2). Despite gradual national decreases through the 1990s (e.g., 12% drop in the total crime rate, 1990-1997), contemporary reported crime levels are still nearly 2.5 to 4.4 times what they were in 1962.

Crimes of violence grew much more than did crimes against property. Nevertheless, it remained a constant throughout the period that property crimes represented over 70% of all crimes reported to the police. Such levels generate frustrations as crime continues to detract from quality of life, and generate concerns about personal safety and fear of crime and disillusionment with the justice system.
Each of the major industrialized countries (except Japan) experienced similar crime increases since the 1960s. Despite some recent crime decreases in several countries, rates of B&E, car theft, assault, robbery and sexual assault recorded by the police are double or triple those of the 1960s.

The 1996 International Crime Victims Survey or ICVS revealed that, averaged across 11 industrialized countries, 42.4% of respondents reported being the victim of one or more of ten indexed crimes. The ten crimes covered included: car theft, theft from car, car vandalism, motorcycle theft, bicycle theft, B&E, robbery, personal theft, sexual incidents, and assaults and threats. Of the countries participating in the 1996 ICVS (i.e., excluding Australia, Belgium and New Zealand), Canada recorded the highest victimization rates for completed residential B&E (Table 1 below; countries have been rank ordered for residential burglary).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Residential Break and Enter (B&amp;E)</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>10 Crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Countries (average)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Source: Mayhew and van Dijk, 1997
- * 1992 data presented (1996 data not available)
- N.A. = data not available

Canada’s residential B&E victimization rate was followed by the United States (2nd), England & Wales (3rd), and The Netherlands (4th). Canada’s rate was more than double the rate in Scotland and Sweden. When considering both completed and attempted residential burglaries, Canada ranks first with a rate of 5.3% of households, followed by the Netherlands (5.1%) and the United States (4.9%).

In spite of having the highest victimization risk, Canada’s police reported residential B&E rates are not the highest among industrialized nations. Of seven countries (see Table 2 below),
Canada ranked fifth in police reported residential B&E and was followed by The Netherlands (6th) and France (7th).

The police reported B&E rate of 2% of Canadian households was significantly lower than the victimization rate of 4% of respondents. This difference cannot be explained by Canadian victims not reporting to the police – the ICVS revealed that 85% of victims of B&E reported to the police (Mayhew & van Dijk, 1997). The difference between the two measures may relate to the relatively small sample survey of the ICVS, and the larger Uniform Crime Reporting survey that provides a census of all crimes reported to the police. In England, some studies indicate a significant attrition rate in the proportion of reported burglaries that are recorded by the police. It is unknown whether this is also true in Canada.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>B&amp;Es Reported By Police (Rate per 100,000 Population)</th>
<th>B&amp;Es Reported By Police (Total Volume)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1589</td>
<td>284974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>49376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>2461 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>519265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>233844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>673</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>213561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (Australia); Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada (Canada); Research and Statistics Directorate, Home Office (England & Wales); Ministry of Justice (France); Ministry of Justice (The Netherlands); Ministry of Justice (New Zealand); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice (United States).

In Canada as in most other developed countries, victims of break & enter tend to have more outgoing lifestyles (i.e., spend more time away from their home than non-victims). Different than in other countries, however (such as England & Wales), break & enters in Canada are positively related to income: families with incomes of $60,000 or more have a 65% higher reported victimization rate for property offences than families with incomes of $15,000 or less.

In England & Wales, studies on repeat victimization have shown that 4% of residential burglary victims account for almost 50% of all reported residential break-ins (Farrell & Pease, 1993; Pease, 1998). In the USA, a study reveals that 10% of victims account for 40% of all reported offences and 10% of public places (bars, restaurants, etc.) account for 60% of reported offences (Eck,
It is not known how many residences are repeat victims of burglary in Canada. This gap has major implications for a Canadian strategy to effectively tackle residential B&Es.

**The costs of crime and its control**

The costs of crime and its control eat up a significant proportion of limited resources, the equivalent of 5% of the GDP in some developed countries. On average in six industrial countries where data are available, the annual cost of crime is $750 US per person (Sansfaçon & Welsh, 1999:15). The costs of crime include police, courts and prisons, private security, lost property, and the shattered lives of victims (e.g., pain and suffering).

According to Statistics Canada’s estimates (1994-1995), nearly $10 billion a year is spent on Canada’s criminal justice system (i.e., police, courts, and corrections) (CCJS, 1997). However, in Canada, the annual costs of crime – including police, courts and corrections, the pain and suffering of victims, and lost productivity – have been estimated at $46 billion (National Crime Prevention Centre, 1998).

In their update study of the costs of crime in Canada, Brantingham and Eston (1998) have identified the following partial costs of property crimes to victims:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Partial costs of property crimes to victims, 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of incidents</strong></td>
<td>849529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average loss (1996$)</strong></td>
<td>2131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total losses (millions)</strong></td>
<td>1810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total losses from all sources in this table (millions 1996$)</strong></td>
<td>4,591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Property and violent crime exact a heavy cost on society. Crime threatens the sustainable development of communities by inflicting direct suffering and losses on victims (e.g., physical and emotional trauma, property loss, etc.), and indirect costs for society (e.g., money spent on the criminal justice system, victim assistance, etc.). The impact of residential burglaries and/or home invasions on victims is considerable, and may include the following:

- loss of property and money
- physical injury
PREVENTING RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND HOME INVASIONS

- feelings and behaviour linked to shock (post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms), and in some cases lasting psychological injury
- ripple effects of crime on the family and friends of victims (e.g., concern about welfare of the victim and of themselves)
- time and trauma associated to participation in the criminal justice process
- difficulties in accessing services such as victim support programs, hospital treatment, insurance, and welfare.

The costs of property crime are almost 1 to 3 depending on whether one uses police recorded crimes or victimization survey data. The total cost of property crime in 1996 is approximately $10 billion. For the period 1992 to 1996, in Canada, the number of residential and commercial claims relating to B&E dropped 30%, which generated an 8% reduction in costs to the insurance industry. According to the Insurance Bureau of Canada – the membership of which represents 80% of the total insurance industry – insurance claims for residential and commercial B&Es dropped from $434 million in 1992 to $398 million in 1996 (Kong, 1998b). However, the situation is uneven across Canada. In Quebec for example, residential burglary has increased by 16% between 1994 and 1998, and claims have increased by 5% between 1995 and 1996, reaching $54 million (Ministère de la Sécurité publique, 1998).

In addition, crime control measures entail significant costs. Overuse of traditional reactive strategies adds to the substantial costs of crime and its control. The following figure, adapted from a study conducted by the RAND corporation in the United States, shows the tax increase required to reduce crime by 10%. It shows that it costs almost 8 times more to reduce crime by increasing incarceration than by adopting incentives for youth to complete school.

Clearly, increasing recourse to incarceration or stiffening penalties is the most expensive approach, in addition to being the least effective. Furthermore, to increase police clearance rates so as to bring more criminals to justice would entail even higher costs to Canada to pay for additional police officers.

What is required is a more balanced approach involving effective preventative and criminal justice measures. The next two sections will show that knowledge of key risk factors and effective approaches to prevention make it possible to attain a better balance.
2 – **Known Risk Factors**

In general terms, we have the knowledge and the tools to respond more effectively and cost-effectively to the contemporary challenges posed by crime and insecurity. Knowledge developed worldwide identifies certain factors that increase the risk for persons to become offenders or to be victimized. Furthermore, there is a large international consensus on the significance of these risk factors. Governmental commissions, research reports, declarations from international conferences and syntheses produced by crime prevention organizations have identified such factors as:

**A vast consensus on some basic risk factors for delinquency and victimization**

- poverty and unemployment deriving from social exclusion, especially for youth;
- dysfunctional families with uncaring and inconsistent parental attitude, violence or parental conflicts;
- social valuation of a culture of violence;
- presence of facilitators (such as firearms and drugs);
- discrimination and exclusion deriving from gender, racial or other forms of inequality;
- degradation of urban environments and social bonds;
- inadequate surveillance of places; and
- availability of goods that are easy to transport and sell.

Controlled experiments, post-hoc evaluations and other research studies have confirmed the validity of many risk factors by examining the effects of interventions targeting one or more risk factors. In many cases, these interventions have reduced delinquency and victimization, and have proven to be more cost-effective than traditional criminal justice responses (see among other Sherman et.al. 1997; Glodblatt & Lewis, 1998; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 1997; Greenwood et.al. 1996; Karoly et.al., 1998). This is clear from the results of actions targeting developmental and situational risk factors (see Tables 4 & 5 reproduced from Sansfaçon & Welsh, 1999: 34 and 42).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 - Effective actions targeting selected developmental risk factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk Factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistent and ineffective parenting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and cognitive abilities of children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With respect to residential burglary specifically, preventative interventions have essentially focussed on victimization-related factors and on policing initiatives. Few social development initiatives have specifically measured their impact on residential burglary. In the following two sections, we will first identify some of the specific risk factors related to residential burglary and second we will describe some promising interventions.

### Key risk factors for residential B&E and home invasions

Both home invasions and residential B&E are multi-faceted multi-causal phenomena with a variety of situational and social causes. Homes with security and natural surveillance that are inadequate are inviting targets. Anonymous environments with limited neighbourhood bonding are also more at-risk than others. Relative deprivation associated with youth and young adults living in disadvantaged neighbourhoods may also increase the attractiveness of burglaries and home invasions as a means of income, excitement, or a sense of belonging to delinquent and/or criminal subcultures.
To a large degree, B&E is a reflection of the affluence of our times and the nature of modern life. Felson (1998) observes that the abundance of valuable, portable, and easily resold consumer goods (e.g., audio and video equipment) offers inviting opportunities for B&E. In addition, the concentration of populations in urban areas, combined with workforce participation and absence from the home during work hours for many, minimizes the risk that offenders will be detected or confronted by a victim. In fact, most studies show that rates of B&Es increase with (1) more consumer goods; (2) shifts in lifestyles where more people are out of the homes and living alone; and (3) more children living in poverty (Felson & Clarke, 1998; Waller and Okihiro, 1978).

Some proportion of these offences may also be linked to varying degrees to organized crime activities. Although most B&E offences are due to individuals operating alone, some (and high rate repeat offenders especially) are involved in drug-and-stolen-property distribution networks that are substructural elements of organized crime activity (Hicks, 1998).

Research conducted in various jurisdictions (Anderson et al., 1995; Burke & O’Rear, 1997; Coupe & Griffiths, 1996; Doherty, 1992; Dunlap, 1997; Farrell, 1995; Grabosky, 1995; Hurley, 1995; James, 1992; Jochelson, 1995; Johnson et al., 1997; Kruger et al. 1997; Pease, 1998; Pease & Laycock, 1996; Robinson, 1998; Salmelainen, 1996; Shaw & Louw, 1998; Valdez, 1997) reveals similarities between the risk factors for home invasion and residential burglaries. This is not too surprising given that break and enter is instrumental to the commission of home invasions. However, evidence relating to home invasion remains under researched at the present time and the evidence presented here should be considered as preliminary for this offence category. Nevertheless, the similarity of the risk factors implies that preventive actions could reduce victim vulnerability to both offence types.

According to routine activity theory, three sets of key risk factors have to be accounted for to explain residential burglary: a suitable target, a motivated offender and a capable guardian.

**Suitable Targets**

Residential B&E targets are not randomly chosen; to a large extent they are determined by the opportunities that a premise presents. B&E offenders target residences rather than residents, and studies in the USA and England indicate that repeat victimization is common. Known risk factors for residential B&E include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Known risk factors related to targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- physical protection: unlocked and/or open doors and windows, poor locks, glass door panels, and automatic garage doors left open;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- access control: security devices not installed or not in use (e.g., alarms, regular locks, and deadlocks);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- protection of visible assets and inadvertent advertising: valuable items such as electronic merchandise and jewellery that can easily been seen from outside the home, and placing empty cartons (that have not been cut up) for new electronic and other merchandise on the curb for trash pick up.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What limited data exists on home invasions also tends to show that home invasion targets are not randomly chosen either, and would be determined by the opportunities that certain residents and their property present. In this sense, targets for home invasion may be chosen in a more discriminating fashion than residential B&E targets. The risk factors for residential B&E would be much the same for home invasions as breaking and entering is an instrumental component, save the necessity for the resident(s) to be at home at the time of a home invasion offence.

Knowledge of more specific risk factors is extremely limited. Factors may include: gambling or prostitution involvement; large amounts of cash and jewellery at home; bragging about or flaunting affluence to relatives or friends; children having bad friends; owing money to personal loan schemes; reputation as a successful business owner (e.g., restaurant, convenience store, karaoke club); reluctance to pay extortion money; disgruntled employees; filling out financial information on memberships forms, credit forms, and so on (at video stores, department stores, etc.) (Dunlap, 1997).

With a crime as offensive as home invasions, we invariably hear the call that citizens should have the right to firearms with a view to protecting themselves and their property and deterring would-be offenders. This position is premised on the view that if offenders perceive that they have a reasonable prospect of facing an armed householder they will be less inclined to commit the offence (Tonner, 1999). However, research conducted in Atlanta, Georgia on home invasion incidents does not support the premise that householder access to firearms acts as an effective deterrent nor does it tend to prevent the commission of an offence in progress (Kellerman et al., 1995). In spite of the universal householder access to firearms in the 198 Atlanta incidents studied, less than 2% of victims employed a firearm in self protection and only 31% of victims were actually confronted by the offender (of whom only 20% carried a firearm or knives). Victim-offender confrontation decreased the likelihood of losing property, but significantly increased the likelihood of injury. Though personal injury to victims occurred in 20% of cases, only 3% were shot and no deaths resulted. Kellerman et al. (1995) conclude that measures aimed at increasing the difficulty of forced entry or enhancing the likelihood of detection would be more useful for preventing home invasion incidents than would householder access to firearms.

**Motivated Offenders**

B&E offenders tend to work alone, and are usually in their mid-to-late teens or early twenties. Repeat offending and repeat victimization are common across a number of jurisdictions. Motivation for B&E concerns the theft of property for use by the offender or for sale to friends, pawn shops, or other stolen property distribution networks. B&E offenders most often have no interest in confronting victims and will flee the scene if the resident returns home during the commission of the offence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Some known risk factors for offending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ to support alcohol and drug habits;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ lack of employment and educational opportunities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ other associated social problems (e.g., poverty).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on limited police data from Australia and the USA, home invaders tend to work in teams of 2-3 or more, and are also usually in their mid-to-late teens or early twenties. Repeat offending is common with the majority of home invasion incidents being committed by a small number of offenders. Explicit motivation for home invasions may include assault (common assault, aggravated, and sexual), gambling debt collection, retaliation for something victims may have done, sending a message from someone hired by the home invaders, and the theft of money and property. One underlying motivation for home invasion is the theft of property and cash to support alcohol and drug habits linked to their participation in criminal subcultures. Weapons such as guns and knives are possessed and used by home invaders in a minority of cases, with the threat or use of violence typically being direct physical force.

Based on data from the RCMP, some of the characteristics of home invasion crews from the West Coast, especially Vancouver, would include:

- the majority would be males of Asian origin between the ages of 18 and 22, some belonging to organized gangs
- most are close friends who have shared living quarters, food, money, cars, jail cells, and common life experiences
- they have strong family-like bonds
- they normally have experience in committing robberies and this knowledge has been passed down from the older members to the younger members
- they may all be members of the same street gang, or they may get together to do a home invasion in one location, splinter off into two or more groups and do home invasions or commercial robbery in another location

**Capable Guardians**

Capable guardians include residents and neighbours, police and private security, as well as instrumental security measures (locks, dogs...). Some of the key risk factors for residential burglary relating to capable guardians are:

**Known risk factors related to guardianship**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Factor</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>untargeted policing: traditional police patrols are of limited effectiveness in preventing crime; no rigorous and systematic action (e.g., tracking repeat offenders and repeat victims; targeted policing and community involvement schemes);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>insufficient surveillance: inadequate lighting and/or shrubs blocking the view of neighbours/passersby, and neighbours who do not know each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lack of human and animal presence: no lights or music on, car in the driveway, or other signs that owners are at home, and no dog</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Measures aimed at reducing residential B&E and home invasions by increasing police surveillance are likely to be of limited value. Felson (1998) calculated the number of potential commercial, public and residential targets for B&E in Los Angeles county and the number of hours officers were actively on patrol, and concluded that each target could expect 30 seconds of police coverage each day. This is clearly an insufficient deterrent to would-be offenders, and the costs associated with the increased volume of police necessary for a significant level of surveillance would be exorbitant. Police services can become effective capable guardians in preventing such crimes through enhanced intelligence gathering and dissemination, and by focusing on hot spots for residential B&E and home invasions. Police services also need to look at ways and means of collaborating with capable guardians who can exert more focused and sustained surveillance, and report suspicious activity to residents, and where appropriate, police officers.

Neighbours are perhaps the most effective capable guardians. This is particularly so where neighbours have some knowledge of one another in terms of daily habits, the cars driven by family members, the cars and faces of friends who may visit, and where neighbours live in relatively close proximity (e.g., they can easily see each other’s property). Passersby may also act as capable guardians where they can clearly see the property and suspicious movement inside or outside the home.

While home invaders sometimes keep their ill-gotten gains within the group or sell merchandise among friends, jewellery and other commodities often end up in pawn shops. Pawn shop owners and workers are potential capable guardians that could make a portion of the offence much more difficult to commit. Such individuals could co-operate with police to report incoming items that match police descriptions of stolen materials.

Victims can also become capable guardians in protecting others from home invasion (and residential B&E when confronted by offenders) by getting good descriptions of the offenders. Important descriptors include tattoos, scars, haircuts and hair colour, language used, accents (e.g., clear or broken English, or another language), use of personal names, and especially for home invasions issues such as cars that may have followed victims home, and whether the suspects went straight to the cash or jewellery. Investigators should focus on getting the details to such questions.
3 - PROMISING PRACTICES TO TACKLE RESIDENTIAL B&E AND HOME INVASIONS

Knowledge of key risk factors and the routine activity theory make clear the specific types of actions that will be required to effectively tackle residential burglary and home invasion problems. Effective approaches must be geared to: helping suitable targets (residents and residences that have been victimized and that may potentially be victimized) ensure the security of their homes and families; reducing the motivation of offenders through focused deterrence and action tackling the causes underpinning their offences (e.g., diminishing offender drug and alcohol dependency); and promoting police collaboration with potential capable guardians who can provide effective social control and surveillance.

What do we know of the effectiveness of interventions designed to tackle risk factors that may be linked to residential burglary?

Interventions Targeting Risk Factors for Victimization

Four programs targeting residential burglary through multi-sectoral interventions especially designed to reduce victimization risk factors have been evaluated (Figure 4). Two were conducted in England (Kirkholt and Safer Cities), one in The Netherlands and one in the United States. Each was based on a multi-agency approach in which problem diagnosis and solutions were developed collaboratively.

In Kirkholt (England), a problem-solving approach involving the precise identification of recidivist burglars and their modus operandi was adopted to reduce repeat burglary and repeat victimization. The scheme included the following components: removal of coin-operated electric and gas meters (reduction in readily available cash); target hardening by up-grading home security with improved locks and bolts; and a “cocoon” neighbourhood watch program. A one-group (no control group) pre-post design was used to evaluate the effects of the program on residential burglaries on the housing estate over a three year period. After the scheme’s first year, police-recorded burglaries had declined by 58% (from 526 to 223), and by the end of the third year the scheme had achieved a 75% reduction in burglaries (from 526 to 132). Compared
PREVENTING RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES AND HOME INVASIONS

with the pre-intervention rate, 1,056 burglaries were prevented over the course of three years (Forrester et al., 1990).

In 1991, the Dutch Secured Housing label was initiated by police in the Rotterdam-Leiden-The Hague triangle. The program has since been extended to the entire country. When housing project developers or housing associations apply for a Police Secured Label, their project and its environment must be approved by the police as meeting standards for residents’ participation and responsibility, neighbourhood management and home watch, as well as building design including orientation of living rooms, low roof, main entrance, and target hardening. A non-equivalent control group design was used to evaluate the effects of the program on residential burglaries one year after the scheme was implemented. Compared to households that did not participate in the program in Rotterdam, households in the Secured Label program had a 70% reduction in burglaries (Scherpennisse, 1997), while rates of burglary were increasing countrywide.

In 1973, in the City of Seattle, a Community Crime Prevention Program was initiated to tackle high levels of burglary. Mayoral support and a coalition built around the diagnosis of the problem were instrumental in the development and implementation of the program. They also proved vital to the program’s longevity (the program lasted long after the one-year evaluation). The program relied principally on situational prevention measures and involved security inspection services; marking personal property during the home security inspection; displaying decals to warn potential burglars that property has been marked; “cocoon-type” block watches involving 10-15 households; and public education campaigns to promote citizen awareness and prevention of the burglary problem. An equivalent control group design was used to evaluate the effects of the program on residential burglary, using before (n=1,474) and after (n=1,216) victimization surveys, each covering a one year time period. Both surveys included a random selection of participating program households and an approximately equal number of non-participating control households. Compared to the households that did not receive the program (control group), program households realized a 61% reduction in burglaries after the first year of the scheme. This amounted to almost four fewer burglaries per 100 households (Cirel et al., 1977).

Phase I of the Safer Cities Programme (SCP) in England and Wales began in 1988 and ended in 1995. The Home Office provided funding for crime prevention schemes in 20 high crime cities. The SCP was designed to reduce crime, lessen the fear of crime, and create safer communities where economic enterprise and community life could flourish. A recent large scale evaluation of SCP focused on almost 300 burglary prevention schemes. The typical program relied on target hardening measures, which included such things as improved door locks, entry systems, alarms, and security lighting. On average 5,200 households were included in each of the 300 evaluated schemes. A non-equivalent control group design was used to evaluate the programs’ effects on residential burglaries approximately one year after the schemes had been implemented. Before and after victimization surveys were administered to 7,500 households covering more than 400 high crime neighbourhoods in 11 of the 20 SCP cities and 8 comparison cities that did not receive the intervention. From before the introduction of the programs to approximately one year after, Safer Cities areas recorded an overall 21% reduction in the prevalence of domestic burglary. In the comparison cities, the risk of residential burglary increased by 3%. (Ekblom et.al., 1996).
Generally, no displacement effect (the problem moving to an adjacent area) seems to have occurred, which was a major concern for situational prevention. However, low intensity areas of the Safer Cities initiative experienced more displacement than high intensity investment zones. Conversely, a “diffusion of benefits” effect (see Clark & Weisburd, 1994) occurred in areas adjacent to high intensity investment zones.

The cost-effectiveness of some of these programs has also been evaluated. In Kirkholt, the cost-benefit ratio has been estimated at 5.04 for each dollar invested and at 1.83 for the Safer Cities Program.

**Interventions Targeting Risk Factors for Offending**

Among the key risk factors for burglary offences are lack of employment and educational opportunities, drug and alcohol consumption habits and one previous offence or more. In other words, interventions to augment employment and educational opportunities, to reduce drug and alcohol dependency and to provide effective sanctions for first-time offenders, should reduce burglary. What does research tell us?

Four programs are described here (Figure 5) targeting risk factors for youth aged 12 to 18. Remember that this groups accounts for a significant proportion of burglary offences (approximately 40%).

The **Quantum Opportunities Program** (QOP) started as a demonstration program in 1989 in five U.S. cities (Philadelphia, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Saginaw, and Milwaukee). The principal aim of QOP is to improve the life course opportunities of disadvantaged, at-risk youth during the high school years. For four years, or up to the completion of high school, young people in the program were offered after school activities for which they received hourly stipends ($1 to $1.33 per hour) and a matching amount of funds in a college-fund account. They were also encouraged to complete school through activities such as computer-assisted instruction, peer tutoring and homework assistance; community service and public event project activities; and development activities such as curricula on life/family skills, college and job planning. A randomized control group design was used to assess program effects. In each city, an equal number of youths (n=50) were randomly assigned to either a program group that...
received the intervention or a control group that did not. The program achieved a number of significant results. Compared to the control group, QOP group members were more likely to have graduated from high school (63% vs. 42%); more likely to have enrolled in some form of post-secondary education (42% vs. 16%); and less likely to have been arrested, as measured by self-report (17% vs. 58%) (Hahn, 1994).

Created in the mid 1970s, Job Corps is a federal training program in the US for disadvantaged/unemployed youth. It aims to improve employability and reduce crime by helping them achieve stable and long-term employment opportunities. Operating in over 100 centres, the program enrolled approximately 100,000 youths aged 16-24 each year and offered the following services in a residential setting: job training, classroom courses to attain graduate equivalent degrees, health care, counselling and job placement. In the evaluation, Job Corps members (n=5,100) who had been out of the program for a maximum of 2 years were compared with a matched group of non-participating youths and an 18 month follow-up was provided. The study found that participating youths were one-third less likely than non-participants to have been arrested one or more times (Long et al., 1981; Eisenhower Foundation, 1990).

In the early 1980s, in the Netherlands, in response to increasing problems of youth vandalism and its associated costs, an alternative program called HALT was initiated. Young people aged 12-18 years caught for the first or second time committing an act of vandalism were offered the opportunity to avoid formal prosecution by participating in the HALT program. The program requires young offenders to repair vandalism damage they have caused, as well as providing assistance in resolving their employment, housing, and education problems. An equivalent control group design was used to evaluate the effects of the program on the participants’ involvement in vandalism in three cities (Rotterdam, Eindhoven, and Dordrecht). Compared to their control counterparts, program group members were more likely to have ceased or decreased their involvement in vandalism (63% vs. 25%). As a result of the program’s success, it has since been expanded to over 43 sites across the country (Kruissink, 1990; Ministry of Interior, 1995).

Finally, functional family therapy for delinquent and pre-delinquent youths and their families began over twenty five years ago in the US. This clinical intervention is aimed at reducing recidivism risk factors (negativity, poor parenting and limited social skills) and increase protective factors (coherent and caring parenting). Functional family therapy programs have since been implemented in different countries and evaluated in different settings. Among the most recent, a study conducted in Sweden on 95 serious young offenders randomly assigned to either a treatment group (n=45) or a control group (n=50). The latter received normal intervention from a probation officer. Two years after the intervention, youths who had received the therapeutic intervention had a 30% lower recidivism rate (50% v 80%) than the controls (Hansson, 1998; see also Elliott, 1998).
Other risk factors related to residential burglary and home invasions are drug and alcohol dependency and the availability of firearms. Figure 6 presents the results of initiatives dealing with these factors.

The regulation of firearms availability has been examined in numerous studies, particularly by public health experts. Studies comparing countries, regions of the same country and cities of different countries (see Cukier, 1998) have been conducted. Among the best known is the “tale of two cities” comparing the twin west coast cities of Vancouver and Seattle. The former has gun control regulation and the other none. The study found a strong association between gun control and a lower death rate (Sloan & Kellerman, 1985). Similarly, an international comparison involving Canadian provinces, the United States, England & Wales and Australia concluded that 92% of the variance in death rates could be explained by access to firearms (Gabor, 1994). This study also indicates that the costs of injuries and deaths related to firearms is US$495 per person in the USA and US$195 in Canada. Overall, studies establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the association between firearms access and accidental death rates (Boyd, 1996). Canada adopted its first gun control legislation in 1977. A thorough evaluation, using 3 types of analyses, exploratory, time-series, and structural modelling, found a clear effect of the gun control legislation in the structural model: homicides were reduced by approximately 55% between 1977 and 1993 (Boyd, 1996).

Although complex, the relation between substance abuse and crime is well established and most studies conclude that as many as 50% of all offences are committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol or to finance their use. A similar proportion of incarcerated offenders have addiction problems (see Brochu, 1995). A study on a representative sample of over 2,000 probationers in the USA found that two-thirds of them had drug or alcohol problems (Mumola & Bonczar, 1998). The capacity of treatment programs to reduce recidivism and substance abuse is increasingly recognized (Lipton, 1995; Layton-MacKenzie, 1997). In 1992, a two year, $2 million initiative was launched by the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs to assess the epidemiology of substance abuse and the effects of substance abuse treatment programs. Involving a large representative sample of over 1,900 persons, the study found a 63% reduction in any illegal activity by program participants (Gerstein et al., 1994).

Furthermore, the economic benefits of three of these initiatives have been evaluated. Job Corps and Quantum Opportunities produced benefits of $1.45 and $3.68 respectively for each dollar invested, while the drug treatment program in CALDATA produced a strong cost-benefit ratio of 7.14.
What these programs do not tell with any degree of certainty is their specific capacity to reduce residential burglary, even less so home invasions. However, given that residential burglary is a high volume crime, that these programs show their capacity to reduce criminal behaviour in youth and young adults and that they directly tackle risk factors associated with residential burglary, it can be affirmed with relative confidence that they could reduce residential burglary if properly implemented and supported in Canada.

Interventions to Improve Capable Guardianship

Two types of actions are discussed here. Two are designed to improve police practices and one involves the installation of closed-circuit television (Figure 7).

In England & Wales, Operation Bumblebee adopted by the Metropolitan Police Service is a high-profile anti-burglary strategy. Its key elements relate to (1) operational and administrative changes to improve operations, detection, investigation and performance; (2) publicity to link up with other agencies and the public; and (3) preventative measures targeting repeat victimisation, community policing and property identification. Beginning in 1991 in one area, the operation was successful enough to be extended to all eight areas of the MPS in 1993. A study to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of Bumblebee in comparison to two other approaches (Gloucestershire and Hampshire) involved interviews with officers, document review and data analysis on recorded crimes and clear-ups. A one year follow-up showed that residential burglary had diminished by 15.5% compared to a 4.2% reduction in recorded burglaries throughout England & Wales in the same time period. Further, clearance rates in the MPS increased from 10.9% in 1991 to 19.8% in 1993 (Stockdale & Gresham, 1994).

While there is yet no strong research evidence that community-based and problem-oriented policing result in reduced levels of crime, both are considered promising practices. In Boston, a mix of strategies to discourage gun carrying in public places by juveniles, especially gang members and probationers, to increase community mobilization, and to help at-risk youth shows evidence of reduced levels of violent crime, especially homicides (Kennedy et al., 1996) and a 31% reduction of property offences between 1990 and 1996 (NCPC, 1999).

Also in England, experience has shown that closed circuit television (CCTV) is most effective when it forms part of a package of crime prevention measures. In 1993, the city of Newcastle
upon Tyne installed CCTV in its city centre to help address various crime and disorder problems, as well as traffic congestion and terrorism. Compared to the non-equivalent control area during the before and after period, areas where CCTV was installed showed a decrease of 19% in overall crime and a 57% reduction in burglaries (Brown, 1995).

Though neighbourhood watch and public education campaigns can be useful components, they should be viewed as elements of a broader strategy as opposed to overestimating their utility alone in reducing crime.

### A Special Note on Neighbourhood Watch and Public Education Campaigns

While Neighbourhood Watch remains a powerful tool for mobilizing populations to engage in crime prevention programs, its effects on reducing crime have not been demonstrated through scientific research. Various researchers (Bennett, 1990; Brown, 1992; Husain, 1990; Rosenbaum, 1987) have studied neighbourhood watch in various jurisdictions and reached the general conclusion that most evaluations of Neighbourhood Watch suffer from weak designs, poor conceptualization, an absence of valid and reliable measurements of program implementation and outcomes, and a failure to address competing explanations for observed effects.

While further research is required to determine whether Neighbourhood Watch, in whole or in part, has an effect in reducing crime it can be extremely useful to mobilize a population to engage in prevention activities that have been evaluated as effective. For instance, micro- or cocoon- Neighbourhood Watch has been proven to effectively reduce burglaries (see Kirkholt program discussed above). It builds upon the concept of Neighbourhood Watch, and stimulates the creation of a cocoon of approximately six dwellings and their residents to watch out for each others’ property. Cocoon watch is effective because the residents of six proximate dwellings can keep an eye on each others’ property more extensively and are more likely to know their immediate neighbours’ daily schedule than neighbours living 20 houses down the street might.

Public education campaigns can also be useful tools for mobilizing the public to participate in crime prevention programs. However, evaluations of such campaigns tend to have, similar to Neighbourhood Watch programs, weak evaluation designs that tend not to make the link between public education, attitudinal change, and behavioural change. Public education campaigns should, therefore, not be considered as a strategy on their own; such campaigns should be tied to programmatic responses using international crime prevention best practice.

### 4 - TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY

Knowledge of risk factors and actions that can reduce them show that risk factors are interrelated and that actions must be multi-faceted. This confirms that multiple partners must be mobilized in rigorous and concerted action. UN Commissions and international gatherings of local elected officials, police executives, judges, social development agencies, government experts and prevention organizations have developed a coherent set of guidelines for successful implementation of crime prevention actions. The ICPC’s Crime Prevention II has proposed the following graphic representation of these elements of a rigorous process.
Some countries are adopting strategic approaches to systematically tackle crime problems through supporting and strengthening this rigorous process. They are integrating the key elements for effective prevention into policy and operational practice at the national, regional and local levels. Perhaps the two strongest examples of nationally led, evidence-based community safety and crime reduction strategies involving action on residential burglary are those of England & Wales and The Netherlands.

**KEY ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL CRIME PREVENTION PROCESS**

- **Safety Diagnosis**
  - Challenges and risk factors
  - Resources

- **Action Plan**
  - Priorities
  - Targeted actions

- **Responsibility Centre**
  - Leadership
  - Mobilize resources
  - Reflect diversity

- **Evaluation and assessment**
  - Process
  - Results

- **Implementation**
  - Coordination
  - Criteria

- **The Policing and Reducing Crime Unit (PRCU) of the Home Office is an instrumental component supporting implementation of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (England and Wales).** The Act requires: the creation of local partnerships between key stakeholders such as police and other services (health, welfare, housing, etc.); completion of a local security audit using data from relevant stakeholder databases; public consultation on security audit findings and the objectives to be pursued; and implementation of actions. In addition, the Home Office announced an investment of £250 million ($600 million) over three years to implement an evidence-based crime reduction strategy. With respect to residential burglary, the government’s crime reduction programme involves the creation of the Property Crime Reduction Action Team. Among the measures, this Team will invest over £50 million over three years ($110 million) in around 500 high burglary neighbourhoods covering two million households. It is anticipated that this initiative will prevent at least 15,000 burglaries in 2001-2002 rising to 25,000 in the longer term.
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Since 1994, policy and practice on crime prevention has been a shared responsibility between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior (The Netherlands). Policy and action platforms based on wide-ranging partnerships have been established to address crime problems affecting the business sector and to reduce crime and violence with a special emphasis on youth. The success of various pilot projects has led to their replication as components of the national strategy. In the area of property crime and residential burglary reduction, the safe label and the city guard schemes have now been extended across the country based on positive evaluation results.

At the local level, a recent initiative undertaken in Cambridge (England) is well worth discussing at some length because of its broad ambit and strong research. The Domestic Burglary Task Force was established in 1994 as a multi-agency group from City Council, County Council, the police, the Probation Service, Victim Support and the University of Cambridge to examine the nature and extent of residential burglary and suggest and implement initiatives on a pilot basis to prevent it.

The general strategy was to collect information on the nature of the residential burglary problem before defining actions on how to respond to it. Information was collected through crime pattern analysis, offender address analysis, interviews with local burglers, environmental survey, repeat burglary victim survey and household survey. Following this analysis, brainstorming sessions involving all partners in the coalition led to identification of actions aimed at potential victims, capable guardians, and potential offenders. The measures delineated in the action focused on all three sets of risk factors identified in this report:

- **Potential victims:**
  - cocoon neighbourhood watch
  - loan alarm scheme (alarms loaned to recent victims for 8 weeks)
  - security advice for victims (fact sheets for victims on methods to reduce repeat burglary)
  - *KeepSafe* (security upgrading for specific categories of victims)
  - *GateSafe* (free installation but not purchase cost of gates across shared pathways and alleys)
  - security pack to residents (“*Beat the Burglar*” security advice pack mailed to residents in targeted wards)

- **Capable guardians:**
  - *Post Watch* (postal delivery workers look for suspicious activities and report them to police)
  - enhanced neighbourhood watch (improved training for neighbourhood watch co-ordinators)
  - community seminar (meeting for local residents to give advice)
  - community safety shop (local base for community beat officers in order to provide contact between police and the public)
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- community centre information link (local community centres provide an outlet for distributing security advice)
- targeted police patrols (use of patrol time to patrol targeted areas)

Potential offenders
- “After School” project
- school excludee
- mediation scheme
- youth development project

An evaluation comparing levels of reported residential burglary in the 12 month period before programme implementation and in the 12 month period during maximum program implementation shows that the level of reduction in the targeted wards is not markedly different to that of the comparison wards. Similarly, the reduction of repeat burglary was not different than was the case for the city as a whole and adjacent comparison wards.

Examining program implementation, the study shows mixed results. All victim-oriented measures and all but one (the community safety shop) capable guardian measures were implemented, whereas only one offender-oriented measure was actually implemented (the youth development project). Victim-oriented programs were implemented as planned but did not meet with strong community interest. Projects aimed at capable guardians were all strongly implemented but the level of guardianship given to the area as a whole was limited. Finally, the only project targeting potential offenders to have been implemented evidenced substantial progress in the young people involved but covered only a small proportion of young people living in the area. As the authors conclude “One interpretation of these findings is that it was the right medicine, but the wrong dosage” (Bennett & Durie, 1999: 41).

Overall, this initiative appears to be taking the right direction: integrated and concerted actions, dealing with a multiplicity of risk factors, based on a sound diagnosis of the situation. It revolved around a strong coalition of local partners, but may have been weak in leadership and capacity to engage citizens. It involved a strong diagnosis of the challenges and risk factors through multiple data sources. The action plan established priorities and proposed a balance of offender and victimization, short and longer term actions, but did not involve examination and use of model practices. Implementation was weak insofar as it did not involve training and more significantly as some measures, especially social development actions targeting offender-related risk factors, were not implemented. Failure to implement potential offender related programs - and to use more promising or proven measures - was related to lack of significant results, though the evaluation period may have been too short to adequately measure the impacts of this initiative and may have been contaminated by other, broader, social phenomena (reduced youth unemployment for example). Finally, evaluation and feedback were strong components, dealing with both process and impacts.

What is clear is that strategic action can be undertaken that will effectively reduce residential burglaries and increase public safety. In addition, many of these actions will also contribute to increased quality of life, lesser social and economic exclusion of youth, and more vibrant
communities. Obviously, the capacity to impact directly on levels of crime depends on larger, less immediately controllable socio-economic factors. For example, negative economic growth and a recession could increase levels of child and youth poverty, or new consumer goods could be marketed without proper consideration for their protection, thereby contributing to increasing the levels of residential burglaries.

Considering that residential burglary is such a high volume crime inflicting significant social and economic consequences, and given the quality of the evidence accumulated internationally on the capacity to act on risk factors and to obtain both short and long term gains in a highly cost-effective way, Canadian governments might consider adopting a highly visible national platform of action on residential burglary. A national platform would include an action plan to support and strengthen actions targeting risk factors in a multi-causal way. Key elements of an action plan might include the following elements:

**Implement Pilot Projects Tackling Risk Factors in Urban Areas Most Affected by Residential Burglary Involving the Following Elements:**

- a coalition with representation from all sectors and strong leadership
- a local diagnosis of the problem with specific data on residential burglaries, modus operandi of the burglars, environmental assessments, repeat victimization, risk factors and existing resources
- an action plan dealing with all three levels of risk factors including:
  - actions for potential victims (cocoon neighbourhood watch schemes, safety assessments, property marking, safety equipment for victims)
  - actions for guardians (problem-oriented policing with creation of residential burglary task forces where none exist, enhanced training for neighbourhood watch co-ordinators, enlisting co-operation from merchants and postal workers, special investigation task forces for known recidivist burglars)
  - actions for potential offenders (after school projects, youth development projects, mediation and restorative sanctions for first-time offenders, incentives for youth to complete school, youth employment support programs)

An integrated approach similar to the Cambridge experiment is well worth adapting to the Canadian context, taking into account two key lessons learned: (1) the amount of medicine must fit the level of problems faced and (2) all three levels of risk factors must be addressed equally, especially social development approaches targeting at-risk youths and first-time offenders.

**Strengthen Community Safety Audits Tools and Methods**

Rigorous action capable of targeting risk factors locally must rest on a strong community safety audit. Audits or diagnoses of the situation are rarely conducted in Canada and when they are they use limited tools and are rarely comparable.
Provide Access to Effective Processes and Actions Across Canada

Effective impacts on residential burglary will only be achieved if the knowledge and tools developed in Canada and elsewhere are made available and their use supported.

Develop Training Courses for Prevention Co-ordinators Based on the Experience of the Pilot Projects and Promising Action Elsewhere

In order to be effectively implemented, good practice and knowledge must be accompanied by training courses.

Support a Problem-Oriented Policing Approach

Problem-oriented policing is an important element of a strategy to effectively tackle residential B&E. Among others, it will be central to a rigorous and precise diagnosis of the problem, and to the development of a system to track repeat offenders and repeat victims.

Consider a Safety Certification Program for Public Housing and Other Federally Supported Housing Development Programs

Experience in the Netherlands shows that safety certification when rigorously implemented, can contribute to reducing the level of residential burglaries. Relevant government agencies and private organizations might consider developing guidelines for safety certification. Such guidelines could be accompanied by incentives (e.g., insurance premium reductions). They should be rigorously evaluated.

Strengthen Analysis Tools

Analysis tools are essential to understand and take into account crime and risk factor trends, in particular to enable the analysis and the development of strategies to respond to repeat victimization.
ENDNOTES

1. The following definitions will be used to distinguish between the two central concepts discussed in this paper:

- **Break and enter (B&E):** to break any part, internal or external, used to close or cover an internal or external opening and illegally enter public or private places. Offences against residential premises typically occur when the residents are not at home, and offender objectives include the theft of property and/or vandalism.

- **Home Invasions:** a residential B&E combined with the offence of robbery, that is, the theft of property via the threat and/or use of violence (at any time during the commission of the offence) or the use of an offensive weapon or an imitation weapon. Such offences against residential premises occur when the residents are at home, and offender objectives include the theft of property, money, and/or illicit drugs.

2. The data on home invasions is derived from the Revised UCR Survey, which allows for examination of more detailed characteristics of crime than does the regular UCR Survey. Data from the former provide a non-representative sample (i.e., they are not representative of the country as a whole) that is mostly drawn from urban areas and accounts for 47% of the national volume of crime.

3. Residential robbery, which is perhaps the most proximate offence category to home invasions, is presented, but this category may not entirely capture the extent of home invasion problems. These are preliminary estimates of the extent of home invasion problems based on data collected by, respectively: the Australian Bureau of Statistics; the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics; and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

Readers should also note that the Canadian data presented for residential robbery is derived, not from the nationwide UCR survey, but rather from the more detailed Uniform Crime Report 2 (or UCR2) survey data. UCR2 data provide a non-representative sample (i.e., data are not representative of Canada) of 179 police departments that represents 48% of the national volume of crime. More detailed statistical investigation would be required to determine the comparative extent of home invasion problems.

4. Unless otherwise indicated, all costs are reported in Canadian dollars.
## ANNEX 1
BEST PRACTICES TO CONSULT ON ICPC’S INTERNET SITE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPECIFIC PRACTICES</th>
<th>Health Sector:</th>
<th>Social Services:</th>
<th>Police (tackling break and enter):</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Hawaii Healthy Start</td>
<td>Perry</td>
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<td>Job Corps</td>
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<td>Police (holding offenders accountable):</td>
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<td>Dutch Robbery Prevention</td>
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<td>Facilitators</td>
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### MISCELLANEOUS

**Situational Preventive Measures**

Include:

1. Lock doors and windows.
2. Light the outside of the house and trim shrubs.
3. Install good dead-bolt locks, window gates and an alarm system.
4. Ask a neighbour to keep an eye on things.
5. Make the house appear occupied. Use timers, and when on vacation, stop deliveries and arrange to have circulars collected, the lawn mowed and garbage put out.
6. Etch identifying numbers on valuables, and move them out of the bedroom, which is the first place a B&E usually looks.
7. Never open your door to a stranger, use a peephole before opening with a door chain.

**Reducing the risk of Assault or Robbery:**

1. Follow your instincts, if a situation doesn’t feel right call for help or get other people around.
2. Keep doors locked when at home, particularly when alone.
3. Practice being conscious of neighbours who are in close proximity and where you can go in the event of an emergency.

**Victims and Witnesses should**

1. Get a good description of the offender(s) - physical appearance and behaviour, distinguishing characteristics (e.g., tattoos, hair style), clothing, manner of speech, types of vehicles involved.
2. Call police emergency number immediately to report the crime(s).
3. For crime that occurs in your home or neighbourhood, notify your neighbour and/or the landlord so that they may take extra precautions.
4. Make use of services available to assist crime victims, their families, and crime witnesses.
REFERENCES


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