National Prevention Strategies for Youth Violence.
An International Comparative Study.

June 2017

Study by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)

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Keywords: Prevention, violence, youth, public policies, national strategies, coordination

This publication was made possible thanks to the financial support of Public safety Canada.

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**ABBREVIATIONS**

CCJS: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

CDC: Centre for Disease Control and Prevention

CESDIP: Center for social research on criminal law and institutions (Centre de recherche sociologique sur le droit et les institutions pénales)

CIPDR: Inter-ministries committee for the prevention of crime and radicalization (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance et de la radicalisation)

CIV: Interministerial committee on cities (Comité interministériel des villes)

CJCP: Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention

CLS: Local security contract (Contrat local de sécurité)

CLSPD: Local security and youth crime prevention council (Conseil local de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance)

COPL: Orientation council on youth policies (Conseil d’orientation des politiques de jeunesse)

COPS-Office: Office of community oriented policing services (Office chargé des services de police de proximité)

CPF: Community Policy Forum

DDR: Disarmament, demobilizaton, and reintegration (Desarme, desmovilizacion y reintegracion)

DOI: Department of Justice

DOP: Department of Probation

DVP: Division of Violence Prevention

ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council

FCGC: Family Community Group Conferencing

FISCA: Fund for antidrug strategy community initiatives (Fonds des initiatives communautaires de la Stratégie antidrogue)

FLAGJ: Fund for activities to combat youth gangs (Fonds de lutte contre les activités des gangs de jeunes)

FNPVJ: National forum on youth violence prevention (Forum national sur la prévention de la violence chez les jeunes)

ICBF: Colombian insitute for family well-being (Instituto colombiano de bienestar familiar)

ICPC: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime

IDB: Interamerican Development Bank

IDP: Integrated Development Plan
IJJ: Youth Justice Initiative
INHSJ: National institute for higher studies on security and justice (Institut National des Hautes Études de la Sécurité et de la Justice)
INSEE: National Institute on Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques)
IWGYP: Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs
JCPS cluster: Justice, Crime Prevention and Security cluster
JJDPA: Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
JJRP: Juvenile Justice Reform Project
JOY project: Justice for Our Youth project
KfK: Competence center for crime prevention (Kompetansesenter for kriminalitetsforebygging)
KRÅD: National crime prevention council (Kriminalitetsforebyggende Rad)
LOV: Orientation law on cities (Loi d’orientation pour la ville)
LSJPA: Law on the youth criminal justice system (Loi sur le système de justice pénale pour les adolescents)
NCCS: National Crime Combatting Strategy
NCE: National Centers of Excellence in Youth Violence Prevention
NCJRS: National Criminal Justice Reference Service
NCPC: National Child Protection Committee
NCPS: National Crime Prevention Strategy
NIMSS: National Injury Mortality Surveillance System
NDP: National Development Plan
NEISS-AIP: National Electronic Injury Surveillance System-All Injury Program
NSO: National Statistics Office
NVDRS: National Violent Death Reporting System
NYDA: National Youth Development Agency
NYP: National Youth Policy
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJJDP: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
OSCC: One Stop Crisis Centres
PND: National development plan (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo)
PNDES: National plan for social and economic development (Plan national de développement économique et social)
SAG: State Advisory Group
SAPS: Social Crime Prevention Unit
SLT: Harmonization of local crime prevention initiatives (Samordning Lokale kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltag)
SNA: Antidrug national strategy (Stratégie nationale antidrogue)
SNPC: National crime prevention strategy (Stratégie nationale pour la prévention du crime)
PS: Public Safety Canada
SRPA: Youth offenders responsibility system (Sistema de responsabilidad penal de adolescentes)
SSP: School Social Police
STRYVE: Striving to Reduce Youth Violence Everywhere
STSPD: Territorial strategy for security and crime prevention (Stratégie territoriale de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance)
Task Force: The Community Preventive Services Task Force
UN: United Nations
UNITY: Urban Networks to Increase Thriving Youth
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
WHO: World Health Organisation
ZEP: Priority education zone (Zone d’Éducation Prioritaire)
In recent years, the prevention of crime and violence has become more complex due to the evolution of criminality. This is due to the fact that we are seeing an unprecedented number of different actors involved, working together in different scales and contexts. The issue of complexity is seen in various domains, from public policy to the relationships these multitude of players establish in the context of public policy.

To begin with, the issue of security is no longer the exclusive responsibility of the police or the government. Rather, it is a phenomenon that encompasses multiple bodies in addition to these two, such as: civil society, communities, and the private sector, among others. Notions, such as the co-construction of security and participation in it, or security and nodal governance are starting to be developed with the goal being a representative model, along with understanding the complex relationships among these various actors (Shearing, 2005).

Moreover, all the acting bodies, now involved in security, have working relationships with multiple levels of government (local, regional, national and international), resulting in the need of effective communication between them. For example: How can we find a balance between the local needs of a community, and the national strategy of a country? What role should each level of government actively play in the prevention of criminality? The importance of the last question becomes heightened when considering a country like Canada that has three governmental levels (local, provincial, and federal), or four if taking into consideration the territories.

Additionally, the prevention of violence and crime it is not the product of one national strategy, or an approach developed by one single minister. Rather, it is the working result of multiple bodies of government coming together. Various ministers (such as Justice, Interior, Education, Health, etc.) take charge of a part of the strategy, or, in multiple cases, initiate preventative actions in an autonomous or concerted manner. Over the years, proper coherence and integration of such strategies have become fundamental for the success in preventative measures.

Finally, with regards to public policy in the prevention of crime and violence, the relationships and articulation between strategies of prevention and the criminal justice system has often been neglected. This is due to the fact that these two systems are still generally seen in opposition to one another, with conflicting purposes and ideologies. However, in order to achieve a comprehensive national strategy, it is crucial to integrate aspects that include prevention of criminal acts, along with alternatives to punishments of such acts, and protection for victims, which is rarely the case.

Taken all together, these four dimensions and the complexity of integration of prevention result in a multidimensional system that proves extremely difficult to implement. Specialists often put forward notions of coordination, collaboration and integration as being one of the main challenges internationally, with regards to security. The main idea is that better interconnectivity between the relevant parties, a better sharing of knowledge, along with better coordination and integration of actions will have a positive impact on the fight against crime and the prevention of violence. In as much, the lack of coordination is often cited as one of the factors explaining the failure of programmes and strategies. A recent comparative study by the ICPC in eight Latin American countries highlighted that the lack of coordination among national strategy and local strategy have become a major obstacle in the betterment of programmes aimed to prevent criminality (Hernandez,
In another recent study, Rios (2015) also showed that the increase in crimes related to drugs was related to the lack of coordination between the federal government of Mexico and local governments. In cases like the latter, the main cause often lies in a problematic vertical coordination between national and local scales of government. However, there also exists a horizontal problem in coordination across different governmental bodies. For example, Moreno (2014) believes that coordination problems within the Mexican federal government explains the difficulty in dealing with organized crime within the country.

These key issues brought the ICPC to look at coordination problems from a comparative perspective, taking into consideration the various contexts as well as the various dimensions of the relationships between all involved stakeholders. The objective then becomes to identify how proper coordination, as well as qualitative dimensions of this coordination (collaboration, leadership, and participation), and information management are ensured in the process of implementing prevention policies. Our focus is on the national strategies in the prevention of violence with regards to youth. This choice is due to the fact that violence is a category that can be compared between various countries, and youth are often the target of these policies. This study maps the different national strategies related to youth violence prevention in six countries: South Africa, Colombia, the United-States, France, and Norway. These countries were chosen primarily because of their different levels of economic development, keeping in mind that this factor can lead to significant differences in the constitution of stakeholders systems. As such, we chose four countries with high income, and two with mid-level income.

With regard to the restitution of the comparison, one term that will be frequently used is “interface”. When notions such as coordination, collaboration, and integration are considered, it becomes clear that the focus should be on the relationships that actors establish between each other, rather than on the actors themselves. Therefore, the crux of this analysis will be on what allows these relationships to occur, allowing instances of coordination, points of convergence, etc. An interface, is thus, any point of interaction between several remote positions which make it possible to facilitate a common place of sharing and an equitable translation of points of view, as well as to facilitate the flow of actions and communications.

Finally, this report is divided into four parts. The first part has three objectives: a) a literature review with regards to youth and violence; b) to describe the comparison devices and c) to describe the methodology used. The second part is concerned with the monographic descriptions of strategies in the prevention of violence within each country. The third part will discuss the comparisons of these strategies with relation to the notion of interface and comparison devices. The fourth section with present the conclusion of the study, along with our recommendations.
Chapter 1.

The Conceptual and Methodological Approach

This chapter will focus on three main objectives:

1. Theorizing the notion of youth violence. This entails explaining the conceptual definitions used in this comparative study, discussing the principal issues associated with youth violence and the factors explaining its emergence, and providing a general overview of violence prevention strategies.

2. Describing the framework for comparison, which entails explaining why certain dimensions were selected for comparison purposes, as well as describing said dimensions in detail.

3. Describing the methodology, i.e., outlining the procedures followed to conduct this comparative study.

1. What do we mean by “youth violence”?

1.1 The starting point: defining our terms

1.1.1 Definitions of “youth”

In 1985, on the occasion of International Youth Year, the United Nations adopted a unified definition of the term youth, which includes all persons between the ages of 15 and 24. The UN applies this definition in all of its programming and statistical tools, with the exception of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines children as being under 18 years of age and adults as over 18.

In the context of this study and its comparative method, definitions of youth vary widely in accordance with the different national contexts and institutional frameworks surveyed. Thus, the strategies we examined either target more or less restrictive age brackets (e.g., children, early adolescents, young adults), or, alternatively, operate under a very inclusive framework, such as youth policies that encompass young people between the ages of 12 and 35. In this light, we opted to adapt our research to each country’s specific norms, and to each strategy studied, rather than apply a single definition based on international standards.

1.1.2 Definitions of youth violence

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines violence as “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (WHO, 2002). More specifically, the WHO identifies three categories of violence: violence against oneself, interpersonal violence and collective violence. In this study, we chose to focus on how the survey countries address the second dimension: interpersonal violence. These are not, however, wholly separate categories and often coincide in the course of a given person’s life (WHO, 2015).
Whatever the type of violence, youth have a higher risk than other age groups of exposure to it, either as victims, perpetrators, or indeed, very often both. Moreover, the main victims of young perpetrators of violence are also young themselves (European Economic and Social Committee, 2006; Shaw, 2001; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs; WHO, 2002). Finally, although acts of violence revolve around the perpetrator-victim duo, they also involve a much broader system of actors, including persons who allow violence to occur or suffer its consequences (WHO, 2002).

1.2 Recurring issues in youth violence

There are four recurring issues in youth violence related phenomena: 1) youth gangs and urban violence, 2) gendered and sexual violence, 3) school violence and 4) antisocial behaviour.

The phenomenon of urban youth gangs is extremely present in political discourse, the media and in public opinion as a cause for concern. As such, it also constitutes a major concern of governments and international organizations. Worldwide, youth gangs have millions of members, most of whom are young men. Moreover, youth gangs are responsible for the majority of acts of urban violence and criminal offences (Hagedorn, 2005). That said, they vary widely in terms of the composition of their membership, their internal dynamics, characteristics and activities (Shaw, 2007). In addition, the very definition of what constitutes a youth gang differs depending on the country, institution and experts consulted. In practice, there are vast differences in the levels of violence and criminality between informal groups of youths, which coalesce around issues of identity, and the extremely organized and active criminal structures at the other end of the spectrum (CIPC, 2016).

Gender is an essential component of violence, particularly among youth (Gallopin & Leigh, 2009; Johnson et al., 2005), in both developed countries and developing countries. Thus, young men constitute 83% of homicide victims in the 10-29 age bracket (WHO, 2017). Although acts of violence mainly affect young men, issues related to sexual violence are nevertheless very important and involve, in the vast majority of cases, female victims and male perpetrators (WHO, 2016).
Violence exercised during social encounters or in a dating context is another emerging concern at the international level. This type of violence is defined as follows:

“Adolescent dating violence is defined as physical, sexual, or psychological violence within an adolescent dating relationship, which manifests as, but is not limited to, threatening partners with physical harm; humiliation; controlling behaviors; or threatening to reveal sexual activity, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the victim to others.” (Vanderleest & Urquides, 2010).

Although cases of this type of violence may involve either men or women perpetrators, the victims are often girls. Moreover, violence rates in homosexual relationships are similar to those in heterosexual relationships (Halpern, Oslak, Young, Martin, & Kupper, 2001; Halpern, Young, Waller, Martin, & Kupper, 2004).

School violence is another growing concern worldwide (OMS, 2002). Over one third of children worldwide are regularly victims of acts of violence or bullying. Moreover, a like proportion of European and North American youths report that they themselves have participated in this type of violence (UNICEF, 2016). Although generally not criminal in nature, school violence has a profound impact on school attendance, thereby threatening the chances for success of those so affected and increasing their risks of later developing violent and criminal behaviour. Consequently, schools represent strategic sites for youth violence prevention. Although schools are the scene of violence and abuse, they also constitute powerful instruments for prevention, which facilitate outreach to very large numbers of children and youth and, thereby, to the entire community (Burton & Leoschut, 2013; Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Violence against Children, 2012).

Antisocial behaviour is a problem particularly associated with adolescence and affects far more people than criminal activities and violence. That said, antisocial behaviour is related to risk factors such as associating with delinquent peer groups, poor relations with parents, a poor school environment, drug and alcohol use, personal problems, victimization, the neighbourhood environment and social affinity groups (Hayward & Sharp, 2005). Disruptive and antisocial behaviour is closely connected with youth violence problems. The early detection of such behaviour may therefore prevent the subsequent development of criminal behaviour (WHO, 2014).

1.3 Risk factors related to youth violence

A broad consensus exists in relation to the various types of youth violence risk factors, from macrosystemic dynamics to an individual’s psychological development, all of which may contribute to creating disadvantaged conditions and greater risk.

According to the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC, 2008), several types of factors bear on violent and criminal behaviour: the macro-environmental factors (economic conditions, poverty and inequality levels, the institutional framework, the political environment, the historical and cultural context, the media, gender equality, social exclusion); the micro-environmental factors (community, family, peer groups, role models, level of education, living environment) and individual factors (psychological characteristics, cognitive abilities, behaviour models, social environment learning). This classification is based on Bronfenbrenner’s ecological model (2009) for addressing youth violence issues (see the diagram below).
Macro-environmental factors concern the systemic structures of exclusion, which result in the marginalization of the most vulnerable groups from economic growth and the labour market, positive social and cultural role models, public spaces, academic success, etc. These dynamics expose youth in particular to the risk of developing violent and anti-social behaviours or becoming victims themselves (Shaw, 2007). In addition to these social, economic and cultural factors, the WHO adduces institutional factors such as weak governance, ineffective legislation and lack of access to the legal system (WHO, 2014).

Micro-environmental factors concern the local community environment and a young person’s immediate entourage; these factors directly influence the risks of exposure to violence (Sheidow, Gorman-Smith, Tolan, & Henry, 2001). Public policies focus in particular on these factors in order to identify the most at risk populations (Wilson & Petersilia, 2011).

Individual factors concern specific challenges which can only be detected and addressed on a case by case basis. These factors are generally considered in broad terms in the context of public policy on child and adolescent development and mental health (Farrington & Welsh, 2007).

There are other possible approaches to risk factors, including the ones below, proposed by the ICPC (Shaw, 2001):

- **Family risk factors**: harsh or erratic parenting skills, poor parental supervision, low family income, poverty, isolation, family violence, abuse and neglect and parental conflict.
- **Individual risk factors**: early aggressive and impulsive behaviour, spending a lot of time with delinquent or violent peer groups.
- **School-related risk factors**: low achievement, disruptive behaviour, bullying, lack of commitment to school, truancy, school exclusion, dropping out.
- **Community risk factors**: poor housing and neighbourhood conditions, a disorganized neighbourhood, little sense of community, high turnover among residents, lack of facilities and services for youth and a lack of job opportunities.
These factors act synergistically and are often interdependent. As a consequence, many strategies and practices endeavour to reduce risk by acting on all of them simultaneously. The goal of prevention, and in particular of youth violence prevention, is to strengthen resilience by influencing moderating or protective factors, which encourage non-violent development among youth (Palmary & Moat, 2002). The WHO has identified several protective factors at the macro, micro and individual levels: early cognitive development, low impulsivity levels, sociability, close relationships with parents, good parental supervision, membership in the middle class, good relations with the school environment, absence of deviant peers, and non-violent neighbourhood environments conducive to social diversity (WHO, 2015).

1.4 Youth violence prevention strategies

Youth violence prevention emerged as an issue in the 1980s, at a time when youth suicide, homicide and violence rates had increased sharply in many countries, particularly the United States. Youth violence has largely been regarded as a public health problem, requiring an integrative prevention strategy (L. Dahlberg & Mercy, 2009). This perspective was spearheaded in the international community and the UN. Thus, the 1990 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, for example, counsels a comprehensive child-centred approach, as well as community programs and services. This philosophy of prevention also promotes comprehensive protection for families and children, thanks notably to the UN’s 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.

By definition, prevention entails addressing multiple factors and therefore rarely concentrates on a single strategy. Instead, prevention constitutes a cross-cutting element present in a wide variety of public policies, strategies and practices. Young people are the main targets of these types of preventive approaches. In 2009, an ICPC study identified 57 countries which had developed national crime prevention strategies. The same study also identified 216 actions plans, fragmented around 25 policy areas, 18 of which were specifically youth oriented (ICPC, 2012).

According to the WHO, there are four steps in the elaboration of youth violence prevention strategies:

“Step one is to define the magnitude, scope, characteristics and consequences of such violence through the systematic collection of information. Step two is to identify and research the risk and protective factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of youth violence, including those that can be modified through interventions. Step three is to determine what works in preventing youth violence by developing and evaluating interventions tailored to the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the groups in which they are to be implemented. Step four is to implement effective and promising interventions in a wide range of settings and, through ongoing monitoring of their effects on the risk factors and the target problem, to evaluate their impact and cost-effectiveness” (WHO, 2015, p. 61).

The various categories of crime and violence prevention strategies may be summarized as follows: primary strategies aim at reducing vulnerability factors in relation to violence and violent behaviours; secondary strategies target young persons particularly at risk, following observation of early warning signs of violence; and tertiary strategies where intervention occurs following the commission of serious acts of violence (Wolfe and Jaffe, 1999). Youth violence prevention focuses mainly on prevention during childhood and adolescence, with at risk populations targeted to reduce potential behaviour issues. Strategies aimed at adults favour secondary and tertiary types of prevention (L. L. Dahlberg & Butchart, 2005).
Consequently, youth violence prevention strategies and action plans must 1) be intersectoral, 2) involve a broad range of actors from government, public institutions and civil society and 3) propose a specific plan to guide collaboration and coordination among all sectors and actors (WHO, 2015).

**Figure 3. Principal types of youth violence prevention strategies (Shaw, 2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preventive measures</th>
<th>Risk factor reduction results sought</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Parenting skills programs</td>
<td>Improved parental supervision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family support</td>
<td>Fewer family conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school education</td>
<td>Fewer school problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster parent training and supervision</td>
<td>Improved academic skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved family and youth relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>School organizational change</td>
<td>Improved school climate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive anti-bullying measures</td>
<td>Reduction in school bullying behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassment, sexism, racism and anti-drugs education</td>
<td>Reduction in truancy and disruptive behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation/conflict resolution training</td>
<td>Increased involvement of users (students, families, teachers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-school ties</td>
<td>Reduction in antisocial behaviour and drug use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved conflict resolution skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improved parental and school support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth groups and centres, sports and recreation activities</td>
<td>Reduction in risky behaviours, strengthened skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer holiday programs</td>
<td>Reduction in anti-social behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth outreach workers</td>
<td>Support for at risk youth</td>
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<td>Youth advocacy groups</td>
<td>Reduction in local disorder and delinquency</td>
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<td>Early adolescence and peer groups</td>
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<td>Mentoring and education for at risk youth</td>
<td>Improved general abilities to develop and function in school and after school</td>
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<td>Drug education projects</td>
<td>Reduced drug use</td>
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<td>After-school programs, homework clubs</td>
<td>Increased school attendance</td>
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<td>Prevention of involvement in street gangs</td>
<td>Reduced risks of recruitment by gangs, delinquency or victimization</td>
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<td>Adolescence</td>
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<td>Incentives to stay in school</td>
<td>Reduced drop out and youth unemployment rates</td>
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<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>Improved skills and qualifications</td>
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<td>Teen parent programs</td>
<td>Improved parenting skills</td>
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<td>Peer support programs</td>
<td>Reduced isolation and homelessness</td>
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<td>Youth foyers and housing programs</td>
<td>Reduced risk of impoverishment, homelessness, delinquency and victimization</td>
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<td>Projects to support and accompany young people leaving care or custody</td>
<td>Reduced risk of reoffending</td>
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However, countries are tending to move away from the international consensus on prevention in favour of a conception of youth violence as a crime problem. Part of this shift, particularly during the
last ten to fifteen years, is due to the perception of politicians and decision-makers that public opinion is generally favourable to a tough line on young offenders and at risk youth (ICPC, 2010; Shaw, 2007).

As the ICPC observed in its 2008 International Report:

“The responses that have been developed to deal with youth crime and victimisation are a good example of the disparities that have emerged between international standards and norms and national action. International authorities stress the importance of intervening in young people’s environment in order to help youth develop and thrive through an active, participative, educational and healthy process. On the other hand, many national authorities have developed punitive approaches that criminalise youth and often their parents too.” (ICPC, 2008, p. 78)

Despite this change towards more repressive and punitive attitudes, the social prevention of violence remains an important component of most countries’ strategies and includes, notably, social development, public health and educational strategies targeting at risk communities. Consequently, any examination of youth violence prevention strategies necessarily entails considering all aspects of public policy addressing these issues.

2. The key conceptual dimensions in comparisons

In 2015, the United Nations Secretariat identified five key dimensions for the effective implementation of crime prevention policies (United Nations Secretariat, 2015):

1. As crime prevention is a very broad concept, it should be based on a collaborative and integrated approach that includes all stakeholders;
2. Crime prevention strategies should be based on relevant information;
3. These strategies must address the broad range of risk factors, in particular by drawing on synergies found in the prevention strategies designed for different types of violence;
4. It’s important to ensure coordination among all actors;
5. Prevention must be widely integrated into reforms of the justice system.

Based on these recommendations, the ICPC decided to examine the different ways prevention issues were integrated in national strategies. We chose, in effect, to base our international comparative analysis on these key dimensions. The conceptual framework of our comparison study is structured around the following concepts: coordination mechanisms; the qualitative dimensions of coordination (i.e., participation, leadership and collaboration); and information management and circulation. In addition, we added a cross-cutting dimension: the strategic approaches to youth violence prevention.

2.1 Strategic approaches to youth violence prevention

The first comparison matrix proposes an analysis of the historical and structural conditions which framed the development of the strategies surveyed. It examines the overall framework upon which each country developed a strategy specific to its respective context, as well as the principles guiding its strategy and the ultimate goals envisaged. This structural framework enables us to better understand the context underlying each of the specific dimensions compared in this study (coordination, the qualitative dimensions of coordination and information management).
This framework encompasses several different aspects: the paradigms governing public policy, as well as the mentalities of both governments and the governed; each survey country’s specific historical, sociocultural and economic context; the place occupied by youth and violence in the public imagination and political discourse; the specific issues or events which made youth crime salient and triggered the political decision to act. All are fundamental elements in the development of public policies. That said, we opted to focus our analysis on three main areas:

a) Approaches and paradigms in the strategic frameworks governing youth violence prevention;

b) The extent to which the different components addressing youth violence prevention are integrated; and

c) Political consensus and institutional resilience.

The conceptual approach utilized for this aspect of the study was based on the Critical Frame Analysis methodology, which is defined as follows:

“Frame analysis starts from the assumption of multiple interpretations in policy-making and seeks to address such implicit or explicit interpretations. (...) At a theoretical level, the key concept of critical frame analysis is that of a ‘policy frame.’ A frame usually is described as an interpretation scheme that structures the meaning of reality. (...) This conceptual schema is not to be understood as intentional in the subject’s way of representing reality. (...) Policy frames originate in discursive consciousness, to the extent that actors using them can explain discursively why they are using them and what they mean to them, but they also originate in the practical consciousness, to the extent that they originate in routines and rules that commonly are applied in certain contexts without an awareness that these are indeed rules or routines, and that they could have been different. Discursive or practical, either way policy frames have concrete and material consequences that set the conditions for future actions and realities.” (Verloo & Lombardo, 2007, p. 31-32)

In effect, we envisage this first section as a metastructural analysis (Di Meo, 1998), i.e., an analysis of the ideological conditions, collective representations, discourses, practices and paradigms, which affect how issues are constructed and how the responses thereto are understood.

2.2 Coordination

The effectiveness of public policy depends on efficient coordination of the actors at different levels of government. When analyzing the complexity of the systems of actors involved in coordination processes, two conceptual approaches are quite useful: 1) analysis based on levels of government and 2) nodal governance.

Nodal governance proposes an approach where systems of coordination are seen as structured around systems of actors and their interactions. This approach enables the mapping of all stakeholders involved in the implementation of a public policy (Burris, Drahos, & Shearing, 2005; Holley & Shearing, 2017). A nodal perspective helps us to avoid examining coordination solely from the perspective of institutional mechanisms, as it also, indeed especially, focuses on the interconnected systems and networks which contribute, in different spheres and at different levels, to the tangible effectiveness of youth violence prevention strategies.
Analysis in terms of **territorial levels** is another approach to studying public policies which takes account of systemic factors and complexity. In effect, major strategies and public policies are implemented in multiple territorial systems, which contributes to the co-construction of public action. In that light, this approach examines how the different levels of governance and government each play a role in the implementation of major strategies (Di Meo, 1995). In effect, coordination mechanisms and systems must not only be efficiently integrated within the systemic dynamics specific to different territorial levels and entities, but it's crucial that they also ensure linkages and overall coherence between these systems.

From a more operational perspective, the literature identifies several **key factors** for the effective coordination and implementation of crime prevention strategies (Tilley, 2013; ONUDC, 2010):

- A clear mission and consensus on expected results;
- Strong leadership from the government in relation to the competent ministries and agencies;
- Partnerships involving a wide range of actors (government, public institutions, local authorities, civil society, communities, the private sector);
- A high level of involvement and commitment on the part of all actors;
- Clear allocation of responsibilities at all levels;
- Clear lines of communication; and
- A management approach that is focused on issue resolution.

The research question which we propose to answer in relation to coordination is: **How are coordination mechanisms organized in relation to the different systems of actors and the different territorial jurisdictions responsible for implementing youth violence prevention related strategies and policies?**

To this end, we have identified two areas for analysis: the coordination mechanisms and the institutional governance models.

### 2.2.1 Coordination mechanisms

We identified two types of coordination mechanisms: vertical coordination mechanisms and horizontal coordination mechanisms.

*Vertical coordination mechanisms*

Vertical coordination mechanisms define the roles and responsibilities of each level of government in the implementation of a public policy. They also define the nature of the coordination between different levels of government. For the purposes of our study, we focused on comparing two main dimensions in assessing vertical coordination: 1) the degree of independence and autonomy of lower levels of government in relation to the level of government that defines strategy; and 2) the importance of lower levels (generally regional and local) in the implementation of policies.

*Horizontal coordination mechanisms*

After determining the responsibilities and degree of autonomy of each implementation level, our research turned its focus to examining the horizontal coordination mechanisms. The latter concern
how, within each level of government, the different actors, institutions and elements of public policies function in relation to each other. Thus, horizontal coordination mechanisms include the linkages (or the absence thereof) between different public policies. They also encompass the interrelations of all actors at a given level of government who are concerned, in one way or another, by the implementation of a given policy. Finally, they include the coordination procedures and mechanisms between institutions. In our study, the two levels presenting the most complex systems and the most pertinent issues were the national level (i.e., the coordination systems where strategies and policies are elaborated) and the local level (where all policies actually take shape in a given territory).

2.2.2 Decentralization, deconcentration and centralism: three models of institutional governance

As for the process of applying a national strategy or a public policy, a political system’s specific organizational model and functioning will shape how any given strategy or policy is implemented. Thus, the same type of public policy will take two totally different forms depending on whether it’s implemented in a centralized system, such as France for example, or a decentralized one, such as Canada’s.

In general terms, we identify three main models of institutional and political organization: centralism, deconcentration and decentralization. Please note that these are theoretical ideal types. In practice, while each country is mainly influenced by one of these models in terms of its general structure, it will also often include aspects of other models within its institutions.

A centralized State is characterized by the concentration of all aspects of public policy under the jurisdiction of central bodies (ministries and government departments, national agencies answering to the central government, national institutions), which are either governmental or agencies under direct governmental control. This concentration takes several different forms, chiefly, the concentration of roles and responsibilities in relation to implementing public policies and the concentration of decision-making powers. This model also manifests in geographical terms: the State’s bodies are generally concentrated in the capital, while regional/local administrations are charged with ensuring the implementation of public policies on the ground.

Deconcentration is characterized by the delegation of several implementation-related powers and responsibilities to non-centralized institutions, usually based in territorial jurisdictions. There are two important aspects to this delegation of powers and responsibilities: 1) it concerns responsibility for executing policies and operational roles, which, however, is unaccompanied by any decision-making authority; and 2) it implies that all public actions are executed within the framework of public policies developed at the central level, which delegates deconcentrated implementation responsibilities and powers to the lower levels of government.

Finally, decentralization constitutes a fundamentally different approach, which attributes to the different levels of government their own specific jurisdictions, responsibilities and decision-making authority. In decentralized systems, national policies and strategies define general guidelines for public policy and the chief roles of central institutions are to provide technical and funding support, as well as ensure oversight. The local levels and municipalities represent a crucial level of governance and government, which assumes most of the responsibility for developing and implementing specific
policies, within the framework of national guidelines of course, but which are first and foremost designed and implemented in accordance with a given area’s specific conditions.

2.3 Participation, collaboration, leadership: qualitative dimensions of coordination systems

If one considers coordination from a systemic perspective, then coordination mechanisms and institutions constitute elements of a coordination system’s structure. The second dimension of coordination systems, however, resides in the interrelations between actors and is first and foremost qualitative in character. In this study, we have chosen to examine three important qualities of coordination systems: participation (who is included, to what extent and when?), collaboration (what is the extent of cooperation between actors?) and leadership, i.e., which actor(s) provide(s) the impetus within these systems?

2.3.1 Participation

The Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines\(^1\) underlines the importance of all actors working in an integrated fashion:

“Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. This includes partnerships working across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens.” (UNODC, 2010, p. 22).

To this end, it’s important to be able to integrate the participation of the relevant actors and stakeholders at every stage of the development and implementation of public policies:

“Communities, in particular, should play an important part in identifying crime prevention priorities, in implementation and evaluation, and in helping to identify a sustainable resource base.” (ECOSOC, 2002).

Today, it is widely acknowledged that participation is an important factor in crime and violence prevention programs, as well as an effective means for reaffirming community limits and deepening democracy (van Steden, van Caem, & Boutellier, 2011). This also contributes to creating stronger and more self-reliant communities (Checkoway, 2011), which have proven more resilient in the face of crime and violence (Crawford, 1995).

The UNODC has identified several categories of actors involved in youth violence prevention: the international community, national and local governments, the police, legal professionals and other professionals, universities, schools, NGOs and local communities (UNODC, 2008). Of course, young people themselves are actors too, in particular those at risk, as they are the primary beneficiaries of prevention programs and strategies.

Participatory approaches vary widely in accordance with specific forms and structures, which greatly influence their results. For the purposes of this study, we considered several different variables to assess levels of participation:

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1 Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines: Making Them Work
- **Who is included? Who is excluded?** It’s essential to identify the stakeholders and select participants to ensure effective participation. Different tools for ensuring participation may be required for different types of actors.

- **What is the extent of participation?** There is a broad range of participatory approaches from simple consultation to complete co-conception of policy and participatory decision-making.

- **At what stage is participation integrated into the process?** Every action, whether public, private or community led, follows a similar pattern. Public policy actions, including publicly funded ones, generally consist of the following stages: problem identification, solution design, implementation and evaluation. Participation is often a key success factor in several of these phases; it is, however, less important in others.

2.3.2 Collaboration

When two actors, whether they be individual or collective, institutional, private or from civil society or the national or local levels, are called on to coordinate their actions around a shared field of action, they develop a relationship, which may be characterized in accordance with the extent of their cooperation. These interactions are not defined in purely binary terms. In practice, the quality of such interactions is situated somewhere along a continuum. Thus, within the complex systems of actors formed around youth violence prevention, several types of relationships of varying quality may emerge. In this study, we have endeavoured to categorize these as different stages of relations, based on the classification system established by Nick Tilley (2013), which, for the purposes of our analysis, we have simplified and adapted to generate the following four categories:

- Hostility, when two stakeholders engage in confrontation on a regular basis and voluntarily limit their coordination;
- Mistrust, when coordination exists in a context where the stakeholders conserve, as much as possible, control over their own processes, particularly in relation to information management;
- Functional coordination, when stakeholders follow the established protocols governing coordination, without however being proactive; and
- Collaboration, when stakeholders go beyond the established protocols and coordination mechanisms to deepen their exchanges.

Of course, the complex systems of actors typically found in coordination mechanisms in a sector as wide-ranging and multi-dimensional as youth violence prevention cannot be characterized by a single pattern of relations. Instead, all such systems manifest highly variable interactions between their various stakeholders. Our objective, then, is to ask whether broad trends may be observed in the different case studies considered in this study and whether we can identify recurring types of relationships between certain categories of actors.

2.3.3 Leadership

For present purposes, leadership is defined as assuming the central role of facilitating and mobilizing a network of actors coalescing around a practice, public policy or strategy (Rabin, 2003). Prevention strategies, and the implementation thereof, require strong leadership at the governmental level to
ensure the efficient integration of all sectors mobilized via the multi-disciplinary approaches inherent to prevention (UNODC, 2010).

Similarly, local coordination systems face numerous challenges in relation to the implementation of different policies and the overall coordination of different aspects of public policy action. In effect, local coordination implies a diverse and complex system of actors, which requires strong local leadership to ensure that things function in a coherent and efficient manner (ICPC, 2001).

There are two main issues here. First, one must determine whether one or more institutions or agencies provide the main impetus behind youth violence prevention issues. This study therefore sought to discover whether strategies were piloted by an institutional actor during their development phase, as well as during each implementation phase. In effect, leadership necessarily changes shape and scale over the life cycle of a public policy. Thus, in later stages, policy implementation requires the involvement of other levels of governance and government, notably downstream, at the local level.

Secondly, it’s necessary to assess whether a political consensus exists around these issues or, alternatively, whether there are major partisan differences. In effect, if political leadership represents a success factor for a strategy, so too does consistency, which may be compromised should the electoral cycle induce major changes in approach resulting in inconsistent public policy actions in the medium and long terms. Consequently, our study also considered the issue of political discourse and changes in government as it examined the essential question of policy coherence, which is particularly crucial in relation to prevention, an inherently lengthy process demanding longterm investments.

Leadership was addressed in relation to several different questions throughout our study, including:

- Is there a specific lead agency, organization or institution in the development and coordinated implementation of each of the youth violence prevention related strategies and policies at, respectively, the national and regional/local levels?
- Do political representatives at the different levels of government (national and local) exercise significant leadership around youth violence prevention issues?

2.4 Information management

Data and information are particularly important in the design, implementation and evaluation of prevention strategies. The WHO has identified a number of main areas and considerations pertaining to the harvesting and management of information related to youth violence prevention (WHO, 2015):

1. Certain types of data concerning youth are particularly pertinent, including: mortality, morbidity and other health related data, self-reported data, data from community services and the justice system, and economic, political and legislative data.

2. It’s important to install an information management system with reporting on violence for each type of data. This implies the implementation of information management systems in a variety of institutions, including schools, hospitals and health services, the police and justice system, community services, etc.

3. Surveys are very important for acquiring a deep understanding of youth violence and related behaviours.
4. Rigorous research should be done to gather types of information beyond the purview of statistical data and surveys, such as studies on risk factors or assessments of existing youth violence prevention programs and strategies.

5. The available information must be compiled and communicated to all actors and institutions, and it must be up-dated on a regular basis.

The Handbook on Crime Prevention Guidelines (UNODC, 2010) underlines the importance of:

- Evidence-based prevention
- Effective assessment instruments such as management and monitoring centres
- Coordination and collaboration
- Responsible and sustainable evaluation processes
- A broad multi-disciplinary knowledge base

The evaluation of preventive actions is a delicate exercise as prevention encompasses a vast range of different factors. Whereas assessment processes focus on specific actions and a small number of criteria, the actual effects of preventive actions are much broader in scope and impact. Furthermore, approaches designed to enable rigorous evaluation often run the risk of falling into the trap of standardization and the application of “ready-made” solutions to highly diverse contexts, at the expense of tailored approaches, developed in response to context-specific situations (Egge & Gundhus, 2012). In effect, approaches based on “what works” (omnipresent today) are not panaceas and are not without limitations (Barton, 2006).

3. The methodological framework

This study had the following methodological objectives:

1- To examine the general principles and conditions, as identified in the literature, for ensuring effective participation, efficient coordination and quality data collection.

2- Based on a comparative analysis of several effective practices, which include one or more of these three elements, identify the key factors for successful implementation of such processes.

3- Following interviews with key actors of the strategies examined in this study, identify and analyze their successes and the challenges confronted in relation to participation, coordination and data collection.

The object of this study was to conduct a comparative analysis in order to provide solid recommendations to governments on the effective application of the abovementioned principles, and thereby enable them to enhance the effectiveness of their social prevention strategies for ensuring the safety and security of youth.

3.1 Selection of the survey countries

High-income countries face different challenges than middle and low-income countries in terms of both governance and criminality issues, as well as in relation to the particular dimensions examined in
this study. We thus decided to examine both high and middle-income countries. On the other hand, we opted to not consider low-income countries, as the latter often lack crime prevention strategies or, where such exist, these are embryonic and highly dependent on international funding, which renders them very volatile in practice. In addition, we discussed our final list of countries with our partners from the Government of Canada. In the end, we chose four high-income countries (Canada, France, Norway and the United States) and two middle-income countries (Colombia and South Africa). As for the high-income group, our selection also reflected the intrinsic interest in comparing countries with a federal governance system vs. those with centralized governance. The middle-income countries, as we shall see in part two, based several of their strategies on their respective national development strategies.

3.2 Data collection

We followed a three-pronged data collection strategy:

- We did a review of the scientific and grey literature on the relevant national strategies and legislation.
- We effected six in-depth case studies, i.e., one for each survey country.
- To complement this information, we interviewed experts on youth violence in all six survey countries.

3.3 Summary of the research process

A preliminary review of the literature allowed us to identify the pertinent indicators, construct the study’s general methodological framework and develop profiles for potential survey countries. This, in turn, enabled us to develop a comparison framework for examining different strategies.

Following this preliminary review, we had meetings with officials from Public Safety Canada to select the most pertinent countries for this study.

Once the countries were selected, we began in-depth reviews of the literature on each country and contacted experts on each country. In the final phase, we analyzed the information gathered and wrote the present report.

The entire research process was completed between the months of February and May 2017.
1. Introduction

The contemporary history of South Africa is characterized by its transition from one of the most unequal, anti-democratic and violent regimes in the world, that of Apartheid, to the “Rainbow Nation,” founded in 1994 and based on the principles of equality, multiculturalism, progress and peace. However, despite this exceptional transformation, the country remains scarred by some of the highest rates of violence in the world. As Graeme Simpson, former director of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, explains:

“...the legacy of apartheid has bequeathed to South Africa a ‘culture of violence’. This has been rooted in the notion that violence in South Africa has become normative rather than deviant and it has come to be regarded as an appropriate means of resolving social, political and even domestic conflict.” (Simpson, 1993)

The Apartheid regime installed deeply rooted systemic, political, social and economic violence in relations between social actors, as well as in relations between citizens and the government. Beyond the intrinsic violence and brutality of a regime based on racial segregation, the very hard struggles that the regime’s opponents and persons of colour were forced to wage, to have their voices heard, also had the effect of institutionalizing violence, which is omnipresent in society.

The transition to democracy in 1994-1995 confirmed just how central the issue of race is to economic, social and political inequality, and how central it is to the problem of violence as well. In effect, persons of colour, particularly youth, are disproportionately affected by violence and crime (Van Der Spuy & Rontish, 2008) and suffer discriminatory treatment in the justice system, whether they are offenders or victims (Gould, 2014).

In a number of different ways, gender is another important factor in relation to youth and discriminatory behaviour. In particular, violence, especially sexual violence, towards women and girls represents a fundamental problem in South Africa, in part due to the mismatch between traditional notions of masculinity and contemporary gender relations (Jantjies & Popovac, 2011). The National Youth Development Agency cites racial and sexual discrimination as factors that continue to be predominant drivers of the climate of violence in South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 2015).

Phillippe Gervais-Lambony (2004) observes that in the 1990s South Africa experienced two major processes of change: globalization and democratization. As a consequence, South Africa’s towns and cities experienced rapid, but under-planned and under-regulated urbanization, which led to the spontaneous rise of vast urban settlements, bereft of access to basic services, strongly marked by racial, social, economic and spatial segregation, and characterized by very young populations
who are particularly vulnerable to both violence and criminal behaviours, especially in connection with the street gangs formed in the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods. The phenomenon of gangs of young men, the great majority of whom are black, is not new in South Africa. Its origins date back to the 1940s (Noonan, 2012). Originally deeply rooted in the disadvantaged populations of poor neighbourhoods in major cities, these gangs are responsible for much of the violence reigning there. Many have become veritable organized crime syndicates, which are now expanding towards new territories, such as rural areas (Standing, 2005).

Although South African society is, in general, one of the most inegalitarian societies in the world, these inequalities are starker still in urban areas, such as Johannesburg or Cape Town (Sellers, Arretche, Kubler, & Razin, 2016). Moreover, urban violence rates correlate with these nationwide structural inequalities (Abrahams, 2010). Thus, although the national homicide rate is already very high at approximately 32.2 per 100 000, homicide rates are much higher in the sprawling townships of the country’s major cities (Wakefield & Tait, 2015).

1.1 For young South Africans, violence is a pervasive reality

South Africa is a young country: in 2014, the 15–34 age bracket accounted for 36.2% of the population, according to the national census by Statistics South Africa. Not only do youth account for over a third of the population, they are the main victims of the systemic violence affecting the country. According to Statistics South Africa, in a single fiscal year (2013-2014), 59% were victims of theft and 53.4% victims of assault. In 2013, 69% of homicides involved youth between 15 and 34. Furthermore, South Africans aged 12 to 22 are 8 times more likely to be physically assaulted than adults, and 5 times more likely to be the victims of theft (Burton & Leoschut, 2006).

While youth are the primary victims of violence, they are also often the perpetrators – in many cases, the same individuals are both victims of violence and offenders; moreover, victimization exposes youth to a higher risk of developing more violent and anti-social behaviours (Souverein, Ward, Visser, & Burton, 2016). This vicious circle of violence has a major impact on the life paths of young offenders: in 2011, youth aged 12 to 22 accounted for 29.9% of the country’s prison population – and 50% of them were incarcerated for violent offenses (Jantjies & Popovac, 2011).

Not only are the youth of South Africa afflicted by, and particularly vulnerable to, systemic violence, said violence is also expressed in the guise of major economic and social challenges. According to Statistics South Africa, 37.5% of South Africans between 15 and 35 were neither employed nor attending school. This phenomenon of very high youth unemployment is indicative of the deep inequalities throughout South African society. Thus, whereas only 14% of young white men are unemployed, 46% of young black women are without jobs (van Wyk, 2014).

In addition, school environments themselves are the site of considerable violence, which includes violence between youths as well as violent acts committed by educational personnel. In 2012, the National School Violence Study indicated that 20.2% of students in secondary school have experienced violence in the form of threats, bullying, thefts, physical assaults, sexual violence, etc. (Burton & Leoschut, 2012). Classrooms have been identified as the most common sites of youth
violence (Department of Basic Education, Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention, & UNICEF, 2016).

Although youth violence is an issue worldwide, in South Africa, violence levels are extraordinarily high: in 2000, an international comparison determined that the homicide rate among young men in South Africa was 9 times the international average (Norman, Matzopoulos, Groenewald, & Bradshaw, 2007).

Violence-related issues affect South African youth in all aspects of their lives, from their families, to their communities and schools, to the economic inequalities, systemic racism and political and symbolic violence afflicting them. With the fall of Apartheid, the dream of building an egalitarian, prosperous and peaceful “Rainbow Nation” accorded a very important place to young people, who were seen as the key to the challenging transformation of South African society.

2. Violence prevention, youth and the construction of the “Rainbow Nation”

In South Africa, there is no youth violence prevention policy as such, rather there exists a set of disjointed strategies and policies dispersed among different institutions, sectors and levels of government (Burton, Leoschut, & Bonora, 2009).

Three main types of public policies form the basis of the contemporary approach to youth violence in South Africa: development policies; youth and education policies; and crime prevention and crime fighting policies. Moreover, these pillars of governmental action are carried out in conjunction with the ongoing process of reconstructing and redefining the responsibilities and jurisdictions attributed to the country’s institutions and its different levels of government, a process marked by an immense challenge: unraveling the authoritarian and undemocratic centralism of the Apartheid regime. Thus, a Herculean task awaited South Africans in 1994, one which the new government that emerged from the struggle for liberation ambitiously tackled, as it sought to breathe new life into the ideals of democracy, prosperity and reconciliation at the heart of its project to build a new South Africa.

2.1 1995-2000: crime prevention as a factor in economic and social development

As early as 1995, fighting violence and crime constituted one of the new government’s priorities. Recognizing that the fight against these phenomena was a prerequisite for economic development, the 1995 National Economic Development Strategy defined the development of an integrative crime prevention strategy as one of its 6 pillars. Thus, for the first time in its history, crime prevention was recognized as a fundamental priority in South Africa (Rauch, 2002a).

2.1.1 The National Crime Prevention Strategy

The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 was the culmination of a vast participatory process initiated in 1995 with the creation of an interdepartmental team assembling civil servants, experts and representatives from civil society. Its primary objective was to develop,
over the long term, an integrated strategy for addressing the multiple complex causes of crime and violence nationwide, through an approach based on social prevention and development (Newham, 2005).

The NCPS identified four pillars (the criminal justice process, community values and education, crime reduction through environmental design, and transnational crime), under which sub-strategies were defined, including some which applied to children and youth, in particular youth diversion programs for young offenders and a number of anti-crime educational programs.

The NCPS identified the principal organizations and key actors for each of these sub-strategies. Implementation was designed to facilitate stakeholder integration and was to be coordinated by a designated intersectoral committee, at every level of government. The NCPS sought to provide an integrative framework for developing intersectoral programs and targeted actions, in which coordination and participation would be fundamental, as such actions involved the participation of national government departments, the local and provincial authorities, and civil society as well.

Whereas the national and provincial levels focused mainly on coordination, oversight and networking, the bulk of responsibilities were attributed to the local authorities. In effect, the latter were in charge of developing and implementing prevention programs, coordinating resources on the ground, promoting civic participation and developing capacities at the local level.

2.1.2  White Papers on Safety and Security, and on Local Government

In 1998, with a view to complementing the NCPS and remedying its shortcomings, two dedicated policies were rolled out: the White Paper on Safety and Security and the White Paper on Local Government.²

The White Paper on Safety and Security provided a blueprint for the country’s approach to crime prevention, in particular by integrating the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the justice system, on the one hand, and the social prevention of crime (the NCPS system), on the other. Youth were prioritized through crime prevention strategies based on social and community development targeting at risk populations in specific locations. Finally, a new central government agency was introduced: the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC). Operating under the authority of the National Department for Safety and Security, the NCPC is responsible for the implementation strategy, coordination and funding.

The aim of the White Paper on Local Government was to strengthen local autonomy and build local capacities for economic and social development. In particular, it encouraged the development of partnerships between local governments and other actors, including public sector actors and representatives of civil society, especially in specific areas such as crime prevention.

In terms of governance, these white papers attached great importance to linkages between different levels of government, including the provincial authorities, in the coordination of, and

² Most policies are developed in the form of white papers, i.e., documents approved by the executive, but which have yet to be approved by the legislature and translated into law. In practice, these documents are elaborated to serve as legal frameworks even though they are almost never enshrined in legislation.
support for, local programs. Local authorities for their part were given a central role in program implementation and development. However, although the white papers ceded many crime prevention responsibilities to local authorities, they failed to accompany these new responsibilities with new funding appropriations or capacity building (Newham, 2005).

In parallel with the decentralization of the civilian institutions responsible for local crime prevention, the South African Police Services began a process of deconcentrating their activities by introducing Youth Crime Prevention Desks in Gauteng province. Located in local police stations, their goal is to involve youth in prevention activities and promote good youth-police relations.

2.1.3 Ambitious policies, but disappointing results

It became rapidly apparent that this first generation of post-Apartheid public policies on violence and crime prevention was not without major flaws. First of all, the NCPS’ capacious initial framework entailed tackling an excessively broad range of issues. As the first crime prevention policy in a nascent democracy, it faced numerous challenges, but failed to prioritize the core issues to be addressed (Rauch, 2002b).

Secondly, the NCPS did not provide for the direct allocation of dedicated funding to implement its strategy. Consequently, ministries and departments were obliged to implement the policy with their own existing resources. That led to an increase in inter-organization competition for funding (du Plessis & Louw, 2005). In the end, social prevention programs were under-funded, as most actual expenditure was allocated to criminal justice system infrastructure projects (Pelser & Rauch, 2001).

Thirdly, the NCPS was flawed in terms of its conception of institutional coordination, in particular due to its failure to propose an institutionalized framework for cooperation. Instead, its approach was predicated on the notion that a situation where multiple organizations ran their own programs would lead to spontaneous improvements in collaboration and, thereby, efficient coordination (Rauch, 2002a). Although the NCPS specified the responsibilities of each department and organization, cooperation nevertheless failed to emerge naturally. In this context, most NCPS initiatives ended up concentrated under the authority of the best funded departments (i.e., the police and justice department) and prevention activities were reduced to their minimum expression under the SAPS, which followed a situational prevention approach (du Plessis & Louw, 2005).

2.2 Since 2009, a renewal of a holistic approach to violence and crime prevention

Following a change in government in the 2009 elections, the approach to the questions of violence and crime shifted yet again as the vision of social and integrated prevention, advocated by the NCPS in 1996, regained official favour.
The National Development Plan (NDP), introduced in 2010, defines a long term vision of the country based on eliminating poverty and reducing inequalities by 2030. This document established the government’s overall strategy and forms the basis for public policy development. In terms of its principal priorities, the NDP devoted an entire chapter to “Establishing safe communities” and made ten essential recommendations, two of which specifically target youth (encourage youth to take responsibility for their own safety and implement anger management and substance abuse programs).

In recent years, a full range of policies and strategies consistent with the NDP have been developed in all areas connected with youth violence prevention. As for social, primary and secondary prevention policies, specifically targeting youth, there are three main policy areas: youth policies, social prevention policies and the school violence prevention strategy.

2.2.1 Youth policies: fundamental pillars of public policy action and social prevention

In the context of the post-Apartheid approach, youth policies, including the National Youth Development Policy Framework of 2002-2007, were envisaged as instruments of social violence prevention. However, like other ultra-integrative and highly ambitious policies adopted during this period (notably the NCPS), these initial initiatives were too broad in scope and failed to prioritize issues. The result: a counter-productive strategy which produced very poor results (Mohy-Ud-Din, 2014).

Priorities were tightened with the National Youth Policy (NYP) in 2009 and the National Youth Development Plan in 2010, which targeted the most vulnerable youth and mainly focused on unemployment and economic development related issues.

One of this policy’s main objectives was to establish a multisectoral framework for developing and implementing youth-centred strategies, to be led by a single coordinating agency: the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA). The NYDA’s main strategic priorities were youth employment, vocational training, health and participation in civic life (National Youth Development Agency, 2015). The youth programs developed by the NYDA prioritize disadvantaged youth who are unemployed and/or untrained, as well as the young persons most vulnerable to violence and/or at risk of falling into a life of crime.

However, the NYDA is beset by several major limitations and has produced mixed results. First of all, it employs a very broad definition of youth, one which encompasses very different life situations and, consequently, implies a major challenge in terms of setting priorities and developing specific programs and actions (World Bank, 2012). Furthermore, although the NYDA has instituted numerical targets and impact assessment mechanisms for its programs, as Morné Oosthuizen (director of the Development Policy Research Unit, at the University of Cape Town) notes, the positive results observed are essentially due to the very low and easily attainable initial objectives (Oosthuizen, 2014). What is more difficult, it would seem, is to precisely quantify the outcomes of NYDA programs in terms of employment for disadvantaged youth (Mohy-Ud-Din, 2014).
2.2.2 School violence prevention

As mentioned above, school violence is a very grave problem in South Africa. To address this major issue, a number of school environment prevention programs have been implemented over the years, across the nation. Many have proved successful. However, due to the lack of rigorous evaluations and insufficient dissemination, it has not been possible to systematize these promising practices (Burton & Leoschut, 2013).

Recently, the Department of Basic Education developed several national instruments for the prevention of violent and anti-social behaviour in schools, chief among them the National School Safety Framework, which has been instituted via a number of pilot projects since 2014. This new policy provides a general structure for school violence prevention, thereby complementing more issue specific policies such as the 2013 National Strategy for the Prevention and Management of Alcohol and Drug Abuse and the 2008 Guidelines for the Prevention and Management of Sexual Violence and Harassment.

This new National Framework is predicated on detailed knowledge of local contexts, such as the information contained in the annual safety assessments done in schools. Moreover, it provides for the development of School Safety Plans, to be developed and managed in each establishment by an ad hoc committee. Finally, it introduces coordination mechanisms, which include the actors and institutions involved in violence prevention in a broader sense (e.g., the health services, the police, social workers and social services), to ensure an integrated management and response to the violence issues present in schools.

The initial conclusions emerging from the different pilot projects launched since 2014 place emphasis on four essential points (Makota & Leoschut, 2016):

- the necessity of shared responsibility by all sectors concerned, and not just the Department of Basic Education;
- the importance of broad stakeholder participation, whether actors are from the public or private sector or from civil society or communities;
- the existence of a general tendency to adopt situational type violence prevention strategies (e.g., installation of physical barriers around schools) instead of identifying strategic interventions that target the underlying roots of violence;
- the very promising outcomes of extracurricular activities programs, which keep youth occupied during their free time, i.e., when they are particularly vulnerable to developing violent behaviours and/or gang recruitment. Moreover, these programs help develop life skills, self esteem and a sense of belonging to the school community.

2.2.3 The Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy of 2011

Introduced by the Social Cluster and developed by the Department of Social Development, this strategy sought to complement the actions of the SAPS Social Prevention Unit, then
This is an innovative strategy in that it encompasses, under a single framework, primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. It includes a wide range of strategic policy areas: family support, early childhood development, assistance to expectant and young mothers, prevention of domestic abuse and violence, victims support, community building, prevention of substance abuse, health, nutrition and AIDS prevention programs, social crime prevention programs, anti-poverty programs, school violence reduction, and reintegration of former prisoners into their families and communities.

This strategy allows each department to develop its own programs, by putting the emphasis on better communication and collaboration rather than on a complete multisectoral integration of governmental action. This approach is presented as an effective means of “getting around the necessity of a coordinating structure by instead doing program roll-outs based on targeted collaboration.” (Department of Social Development, 2011, p. 51).

Nonetheless, deplores an actor interviewed for the present study, this very social approach to prevention is not backed by the political will needed to endow the Department of Social Development with the weight and authority required to fully implement its mission:

“The Department of Social Development should be a really key actor. The integrated social prevention policy of 2011, it’s this department that is trying to lead it, [but] it’s the government which should be the driving force through a more strategic department, because the Department of Social Development doesn’t really have the power over the other departments to make them sit around a table and tell them what they must do.”

2.2.4 The 2011 Policy on Community Safety Forums

Although the 2000-2010 period was characterized by the change from a holistic national strategy towards a more limited sectoral approach focused on policing and crime and violence prevention, this does not mean, however, that integrated, social multisectoral approaches were no longer being developed. In effect, although the government went in a different direction, local authorities, particularly in many of the country’s towns and big cities, continued to develop strategies and institutions based on the principles of the NCPC and the white papers of 1998.

In particular, several major cities set up Community Safety Forums (CSFs), roundtable structures bringing together the local social services and civil society actors. The CSFs originated many of the locally developed programs and initiatives of the 2000s (Newham, 2005). However, these structures were very heterogeneous and, moreover, lacked systematized cooperation processes and strong connections with certain key local, provincial and national actors, in particular the SAPS and its CPFs (Community Policing Forums) (Tait & Usher, 2002).

In 2011, the Community Safety Forums Policy was adopted to establish a unified national approach for the CSFs and ensure the coordination of all actors. This policy, advocated by the
Justice, Prevention, Crime and Security (JPCS) cluster,\(^3\) followed a nearly decade long development process, which included pilot projects. This policy places the CSFs under the direction of police department and integrates the CPFs as bodies specifically dedicated to community-police relations.

The CSFs are defined as multisectoral and multi-level structures charged with coordinating and implementing all crime prevention programs in their respective police districts (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2012). They include representatives from the following institutions: the Ministries of Correctional Services, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Interior, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs; major cities, districts and local municipalities; the Local Government Agency; as well as representatives from the social cluster and the SAPS. In addition, these structures also include representatives from local stakeholders, such as the pre-existing Community Security Forums, NGOs active in pertinent areas (child protection, victim support, restorative justice and economic empowerment), religious organizations, municipal councils, organizations representing the interests of minorities, women’s groups, traditional chiefs and the private sector.

2.3 Since 2016, new developments in the area of violence prevention

In the past year, three new public policies on violence prevention, fighting crime and juvenile delinquency prevention were introduced (but had not yet been implemented as these lines were being written). During the summer of 2016, two new white papers were tabled, which updated the White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998. These two policies introduce a new approach, which dissociates policing (White Paper on Policing) from public safety (White Paper on Safety and Security). Both white papers were developed by the SAPS, thereby confirming the political will to reconsolidate all activities for combating and preventing violence and crime under the direction of the Police. These two proposals were presented as a “hard” approach, which adopts “zero tolerance” and “revisits the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996” (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2016).

2.3.1 The new White Paper on Safety and Security of 2016

The objective of this new policy is to clarify actors’ roles and improve coordination to enable integrated planning of public action. It is predicated on several key dimensions, including: the efficiency of the justice system; early prevention, particularly with children and families; the

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\(^3\) With a view to strengthening coordination at the national level, the Justice, Prevention, Crime and Security (JPCS) cluster was created in 1999 as part of a reorganization of national ministerial institutions into issue-based groupings. Although this cluster drives public policy action in crime and violence prevention, it is composed almost exclusively of policing, justice and national defence institutions (Rauch, 2002b). More specifically, this intersectoral coordination structure assembles the following national agencies: the SAPS, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the correctional services, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance and the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
efficiency of the security services and their integration with citizens; and the active participation of communities (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2016).

Adopting a social approach to crime and violence prevention, it focuses in particular on groups at high risk of victimization and/or offending: youth, as well as more vulnerable groups such as women, children, LGBTQ persons, the elderly and people with disabilities. It integrates social/primary prevention, secondary prevention and tertiary prevention, in the form of restorative justice.

As we were writing this report, the government announced a National Anti-Gang Strategy, described as a series of “interventions targeted at socio-economic issues surrounding gangsterism and its root causes, addressed in a multi-agency fashion, incorporating government departments at all levels, in partnership with civil society and communities” (press conference of Police Minister Fikile Mbalula, April 26, 2017).

Finally, it’s important to note that, although the new White Paper on Safety and Security is not encountering major opposition and is generally considered an improvement on the existing public policy framework, certain observers see the White Paper on Policing as an authoritarian recentralization of municipal systems under the control of the SAPS. This latter policy has provoked widespread opposition from public actors, notably local governments such as the City of Cape Town, which decry a recentralization “worthy of Apartheid” (joint press release from the Minister of Community Security of Western Cape Province, the Mayor of Cape Town and the Chair of the Municipal Committee on Safety and Security in Cape Town, 2016). These recent developments are nothing new: in effect, since 2009, even as crime prevention policies returned to the holistic, social and progressive principles of the NCPS, policing practices became significantly harsher, as attested the re-militarization of the SAPS and a hardening of political discourse in relation to crime and violence (Silbernagl, 2016).

In effect, these two policies enshrine the dichotomy in the government’s strategy between holistic social prevention and muscular repression.

3. **Coordination**

In the South African institutional system, the notions of co-responsibility and decentralization are foundational principles. As a consequence, the three levels of government intervene in a differentiated but co-dependent manner in the development and implementation of public policies. This gives rise to major coordination issues.

3.1 **Vertical and horizontal coordination systems**

The national government assumes general responsibility over developing strategies for different policy areas, such as security, youth issues, etc. The nine provincial governments administer most of the major public services, such as social assistance, education or health. The 257 municipal governments are responsible for coordinating all actors on the ground, notably through the
preparation of an Integrated Development Plan (IDP), which is supposed to ensure the harmonization of local efforts with national and provincial plans.

This interdependence and interconnection between different levels of government rests on a deconcentration of institutions and implies the existence of very solid, coherent and efficient scalar coordination mechanisms to ensure proper functioning on the ground. In effect, a blockage or dysfunction at one level of government can lead to negative consequences at the local level, a point underlined during our interviews with grassroots actors:

“I think that in South Africa coordination is a general problem, whether it’s horizontally with sectors and departments in municipalities or vertically between the national, provincial and local levels. It’s one of the key governance challenges in our country. There doesn’t appear to be a fluid connection between what some are doing and what others are doing.”

It was the White Paper on Safety and Security of 1998 that first allocated roles in the areas of public safety and violence prevention, particularly at the provincial and local levels, which share numerous responsibilities and missions. However, this allocation of roles was not accompanied by the defining of clear coordination mechanisms. Consequently, coordination constitutes the primary challenge raised in both the literature and interviews with practitioners. This issue encompasses, moreover, several problematic aspects: a general deficiency in terms of coordination mechanisms; strong competition between agencies and a lack of collaboration at all levels; the absence of clearly defined funding systems or dedicated funding; and a high number of unfunded responsibilities, particularly at the local level. In a word, although the need for intra and inter-institutional coordination has been recognized in all public policies since 1995, it has never been precisely defined in terms of procedures and mechanisms. As a result, it has become “everyone’s objective and nobody’s responsibility” (du Plessis & Louw, 2005, p. 442).

The new White Paper on Security of 2016 endeavours to remedy the climate of competition and absence of collaboration affecting interdepartmental coordination. Interviews conducted with several actors involved in the development of this new policy shed light on some of the current thinking on how to ensure a lasting solution to the issues of coordination in crime prevention. Certain actors advocate the establishment of a national crime prevention centre, answering directly to the president, which would be in charge of ensuring collaboration between actors and interdepartmental coordination, developing policies and tools, as well as ensuring information management, monitoring and evaluation. The purpose of placing the coordination structure under the direct authority of the presidency is to enable averting competition between ministries of equal rank in the hierarchy and to ensure strong leadership.

“To implement the White Paper, the only framework within which coordination may be effective is the office of the Presidency and the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, a ministry which answers directly to it. This is required to
better supervise and coordinate the different ministries, otherwise it’s impossible to interconnect and coordinate cabinet ministers.”

However, the feasibility of this proposal was questioned by one of the actors interviewed:

“In reality, I am not very optimistic [regarding the feasibility of a national centre]. The economy is not doing well. There’s no public money. We are facing many difficulties, and unless there’s a very serious reorganization of institutions and their funding, I don’t see this scenario occurring in the near future.”

The new White Paper on Security also endeavours to establish frameworks for efficient coordination between actors at the local level. Although this document does not provide specific details, efforts are proceeding to design a coherent operationalization framework.

“I think that the White Paper [on Safety of 2016] establishes relations between different departments at the local level. Moreover, I think that the regulations which are still in the process of development will provide a much more detailed framework by operationalizing the implementation plan and defining how practitioners, civil servants and politicians will be able to work together at the local level.”

Finally, the new policy will be formulated in manner that complements the 2012 White Paper on the CSFs.

“There’s a dialogue between the two white papers, but this dialogue has yet to reach the level of implementation. The intention, then, is to make all of this operational and provide a structure to ensure that the local structures and CSFs play their roles. It remains to be seen how this will be operationalized and how to ensure that the community security structures receive the necessary support, all of which is obviously subject to constraints. There is also the question of institutional capacity and institutional memory at every level of structure, which is a big issue.”

It seems then that the latest iteration of the White Paper on Safety and Security is the subject of solid comprehensive reflection and will generate concrete ideas on how to resolve the coordination issues undermining South African institutions.

### 3.2 The Community Security Forums (CSFs)

These structures were designed as purely local coordination and implementation organizations, which implies, firstly, that strategic orientations are determined upstream and applied vertically, without local jurisdiction over content development and, secondly, that the CSFs are structured around the same key actors as the other levels, namely the Justice, Prevention Crime and Security cluster. As a consequence, the CSFs, as defined in the policy of 2012 and the subsequent application thereof, constitute the deconcentrated instruments of a policy which remains centralized, a policy which puts policing at the heart of its activities. This predominance of law enforcement in coordination agencies implies a de facto recentring of prevention initiatives around policing-based approaches. As a consequence, situational prevention and crime reduction take precedence over a social and comprehensive vision of prevention.
Furthermore, the implanting of these structures in the country’s municipalities has been very patchy fashion, due to the enormous variety of different local contexts.

“The challenge is that in many places these structures [the CFSSs] are there but do not function due to a lack of funding. In other places, they don’t exist at all, even though public policies stipulate that the municipalities must create active CSFs with broad participation (...) We have also noticed that in many communities these structures tend to be taken over by local political dynamics and, consequently, are not used for their original purpose.”

3.3 Local governance issues

In 2009, an assessment of local governance systems underlined failings in several essential aspects, a number of them connected with crime and violence prevention issues, as well as with development and social prevention issues affecting youth, including: tensions between administrative systems and local political authorities; insufficient separation of powers between local politicians and municipal government agencies in specific policy areas, notably public safety; major deficiencies in the implementation of national policies and strategies (Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009).

Andrew Siddle et Thomas A. Koelble underline moreover the great vulnerability of local governments to political machinations, private interests and the phenomena of collusion, corruption and clientelism which undermine the effectiveness of many South African municipalities.

“Most municipalities soon became the fiefdoms of rent-seeking politicians; most of them were overwhelmed, in one way or another, by the demands placed on them; the delivery of services aimed at promoting the objectives of the developmental state soon became of secondary importance; local councils proved ineffective because of low levels of education, lack of skilled administrative and technical personnel, poor organization, infrequent meetings, internal division and party dominance; poor performance and non-accountability inevitably followed; credibility amongst the populace was lost; and local governance remained weak (...)little has changed since then.” (Koelble & Siddle, 2014, p. 612)

In 2011-2012, the Auditor General’s Report on local government painted a very critical portrait of the state of local governance, which, nevertheless, remains central to the implementation of all public policies, notably in relation to public safety and social services (Auditor General, 2013).

4. Participation, leadership and collaboration

Public policies are developed in accordance with a sectoral logic, in separate silos, as it were. As a consequence, each department follows a specific agenda, largely bereft of any shared vision. With respect to social violence prevention, this translated into the dismal failure of the NCPS, as well as
the inability to establish long term governmental leadership. And yet the latter is crucial for ensuring the emergence of true inter-institutional synergies. Indeed, what prevails is inter-departmental competition and sectoral silo-type dynamics, largely due to a system where funding for public policies is fragmented between different departments, and where said funding is, in any case, all too often insufficient, if not indeed non-existent, particularly as regards social prevention.

In practice, the predominance of the police and the justice system in coordination systems and the unequal funding of institutions have led to violence and crime prevention being seen essentially in terms of situational prevention. Situational prevention is overseen and instituted by local governments in the form of urban design measures and policing (the municipal police in big cities, the SAPS elsewhere). As for social prevention, while it may be a crosscutting element in many types of policies and strategies, it does not constitute the core mandate of any agency or public actor. Furthermore, in addition to this absence of institutional leadership, social prevention is disadvantaged by the lack of a precise definition of what it constitutes. Consequently, as one might expect, there is a great lack of public funding for primary and social prevention initiatives, particularly for children and youth (Phyfer & Wakefield, 2015).

With respect to participation, leadership and collaboration, the overview done for this study allowed us to identify several crucial points. First of all, the elaboration of strategies, plans and public policies does not follow a uniform pattern: some processes are very participatory and engage a wide spectrum of actors; at the opposite extreme, some processes are very closed, very vertical, and are more an expression of the political climates and discourses of the day than a function of real needs and constraints. The trend, since 2000, has been towards public policy development effected in issue-based silos (clusters), under the direction of a single department, without a vision of cooperation or coordination and appropriate consultation of stakeholders (du Plessis & Louw, 2005).

This sectoral silo-type logic poses major leadership issues for local coordination during the implementation phase on the ground. In effect, it falls to the local authorities downstream to take charge of coordination and ensure coherency between different public policies, a task demanding strong leadership. This responsibility goes well beyond coordination systems and institutions, as it encompasses aspects such as the quality of collaboration between actors, political leadership, the participation of different stakeholders from local systems of actors, the existence (or absence) of necessary solid local competencies and sufficient financial resources. Local coordination, then, is a vast and complex task, one in which there exist vast differences between the municipalities which manage to develop the conditions necessary for coordinated implementation and those which do not, as one of the interviewees underlined:

"[Successful local implementation and coordination] faces many challenges and depends on the individuals involved. [There are] more actions in the large metropolises like Johannesburg, Durban or Cape Town, as resources have been put at their disposal, as well as in some smaller municipalities and local governments which have fewer resources but work well together. (...) Not everything functions optimally, but these municipalities do their best, implement actions, develop municipal security..."
plans (...), consider the role of education, civil servants and social services. However, no priority is given to local capacity building and as long as that doesn’t happen, the process [of implementing prevention and security policies at the local level] will always face great challenges.”

The development and functioning of coordination structures, in particular for CSFs, poses a challenge in terms of leadership. The Policy on CSFs clearly stipulates that the municipalities are responsible for “establishing lasting forums to ensure coordinated, collaborative and permanent participation” (Civilian Secretariat for Police, 2012, p.44); in so doing, it is proposing a potential, if poorly defined, model for municipal leadership (Urban Safety Reference Group, 2016). This issue was in fact raised in an interview with one of the actors concerned:

“In particular, the White Paper of 2012 on the CSFs constitutes [a policy] where cities have great difficulties in understanding where and what their role is, how they can support these structures and express their own vision and ways of doing things. [These question marks] underlie a widely shared position and constitute an appeal for a better transfer of resources.”

Ironically, this lack of coherence and leadership occasionally contributed to the maintaining of social prevention practices. During the “fight against crime” policy of the early 2000s, a period during which the NCCS had reoriented the mandate of justice and law enforcement institutions towards a “get tough” policy, ministries with a social mission (Education and Social Development) and which were excluded from this new strategy, were able to continue developing activities inherited from the NCPS period and its principles of social prevention (Frank, 2006).

In general, the different segments of civil society tend to attribute the responsibility for violence and crime prevention to the justice system and the police (Phyfer & Wakefield, 2015). Although the latest White Paper on Safety and Security (of 2016) does contribute new elements and nuances, it remains to be seen what this will mean in practice (Urban Safety Reference Group, 2016).

5. Information management

At the national level, the principal sources of information are the SAPS and the justice system, Statistics South Africa, in particular with its victimization surveys, and a solid network of public research centres. In addition, the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System (NIMSS) has been collecting data on physical violence since 1999. However, neither the justice system nor the policing services centralize or disseminate data on minors in trouble with the law. That is a major impediment to research and knowledge production (Muntingh, 2009). This situation exists despite the 2008 Juvenile Justice Act, which recognized the need to establish an information system on minors in trouble with the law.

In addition to the deficiencies in information sharing systems as such, a culture of information exchange is often lacking, at all levels. Confidentiality rules significantly complicate inter-
institutional circulation of information, as well as information sharing with research centres and civil society, despite the important roles the latter play in producing scientific analyses and knowledge. As already mentioned, these issues are particularly pertinent in relation to the data collected by the police and the justice system.

Furthermore, most statistical data is centralized at the national level and, consequently, standardized in accordance with national indicators. It is therefore necessary to complete this information by collecting local data, corresponding to particular local contexts. Data is produced at the local level in the form of local surveys and security assessments. This, however, is not done on a systematic basis. Different local jurisdictions vary vastly in this regard. In practice, as the provinces and municipalities play a dominant role in these processes, results depend greatly on whether or not the regular production of reliable data constitutes an institutional and/or political priority.

“The recent new orientation adopted by the SAPS civil secretariat is to promote data collection at the local level, which is a good thing (...) The provinces utilize different models and different sources to gather, process and use data (...) as for integrating all [local] data and surveys, the [local] governments don’t have the capacity to do so at this time.”

Finally, actors from the academic research community and civil society form a very dynamic network, which often mitigates institutional deficiencies, in terms of the production of reliable, publicly available data and knowledge. In 2005, the Centre for Justice and Crime Prevention (CJCP) conducted the first national youth victimization survey. In 2008, in the absence of representative data on school violence, this same organization undertook, in partnership with the Ministry of Education, a systematic study on school violence (Burton & Leoschut, 2013), an exercise which it reprised in 2012 (Burton & Leoschut, 2012).

In short, quality data is produced in South Africa; where major issues emerge is in the circulation and exchange of knowledge and information, and in the evaluation of policies and programs. Clearly, what is lacking is a system for sharing and circulating information, a deficiency lamented by many actors, notably in the area of applied research.

“To date, [capacity building and information sharing] are not functioning at all (...) There does not exist a structure that facilitates information sharing and there remain profound deficiencies in the processes implemented (...) the ideal situation would be to develop information and data use at the local level as well.”

Another major deficiency identified by this study, both in its review of the literature and during interviews with actors, is the striking lack of assessments of violence and crime prevention initiatives and public policies. The result is a dearth of information and knowledge on "what works." Although certain evaluation initiatives have emerged from civil society, government programs are still lagging well behind in this respect (Dixon, 2002; Frank, 2006; Palmary, 2002; Pelser, 2008).

The various deficiencies and gaps in information management systems have sparked the emergence of networking type solutions, particularly at the local level. An excellent example is the
South African Cities Network and its working group on public safety issues, the Urban Safety Reference Group, created in 2014. One of its representatives explained to us the crucial role it plays in remedying the issue of insufficient information sharing.

“This is precisely where the Network intervenes: it accompanies [cities and local actors] in the process [of implementing a CSF] or facilitates contacts with other municipalities and other interlocutors who may be able to provide information on how cities go about establishing CSFs, or simply on whether a CSF exists or not, what the challenges are, especially in terms of funding, what the levels of youth involvement are, whether this involvement is genuine or superficial.”

6. Conclusion

South Africa occupies a very singular place, both in our study and in the international concert of nations in the sense that the country has confronted, throughout the last 30 years, the challenges of completely redefining its paradigms, society, political system, administrative apparatus, relations between citizens, as well as the very definition of citizenship, the everyday practices of all actors, its procedures in developing public policy action and, finally, its approach in the face of the issues of large scale violence afflicting the entire country.

Despite a post-apartheid vision that put the reduction of inequalities and the reparation of injustices at the heart of the State’s priorities and values, social prevention remains the poor relation among strategies to combat violence and crime, particularly regarding the efforts focusing on children and youth. The State’s attention, financial and human resources, institutional efforts and political leadership are all directed towards crime reduction strategies and structured around law enforcement and the justice system. Notwithstanding the founding principles proclaimed in the Constitution and in foundational policies such as the NCPS, social prevention does not, in practice, constitute a priority, particularly since the early 2000s. The key actors and institutions in youth-centred social prevention, such as the social services, the education and health sectors or young people themselves, constitute, at best, bit players in prevention policies. These institutions do develop their own policies, such as school violence prevention strategies or, another example, labour market integration measures for youth. However, their actions are isolated, lacking in an intersectoral vision or coordination and are limited in scope due to the generalized under-funding of social development institutions.

“Lack of coordination, proliferation of responsibilities in several departments, policies in entirely separate silos that, moreover, are not implemented efficiently, very weak accountability systems, vague financial protocols... In short, the system does not work to direct adequate support and responsibility to the elements which need them most.”

The dynamics of efficient coordination imply a philosophy of collaboration and partnership paradigms which go beyond the framework of a few central institutions to include a vast range of
actors: however, this basic principle is far from widely shared by civil servants accustomed to existing practices, whether at the national level or the provincial and local levels. The strategies developed at the national level, particularly at the dawn of the democratic transition, underestimated the difficulties of implementation. However, starting around 2010, greater attention has been given to the articulation of public policy at the local level.

The issues of collaboration, political leadership and real participation have arisen due to a system of governance marked by authoritarianism, a system still struggling towards its renaissance as a fully democratic, peaceful and decentralized system. These three qualitative dimensions of coordination – collaboration, political leadership and real participation – are decisive for public policy effectiveness. They are the expression of philosophies deeply rooted in institutions and the individual and collective practices of actors. This qualitative aspect to coordination demands great investments in time, capacity building, and the transforming of institutional paradigms and concrete practices. This is a long term undertaking which constitutes one of modern South Africa's greatest challenges.
CHAPTER 3. CANADA

1. Introduction

Before painting a portrait of youth in Canada, it’s important to clarify what institutions mean by the term “youth.” According to the federal government and for statistical purposes, a youth is a person aged 10 to 24. Youth, so defined, represented 17.7% of the Canadian population in 2016 (Statistics Canada, 2016).

Regarding the number of young offenders, Statistics Canada figures indicate that youth courts processed 32,835 cases in 2014-2015 (Statistics Canada, 2016a). The most common crimes committed by youth were property offences of theft under $5,000, common assault and drug infractions (Statistics Canada, 2014). It is apparent from a survey of young Canadians that criminal acts and behaviour are much more frequent among those who, by their own admission, have consumed alcohol or drugs (Statistics Canada, 2014). As a consequence, Canada sees the fight against drug abuse as a means to prevent crime.

The fight against youth gangs is another crime prevention priority of the government. In 2006, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada identified 300 street gangs and 11,000 gang members nationwide (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2011). According to the literature, this issue is particularly prevalent in Indigenous communities, especially among their younger residents (Totten, 2009). It would appear then that while young members of Indigenous communities face the same issues as youth in the rest of the population, they do so to a greater extent and in higher proportions. Thus, in addition to their involvement in gangs, Indigenous youth have higher conviction rates in drug related criminal offences (National Crime Prevention Centre, 2009). Aboriginal youth are also over-represented in the criminal justice system (Totten, 2009). Consequently, most public policies and prevention strategies prioritize Indigenous youth.

Finally, bullying and school violence are widespread phenomena among Canadian youth: in a 2010-2011 survey of 63,000 Canadian adolescents, 42% of boys and 29% of girls stated that they had been bullied during the school year and 28% admitted to participation in acts of bullying (Radio-Canada, 23 May 2013).

2. The evidence based Canadian model

2.1 Crime prevention

In Canada, the dominant approach to crime prevention was traditionally a reactive one based on repression. Policing and the justice system were prioritized in the allocation of resources and efforts (Monchalin, 2009). However, over time, it became apparent that under this approach costs were constantly rising. Moreover, arguments were made to the effect that implementing preventive actions before infractions are committed would not only lower the crime rate as well,
but would prove more cost effective than the police and the justice system. Some argue for example that if 10% of the budgets allocated to policing and the justice and correctional systems were invested in prevention this would generate a 50% reduction in crime (Waller, 2016). Based on this observation, the government, and in particular Public Safety Canada (PS), has increasingly turned its efforts towards prevention in general and crime prevention in particular. Through the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), Public Safety Canada provides national leadership in effective and efficient practices for preventing and reducing crime by acting on known risk factors. The NCPS supports the implementation of effective crime prevention practices in small and large communities across the country. As a result, the NCPS has come to occupy an increasingly central role in Canada in the last twenty years (Hodgkinson & Farrell, 2017; Monchalin, 2009). In 1994, in light of a body of research supporting prevention through social development and situational prevention, the government sought, as we have seen, to move away from its reactive approach, based on policing and the justice system, towards developing a strategy informed by these research results. According to the Social Development approach, inequalities are a major cause of crime (Hodgkinson & Farrell, 2017). To address inequalities, it’s necessary to take measures at the local level which affect the well-being of youth through education, employment, health and direct reduction of inequalities. This implies community participation and establishing numerous partnerships (Léonard, Rosario, Scott, & Bressan, 2005).

The Government of Canada has in effect adopted a philosophy of secondary prevention focusing on risk factors identified by the literature. This was the thinking behind the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1994. Conceived of as a multisectoral policy based in the municipalities, the NCPS provides for a holistic approach, which integrates economic and social factors (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2001; Hodgkinson & Farrell, 2017). Our review of the literature also identified the need to implement situational prevention measures. The Communities at Risk: Security Infrastructure Program (SIP) is based on this latter approach.

The NCPS is based on three principles: 1) community based actions; 2) partnerships between researchers, practitioners and communities; and 3) the production and dissemination of crime prevention knowledge (Hodgkinson & Farrell, 2017). Thus, with both efficiency and investing in effective prevention measures in mind, Canada adopted an evidence based approach. The emphasis, then, is on implementing actions based on existing initiatives and measures, whether in Canada or elsewhere, whose positive impacts have been evaluated and demonstrated (Waller, 2016). According to one our interview participants, a public sector official in charge of crime prevention research, this is a recent position dating from 2008. Previously, a variety of actions could be implemented despite the absence of any strategic orientation in the government funding of such initiatives. Since 2008, a scientific approach has prevailed. Funding is directed towards initiatives corresponding to models of good practices identified in the scientific literature, i.e., practices already established in one or more countries, which have been evaluated and found to be effective. Moreover, when the federal government funds programs based on established models, evaluations are subsequently done to assess both success factors and causes of failures.

In 1998, the National Crime Prevention Centre was launched to plan, develop and implement measures taken under the auspices of the NCPS (Public Safety Canada, 2011). Originally, a
separate agency within PS, this agency was recently completely integrated into the ministry and no longer exists as a distinct entity. Under the NCPS, PS has two principal activities: 1) collecting and disseminating knowledge and 2) providing funding support for prevention initiatives (Public Safety Canada, 2009). These two activities are, in fact, closely related. As explained above, PS bases its funding support on the knowledge and evidence based data it has acquired. PS engages in research on crime prevention, risk factors and policies undertaken in other countries in order to fund and implement evidence based interventions, especially those targeting youth crime reduction. It also funds initiatives to promote new knowledge acquisition (Public Safety Canada, 2011). PS seeks to build a knowledge base, based on scientific research, that is as complete as possible, which it may then disseminate, in particular to community groups. In effect, funding requests for measures that a community group proposes to develop and implement must be based on PS prescribed models of good practices to ensure that they are sound and will produce positive results. To this end, PS makes publicly available documentary and technical resources such as evaluation reports of different processes, results and technical tools (Public Safety Canada, 2009). PS support is also available during the project implementation phase. Finally, once actions have been funded and implemented, some are assessed to further expand the crime prevention knowledge base at PS. This allows PS to assess the positive and negative impacts of actions undertaken, as well as identify their causes and the costs incurred (Laliberté, Rosario, Léonard, Smith-Moncrieffe, & Warner, 2015).

PS has established funding priorities in line with its objectives. These priorities include children and adolescents at risk, and drug related crimes and street gangs, with a particular emphasis on Indigenous communities. (Public Safety Canada, 2015). This emphasis on Indigenous communities is a crosscutting issue affecting all major public policies. In effect, different ministries recognize the magnitude and complex nature of the issues confronting Indigenous communities. Different funding sources are available to address these issues. In particular, PS manages three main funds. The Crime Prevention Action Fund (CPAF) provides assistance on a one-off basis to communities and organizations wishing to elaborate and implement crime prevention initiatives (Laliberté et al., 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2011). The NCPS’ Youth Gang Prevention Fund (YGPF) targets youth at risk of joining street gangs or youth who are already gang members. Acting in coordination with the provincial, territorial and municipal levels, PS decides which projects to fund. For PS, it is important to identify the municipalities and communities where the problem of street gangs is particularly salient (Public Safety Canada, 2011). Finally, the Northern and Aboriginal Crime Prevention Fund (NACPF) assists communities struggling with multiple risk factors and other problems affecting their capacity to combat crime, such as geographic isolation and a limited capacity for intervention. In its report on the ministry’s results for fiscal year 2015-2016, PS (2016) notes that under the NCPS it funded 67 projects across the country. These
projects intervened in a variety of priority areas such as street gangs, youth violence, bullying in schools and preventing radicalization.\(^4\)

In parallel with the NCPS, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and its Centre for Youth Crime Prevention also play a role in youth crime prevention. In effect, the RCMP has established a national youth strategy to reduce youth crime, which focuses on both offenders and victims. Its priority issues include bullying and cyber-bullying, radicalization, drug and alcohol consumption, and violence in dating relationships. To counter these problems, the RCMP has adopted an approach based on risk factors (Government of Canada, 2004). The actions implemented depend on schools, communities and the justice system, but most of all on youth themselves. In effect, the RCMP seeks to organize consultations and partnerships with youth. It has also put police educators in schools to serve as resources and to provide youth with information, particularly on bullying, violence in dating relationships and drugs. The purpose of these actions is to provide youth with assistance and develop their awareness of these issues (Government of Canada, 2004). Finally, the RCMP has established a National Youth Advisory Committee with members between the ages of 13 and 18. This committee is a token of the RCMP’s willingness to give youth a voice and include them in the process of designing the crime prevention actions identified by the Centre for Youth Crime Prevention. To this end, the Committee’s role is to raise issues which impact the lives of youth and design initiatives answering their needs. In effect, this committee constitutes an opportunity for youth to represent young people at large and express their opinions on the subjects that matter to them (Government of Canada, 2004).

2.2 Youth policy

In Canada, there is no official youth policy at the federal level nor is there a Ministry of Youth (Dougherty, 2016). And yet, many experts across the country do recommend the elaboration of a national youth policy. Many deem that the adoption of a national youth policy would serve to reaffirm the government’s support for youth during this period of their lives, so full of both opportunities, as well as challenges and difficulties. Most importantly, such a policy would enable federal as well as provincial and territorial ministries to coordinate their efforts and work together on achieving a consensus on young people’s place in society (Dougherty, 2016). In effect, the present absence of coordination between different youth programs hinders the emergence of a coherent approach and common understanding of different issues (Dougherty, 2016).

That said, the present government is demonstrating its willingness to make youth into a priority and accord young people a central place. As a symbolic gesture, the Prime Minister named himself the Minister of Youth. In a more concrete action, the Prime Minister also created a Youth Council in the summer of 2016. Composed of thirty Canadians aged 16 to 24, it’s mandate is to advise the Prime Minister on issues relevant to youth such as employment and education or

\(^4\) On the 26th of June 2017, Public Safety Canada launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence, a new structure whose mandate is to ensure national leadership around violence prevention issues, promote coordination among actors and ensure support for community groups, practitioners and first responders, notably through the Community Resilience Fund.
indeed ecology. This Council meets several times a year, either virtually or in person ("Prime Minister's Youth Council Backgrounder," 2016).

It's interesting to note that there does exist a federal action plan on children. Adopted in 2004, following the 2002 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Children, this plan, entitled “A Canada Fit for Children,” endorses the declaration and the action plan thereto, adopted by the members of the UN General Assembly (Government of Canada, 2004). Canada’s plan reiterated the government’s will to make children into a priority, notably by taking actions to ensure that children enjoy good physical and mental health, are protected and safe, benefit from all of the conditions required for an adequate education, and are engaged and socially responsible (Government of Canada, 2004). It’s worth noting that the elaboration of this action plan entailed cooperation between the different levels of government, following public consultations (Government of Canada, 2004). This process made it possible to establish a shared vision and objectives – which is something lacking in youth related issues. This plan could therefore serve as a model for the elaboration of a similar plan aimed at youth in general.

2.3 Substance abuse prevention policy

Youth drug consumption is an issue which concerns Canada’s federal government. This is why, in 2007, under the leadership of the Ministry of Justice, twelve federal government ministries and organizations developed a National Anti-Drug Strategy (NAS), with a focus on youth in particular. A highly structured and developed system of governance was instituted, which enables extremely efficient interdepartmental coordination. A steering committee of deputy ministers meets once a year to supervise the implementation of the NAS and ensure that the results obtained match expectations. The deputy ministers of Health Canada, PS, the RCMP, Correctional Services Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs, notably, all collaborate in this steering committee, which is chaired by the Minister of Justice. Working groups, composed of executive directors of the abovementioned ministries, are formed, as required, in accordance with specific aspects of the Strategy’s development and implementation. There is, for instance, a “prevention and treatment” working group, chaired by Health Canada with the participation of PS, the Ministry of Justice, the RCMP, Correctional Services Canada and mental health research institutes, notably, which meets two or three times a year. The “policy and performance” working group is chaired by the Ministry of Justice and assembles the same ministries, plus the Ministry of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. In effect, as mentioned above, Indigenous peoples are a priority target group of numerous policies. The working group oversees the defining of the Strategy’s strategic orientations. Sub-committees may also be formed to ensure efficient coordination. For example, in the area of prevention and treatment, a sub-committee was set up to inventory all existing programs and interventions in the various federal departments (Ministry of Justice, undated.-b).

The Strategy’s orientations are also implemented in a highly collaborative manner. For example, one particular component of the NAS focuses on preventing substance abuse. The main agencies
collaborating in its implementation were the Ministry of Health, in charge of a media campaign and the Drug Strategy Community Initiatives Fund (DSCIF), PS, also in charge of funding, and the RCMP, whose mission includes raising public awareness about drugs (Ministry of Justice, undated.-b).

Finally, as a result of the NAS, Canadian youth substance abuse prevention standards were developed to provide tools and explanations on the planning, implementation and evaluation of prevention actions on the ground. These standards emphasize the importance of adopting a long term multisectoral approach, involving schools, communities and families (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2015).

The NAS provides funding support to interventions in communities and school environments (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2015). This entails mobilizing different funds, including the Drug Strategy Community Initiatives Fund (DSCIF). Organizations wishing to obtain DSCIF funding must submit project proposals based on models that employ approved good or promising practices. During the implementation phase, tools and technical advice are made available to beneficiary organizations to assist them in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of project measures (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2015).

Also contributing to the objectives pursued by the National Anti-Drug Strategy, but under a different policy structure, is the work implemented by PS under the National Crime Prevention Strategy, which “seeks to lessen factors, such as the consumption of illicit drugs, which threaten certain populations of children and youth” (International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, 2015).

3. Coordination and governance

3.1 Horizontal coordination

3.1.1 At the national level

The federal government shares responsibility for crime prevention and justice with the provinces. As we have seen, the strategies for both are characterized by strong multisectoral coordination. In effect, PS chairs the Interdepartmental Committee on Crime Prevention, which assembles twelve different ministries. The object of this coordination body is to promote the elaboration of prevention strategies at the federal level, encourage information exchange on the various initiatives in different ministries and implement coordination of the federal government’s efforts (Public Safety Canada, 2011). In the justice sector, the Ministry of Justice works in collaboration with other federal ministries in the context of the Youth Justice Initiative (YJI) (Ministry of Justice, undated). In addition, the Ministry of Justice has collaborated with PS during different reforms of the justice system (Public Safety Canada, 2016).

The policy analysis unit at PS argues that there exists a real interest in coordination to avoid having different ministries duplicating the same work independently, each in their own silos. Thus, every time an initiative is renewed or created, the federal government is obliged, according to our
interlocutor at the analysis unit, to collaborate to avoid the dangers and inefficiencies of working in isolation.

“\textit{When an initiative is renewed, the federal government is obliged to consult the ministries concerned to ensure that it is properly coordinated.}”

However, the goal of this coordination is more concerned with ensuring consultation than joint decision-making. In effect, there is no interdepartmental co-construction of public policies. Coordination centres around discussions, consultations and information exchange so that different ministries may remain informed and apprised of what other ministries are doing, even as each ministry develops its own policies separately. As was the case with the YJI (a Ministry of Justice program) and the NCPS (a PS initiative). As we have seen, the National Anti-Drug Strategy is an exception to this pattern in that its governance and policy development structure allows for the involvement of multiple ministries in its elaboration and implementation. This facilitates a more comprehensive vision and a shared approach to the same issue. This type of structure could be replicated in other areas such as crime prevention in general, a complex issue which concerns different ministries.

3.1.2 At the local level

Youth violence related issues (delinquency, drugs, youth gangs) are complex and require the intervention of a large number of partners and different sectors at the community level (Linden, 2010). This is even more true in Canada as the government has adopted a prevention approach based on social development, which also demands numerous partnerships (Léonard et al., 2005).

However, on the ground things do not unfold in such a well coordinated manner. In effect, the PS policy analysis unit argues that local coordination on the ground functions more in isolation than coordination at the national level. Differences in mandates between different actors and concern over avoiding doing the same work twice can lead to excessive separation between actors who could work together in a more coordinated manner on the ground.

“As for PS interventions in communities, at the present time there isn’t enough coordination with other federal government ministries. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, different ministries have very different mandates to avoid duplicating work. At the end of the day, we sometimes wonder if it wouldn’t be better to work in a more coordinated fashion, particularly in communities with great needs. The walls we’ve built to clearly distinguish the mandates of different ministries can also serve to limit the effectiveness of our response.”

Certain solutions or potential improvements may be envisioned. For example, some communities have implemented structures and mechanisms to promote cooperation which could be duplicated elsewhere. Certain communities have created crime prevention working groups for example. Quebec City did this in 1992. Its working group was composed of representatives from the municipal government, schools, universities and police departments. In the end, this
roundtable committee adopted 25 recommendations (e.g., local prevention strategies based on partnerships) which were integrated into a policy adopted in 2001 (Monchalin, 2009).

A second example is the Hub model. Developed in Saskatchewan in 2010 to address high crime rates, this model is based on a collaborative approach to crime prevention. The Hub is not an agency or place but rather a 90 minute conversation which takes place twice a week between professionals from different fields, in particular police officers and education and social services professionals. Its goal is to link up each situation deemed as at risk with the appropriate service(s) (McFee & Taylor, 2014). The “Hub” is not innovative because it’s based on partnerships. What makes it a path-breaking approach is its success in making coordination extremely effective and rapid. What happens is that partnerships are set in motion whenever a person with one or more risk factors is identified by one of the actors. These new cases are addressed during the second part of the discussion. The first part is devoted to following up on past cases. On average, after a situation is discussed for the first time, the initial intervention by the appropriate service(s) takes place in the following 48 hours. Moreover, in over half of the cases, the case is closed in a few days. This doesn't mean that the situation has been resolved, but rather that, thanks to the “hub,” the situation has been rapidly referred to the competent actor(s) (McFee & Taylor, 2014). This coordination mechanism has proven its effectiveness and produced very positive results. Essentially, the efforts implemented by different agencies are no longer fragmented, collaboration between actors, particularly in terms of information sharing, has improved and a mechanism for sharing points of view and perspectives has been established (McFee & Taylor, 2014). Due to its success, this model is spreading across Canada (McFee & Taylor, 2014).

### 3.2 Vertical coordination

In a country with a federal system, the principal vertical coordination issue concerns the relationship between the federal government and the governments at provincial (or state) level. In Canada, vertical coordination between the federal government, the provinces and territories takes the form of federal-provincial-territorial working groups (FPT working groups), which are co-managed by the federal government, the provinces and territories. FPT meetings are a forum allowing actors from the different levels of government to collaborate and coordinate their actions. As an actor who represents PS during FPT meetings explained to us, these meetings focus on specific policy areas and bring together the minister (or ministers) in charge of this question at the federal level with his/her (their) counterparts in each province and territory. For example, the FPT working group on crime prevention brings together PS and the equivalent ministers from each province. Likewise, the FPT justice working group includes the ministers of Justice and Public Safety from Canada and each province and territory. These two FPT working groups meet regularly and advise ministers during the elaboration and implementation of policies and programs in the areas of public safety, crime prevention or justice. In addition, these working groups communicate information on initiatives rolled out in relation to the relevant public policies and programs. In the opinion of a participant in the crime prevention working group, this is a very useful instrument as exchanges truly go back and forth in both directions. In short, this working
group makes it possible to assemble all actors and adopt a common work/action plan, with a shared approach and priorities.

“The FPT working group holds regular meetings to coordinate crime prevention efforts. It’s a working group that mainly examines policy issues. The group meets in person once a year, in addition to its quarterly teleconferences. Since 2013, the working group has been focusing its efforts on the five-year National Crime Prevention Action Plan, which contains a commitment to report to Canadians on the progress made in broadening the shared knowledge base on effective crime prevention practices in Canada.”

Although good vertical coordination between equivalent ministries at the federal, provincial and territorial levels has been instituted, there is room for improvement in the coordination between PS and other provincial and territorial ministries. In effect, these actors don't always communicate with each other and coordinate their actions. That has an effect on the ground, as certain actions cannot be implemented in the absence of proper cross-sector coordination between different areas of the federal and provincial or territorial governments. Vertical coordination, it seems, is effective when it is sectoral in nature. However, a more cross-sector type of coordination is needed to enable the implementation of actions that are intrinsically multisectoral.

Finally, vertical coordination also encompasses relations between the federal government and the local level. Such coordination is mainly effected through the funding granted by different federal ministries to organizations and municipalities, as well as via the support and technical assistance the federal government provides in the design and implementation of prevention actions. PS, for example, develops and disseminates models based on good practices, as well as guides and technical advice on the criteria that interventions must satisfy to be effective. In addition, PS officials are assigned to assist organizations, at their request, when the latter are developing project funding proposals, as well as throughout the project implementation phase on the ground, once funding has been granted. It would appear, however, according to certain program officers charged with assisting the implementation of funded projects, that the resources that PS makes available to facilitate successful implementation may be insufficient or are not provided in a timely manner (Public Safety Canada, 2011).

Furthermore, funding which is mainly oriented towards models based on practices implemented and evaluated in the past may prevent the emergence of promising new practices. Furthermore, a research advisor working at PS explained to us that the approved intervention models often imply an unwieldy and costly structure, which certain communities lack the resources to integrate or which are difficult to integrate into their existing structures.

“Concerning program implementation, the NCPS has for a several years now emphasized the funding of model programs, i.e., programs which have demonstrated results. These programs are generally multi-faceted and demand a certain capacity from the organizations which must implement them in communities. We have also
noted that these programs tend to be more sophisticated, more onerous and require the participation of specialized personnel, which translates into a certain number of administrative challenges. That said, we need to develop a response which is better adapted to communities with limited capacities and which are grappling with multiple problems.”

According to the PS policy analysis unit, another impediment to coordination is the temporary and project specific nature of government funding, which does not allow for the undertaking of long term actions. Communities have difficulty in finding other sources of funding to pursue programs once federal funding has terminated. Thus, even projects which produce positive outcomes must shut down.

“Presently, the funding available from PS in support of crime prevention initiatives is time limited. So, after a maximum of five years, even if a project has delivered good results, once funding has terminated, it’s difficult for the project managers to find alternative funding sources and continue managing the project. Moreover, our experience has shown us that it’s difficult to integrate such projects in the existing structures at the provincial/municipal level. FPT discussions are presently focusing on the search for innovative solutions to better address the issue of perpetuating effective crime prevention projects on a long term basis.”

Finally, vertical coordination problems remain particularly acute with Indigenous communities. Despite the increasing efforts undertaken to implement policy actions, these interventions are not effective and programs are not integrated into communities. On the one hand, it’s difficult for Indigenous communities, which are lacking in means and resources, both material and human, to carry out the procedures involved in making grant applications. On the other hand, the few projects that are implemented prove ephemeral. Major work needs to be undertaken at PS to improve this coordination.

“Concerning Indigenous communities, we’ve identified several issues in our approach which need to be adjusted. The federal government has implemented a few integrated projects, i.e., projects which required the collaboration of several ministries to provide better coordinated services in the community, as well as to ensure that the community need only collaborate via a single point of contact. These projects delivered positive results, but they were not continued once the temporary funding came to an end.”

4. Participation, leadership and collaboration

4.1 Participation

In Canada, the federal government has a central role in developing prevention strategies in relation to crime, violence against women and drug abuse. Almost all ministries are involved in these efforts. However, such involvement often essentially consists of consultations with actors rather than real involvement in decision-making and operational processes. With the exception of the NAS, which was developed through co-construction, public policies are generally elaborated
by a single ministry. This can be problematic. For example, according to the policy analysis unit, PS could certainly improve its collaboration with the Ministry of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. As we have seen, Indigenous communities confront multiple issues and are a priority target population of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. However, PS lacks the knowledge or the means required to properly grasp and respond to the needs of Indigenous communities. Consequently, a more systematic participation of the Ministry of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada in the elaboration of prevention policies would represent a step in the right direction.

“Under the NCPS, PS seeks to develop customized programs to better answer the needs of Indigenous populations. To this end, PS should better coordinate these efforts with the Ministry of Indian and Northern Affairs.”

The participation of provincial and territorial governments in FPT working groups concerns the very elaboration of policies and the defining of certain priorities or approaches to public action. This is essential as it enables all provinces to arrive at a consensus on shared principles and orientations. Moreover, it also allows provinces and territories to better apprehend the realities of their respective territories, issues and most affected communities, and, thereby, to make proper determinations on which communities to prioritize.

Civil society, for its part, is totally absent from the process of elaborating public policies and strategies. From a perspective where participation is seen as a means of deepening democracy, to develop national strategies via an entirely governmental process, from which civil society is totally absent, even in an advisory capacity, may seem problematic. Only the RCMP seems to have set up structures to let youth have their say. The National Youth Advisory Committee, discussed above, is the mechanism through which the RCMP hopes to learn the points of view of youth, as well as involve young people in discussions on public policies affecting them. This association with policy-making, it is supposed, will encourage their subsequent buy-in regarding the policies and strategies affecting them, thereby ensuring greater effectiveness in the measures taken to apply said strategies.

Communities as well are core actors in prevention at the local level, thanks to their organizations and professionals, who are charged with designing and implementing actions and initiatives. Such participation is very important as it guarantees a community’s involvement in, and ownership of, a project, both of which are essential to its success (Léonard et al., 2005).

4.2 Leadership

As we have seen, in Canada, crime prevention is seen through the prism of an integrated perspective, which encompasses different types of violence (drugs, street gangs, school violence), as well as the entire range of causal factors. This allows PS to exercise leadership in violence prevention issues, particularly in relation to secondary prevention.
Thanks to cooperation and collaboration mechanisms such as the FTP working group or the Interdepartmental Committee on Crime Prevention, PS ensures strong coordination mechanisms, through which a common vision and approach to issues and priorities in implementing strategies may be formed. A notable example was the FTP working group’s success in gaining the agreement of all provinces on the adoption of an evidence based prevention approach. This agreement, it goes without saying, was the result of a long and complex process, consisting of numerous inter-governmental discussions and exchanges, which, moreover, are ongoing. Further strengthening PS’ leadership is its leading role in charge of research and knowledge dissemination, which allows it to guide and encourage the orientations of actors on the ground. PS’ leadership role also derives from the funding it grants to front line organizations, and to the provinces and territories. Organizations wishing to make a funding request must, after all, comply with PS approved models.

Although strong leadership is beneficial in that it enables a more unified and coherent approach to crime prevention, certain observers, such as Monchalin (2009), regret the lack of a “responsibility centre” located at the federal level. Presently, the implementation of concrete actions follows a “bottom-up” pattern, where it falls to local organizations to make representations, design projects and submit project funding requests.

4.3 Collaboration

At the national level, collaboration means coordination beyond a functional minimum, in accordance with mandatory mechanisms. Collaboration occurs when actors demonstrate a willingness to fully collaborate and deepen their exchanges. The different federal and provincial ministries are animated by a willingness to collaborate, communicate and share their work and experiences. As one of our interviewees, who works in the Policy division at PS, explained to us, exchanges go beyond public policies and extend to their respective objectives and challenges, as well as to future orientations in prevention. This collaboration is important because it exposes ministries to different perspectives and facilitates collective reflection on important issues.

“We also share our future objectives. For example, we try to explore what is the role of social innovation in crime prevention. Obviously, certain provinces are more advanced than others because this question figures among their priorities. We support each other through our respective challenges.”

Furthermore, according to the same interviewee, collaboration between the federal government and the provinces and territories enables actors to adopt a common position to harmonize social climates and policies. In effect, it is possible to harmonize the approaches, priorities, strategies and responses of each province with the federal government.

“The provinces and territories have implemented a variety of prevention initiatives and through our continuous exchanges we endeavour to optimize our respective initiatives to advance crime prevention in Canada.”

National Prevention Strategies for Youth Violence: An International Comparative Study
An example of this collaboration is the joint initiative of the federal, provincial and territorial governments to create an inventory of crime prevention programs and initiatives in Canada. This inventory, which was designed by the FTP working group, catalogues all programs implemented across Canada by topic and risk factor. It also catalogues good practices.

"As part of our FPT discussions, we are working to develop an inventory of our practices. This is a nice example of FPT collaboration."

However, at the local level, collaboration can be problematic. For example, according to a person who participated in a youth violence prevention program in Quebec, the actors on the ground didn’t trust each other. That resulted in an absence of information sharing between stakeholders, a potential obstacle to a properly functioning program. Lack of trust is often accompanied by very different work philosophies and procedures. Not all actors work in the same direction and pursue the same objectives. Beyond the lack of trust among certain actors, another factor is in play: although actors may be working as part of the same program, they do not answer to the program, but rather to their respective organizations. One could therefore envisage a procedure allowing actors on the ground to report to the program manager rather than to their respective organizations’ hierarchy. This would facilitate coherence in the work of grassroots actors who, under such an arrangement, would be more likely to pull in the same direction. These issues illustrate the conflict between a vertical institutional logic and a horizontal logic reflecting grassroots factors, i.e., two types of institutional dynamics which sometimes seem incompatible.

5. **Information, data and knowledge sharing**

Knowledge building and sharing are central components of crime prevention in Canada. As we have seen, the mission of PS is to connect actors on the ground with crime prevention research in order to encourage evidence based interventions, i.e., models based on good practices. To this end, PS makes its knowledge base available to communities and organizations. This knowledge base includes, notably, summaries of evaluations and research reports on risk factors and related issues, as well as tools and guides on best practices. This dissemination is done on a large scale, as much of the PS knowledge base is available on its internet site. The data collected by PS largely originates in the United States, where many programs have been evaluated. That said, increasing numbers of evaluations are being done in Canada. This is contributing to the development of Canadian expertise.

Although effective in its knowledge dissemination role, PS seems to engage in limited knowledge production. In effect, PS does not produce its own data and only utilizes secondary sources. On the other hand, although PS does not collect its own data, it does rely on a strong partnership with Statistics Canada and other federal government departments. It may seem paradoxical that a department that ensures national leadership, in part due to its capacity to produce and disseminate knowledge, does not actually work with primary data. Be that as it may, strong collaboration with other departments and with Statistics Canada on numerous surveys provides
PS with constant access to necessary information. Moreover, in the context of this collaboration, PS may contribute new questions to data collection tools. At Statistics Canada, there is a division that deals specifically with law and justice issues: the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS). CCJS coordinates a federal, provincial and territorial partnership on data collection focusing on the nature and scope of criminal activity, as well as on matters pertaining to the administration of justice. During prior collaborations, the CCSJ and PS were able to jointly analyze trends and the distribution of crime in neighbourhoods and cities. This enables PS to better target the communities in need of funding support and programs, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of intervention (Public Safety Canada, undated).

At the local level, as we’ve just seen, the main sources of knowledge are the tools and research findings relayed by PS. Consequently, according to Waller (2016), municipalities benefit from unprecedented access to information on programs and strategies implemented in other communities and deemed to be effective. However, data sharing procedures between actors in the field have not been systematized. This can create inequalities in access to information, as well as complications and delays during the implementation of a project. Finally, as we have seen, the reporting of data required to monitor an intervention’s target populations may be compromised by a certain lack of trust among different grassroots actors.

6. **Conclusion**

In Canada, youth violence related issues are the shared responsibility of the federal, provincial and, on certain points, municipal governments. At the federal level, the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) ensures a certain national integration of policy orientations. As a result, there is quite solid leadership at the national level, where Public Safety Canada assumes a leadership role in setting strategic orientations, from both an operational perspective, as well as in terms of knowledge production and dissemination, and technical and funding support. Moreover, this integration at the federal level is founded on quite effective cooperation between different governmental institutions, which is based on a spirit of collaboration among different actors in the interests of improving efficiency.

However, major issues are evident in terms of vertical coordination and local coordination. Vertical coordination rests on the complementarity and independence of the three levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal). However, in practice, major deficiencies are apparent in the interfaces ensuring inter-governmental linkages, notwithstanding the effective functioning of certain coordination structures such as the FTP committees.

As for local coordination, an issue of note is the difficulty experienced by the most vulnerable communities, in particular small municipalities and Indigenous communities, in implementing effective local action in compliance with the orientations of national strategies. This problem is a reflection of their major shortfalls in financial, material and human resources, as well as in institutional capacities. Particular emphasis must be placed on the situation of Indigenous communities, which represent especially vulnerable and marginalized environments confronted with major issues, particularly in relation to youth violence. Although recent efforts have been
made to provide strategic planning adapted to these specific contexts, the effectiveness of prevention policies in Indigenous communities remains one of the major challenges facing governments, at both the federal and provincial levels.

In general, one notes great disparities in the effectiveness of different local coordination systems, which often suffer from a lack of collaboration and connectivity between actors and stakeholders. In essence, this is an issue of weak local networking dynamics and underlines the urgent need to strengthen them. The “hubs” model represents a promising tool for remedying this issue.

With respect to participation, it’s evident that civil society, local communities and target groups are largely absent from the design phase of prevention strategies and, to a certain extent, from their implementation as well. Here too, although some progress has been made, this remains a very major shortcoming.
1. **Introduction: Youth and violence in Colombia**

Colombia has been embroiled in armed conflict since 1948. The conflict is estimated to have resulted in over 420,000 deaths between 1948 and 2012 and over 25,000 disappearances between 1958 and 2012. The overwhelming majority of victims have been civilians from the rural communities most exposed to the violence (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014). In addition, Human Rights Watch reports that there are more than 5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country.

The violence has varied in intensity over time, with successive waves starting in the 1980s and 1990s continuing into the early 2000s. These waves have corresponded to the upsurge in drug trafficking and organized crime, the increasingly complex configuration of armed groups, the convergence and linkages between the armed conflict and drug trafficking, and government repression (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2014).

In short, violence in Colombia is an endemic problem, a social fact having a direct or indirect impact on each and every sector and aspect of the country’s society, economy, and democracy. However, the violence exhibits a highly patchy distribution, with its impact being greatest on marginalized populations, geographically circumscribed areas, remote rural areas, and certain districts of large cities. For example, urban crime in Colombia’s three largest cities is concentrated within a small proportion of their territory: 1.2% in the case of Bogotá, 3.2% in that of Medellín, and 3.8% in that of Cali (Ortega, Mejía, & Ortiz, 2015).

Logically enough, the approaches and methods adopted in addressing the phenomenon of violence in Colombia have been intrinsically linked to the conflict and to drug trafficking. That is, the problem has primarily been viewed through the lens of national security.

As a World Health Organization report observes “youth have become visible through violence” (PAHO/WHO/GTZ, 2006, p. 19). Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, disadvantaged adolescents and young adults have constituted the main recruitment pool for various protagonists involved in organized violence, first in the context of the armed conflict and later in the contexts of drug trafficking, organized crime, urban crime, and delinquency. These same youths are the primary victims of this physical, psychological, and sexual violence as well as the persons most susceptible to drug use and addiction.

Foremost among the causes and issues in relation to youth violence are the extremely difficult socioeconomic conditions faced by children, adolescents, and young adults from working-class families in Colombia. Among the macro-scale factors at play are poverty, social inequality, a very high rate of youth unemployment, and limited access to higher education. Community and family determinants of juvenile violence include repeated exposure to violence in working-class neighbourhoods and rural areas impacted by the armed conflict and drug trafficking, as well as
the prevalence of domestic violence in Colombian society (González, Rocio, Escobar-Córdoba & Castellanos Castañeda, 2007).

Drug use in Colombia has increased since the 1970s and 1980s, particularly among youth, and constitutes a major problem today, especially in urban environments. Drug use is a primary risk factor for violence; it is strongly associated with the development of violent behaviour and the commission of criminal acts (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2013).

Youth gangs formed in urban settings are doubly problematic: on the one hand, they tend to foster destructive behaviours and activities connected with juvenile delinquency and street crime; on the other, they serve as a stepping stone toward recruitment by organized crime, which uses these generally informal gangs as nurseries for potential recruits and as “subcontractors.” The drug trafficking system depends in considerable part on bringing vulnerable youth into the fold as both drug users and sicarios (cartel henchmen, mainly recruited from among adolescents and young men). These youths are thus exposed to both the extreme violence inherent in drug trafficking and the violence in the form of state repression. Young people are the weak link in this criminal chain, and also its first victims. Although accurate figures are very difficult to obtain, minors are estimated to make up 50% of the membership of Colombia’s criminal organizations (Springer, 2012). Moreover, the 12–28 age group accounted for 48.4% of Bogotá’s homicide victims in 2012 (Secretaría Distrital de Gobierno, 2013).

With the progress achieved on the peace process and drug enforcement campaigns, violence and the forms it takes in Colombia are changing. In 2016, the country’s homicide rate was 24.4 per 100,000 inhabitants, the lowest rate since 1974 (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2016). This steady decrease in the homicide rate also applies to youths aged 14 to 28, the age bracket accounting for the largest proportion of both perpetrators and victims. However, the available statistics also show an increase in common crime (e.g., theft, assault), which primarily involves adolescents and young adults. These developments can be explained by the success of the peace process, which has resulted in a reduction in conflict-related crimes (e.g., assassinations, kidnappings); the data reflects a shift in crime patterns towards common crime and organized crime (Ortega et al., 2015).

2. **Youth violence and its prevention in national policies and strategies**

Colombia has no specific youth violence and/or crime prevention policies; these concerns are divided up and addressed through a variety of broad policy areas.

Any attempt at grasping the logic underlying the Colombian government’s approach demands an examination of policies enacted at several levels and in different sectors of action. The outline presented here considers three scales (international, national, local) and three policy areas — development, youth and security — in which the vast majority of public policies related to youth and violence are developed.
2.1 Violence prevention: a pan-American concern

During the 1990s, the public health perspective on violence spread throughout the Americas (Guerrero, 2008). In 2000, this trend culminated in the founding of the Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of Violence (IACPV) by the major international institutions active on the continent (the Pan-American Health Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, the Organization of American States, UNESCO, and several US agencies).

The concept of violence and crime prevention, included under the umbrella concept of “citizen security,” made its appearance in Colombia in the 1990s. Whereas previous approaches had focused on public safety, law and order, and crime reduction, the primary objective of the new paradigm is to establish a civic culture of community cohesion, lawfulness, and governability.

In response to the endemic and pervasive nature of the violence in Colombia, government bodies and civil society organizations alike have developed a great many prevention programs and initiatives with varying degrees of success. These have been deployed at the national, municipal, and community levels (PAHO/WHO/GTZ, 2006).

Since the early 2000s, violence prevention, particularly in relation to youth, has been a much discussed issue in Colombia. This development parallels a continent-wide trend toward violence prevention instigated by international organizations, one that has found form in the IACPV, an organization which aims to enhance the coordination of prevention efforts at all scales and to encourage and support the development of national strategies.

The initiatives developed by the Colombian government include:

- programs focusing on institutional capacity-building and on inter-regional and inter-sectoral cooperation;
- increased integration of youth policies and violence prevention issues;
- the development and implementation of a restorative justice-based framework for managing young offenders;
- the development of a national juvenile delinquency prevention strategy;
- studies and analyses based on field research (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2013).

In Colombia today, youth violence issues are addressed via three major types of public policies: public security policies, development policies, and youth policies.

2.2 Social prevention: development policies and youth policies

2.2.1 Development policies

For the Colombian state, development policies constitute highly important strategic instruments. The Constitution of 1991 provides for the drafting of a national development plan5 (PND) to

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5 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
establish the government’s principal strategic priorities, with a corresponding investment plan to guide the allocation of government funds to the various spheres of government action. These planning tools encompass both the national and local levels, with the PND constituting the fundamental government policy document in each electoral cycle. A key observation found in this document concerns the relationship between human development and violence: "inequality, much like violence, is endemic and long-standing in Colombia, and its transformation demands fundamental changes" (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2015, p. v).

The main principles underlying a social approach to violence prevention (including youth violence prevention) are found in the PND: inequality reduction, child and youth protection, social assistance and family support, public safety, education, employment, democratic consolidation and peace building, etc. Each of these strategic policy areas is assigned to a different government department or agency. This reflects the government’s highly sector-specific organizational structure, in which all jurisdictions and policies in a given policy area fall under the purview of a sole institution.

The PND also identifies several priority regions of the country and an overall strategy for each. It is then up to local, departmental, or municipal authorities to elaborate local development plans and implement their own policies. Local development plans generally encompass numerous aspects integral to social prevention, such as education, health, vulnerable populations, recreation, participatory democracy, and land use planning.

2.2.2 Youth policies

The rapid growth of drug trafficking, especially during the 1980s, provoked a wave of urban violence and a sharp rise in drug and alcohol abuse. These phenomena, primarily affecting young men and adolescents, prompted some necessary soul-searching around the problems faced by urban youth. The need to address these issues subsequently became a central aspect of Colombia’s youth policies (WHO, 2007).

In accordance with the principles of decentralization set out in the Constitution of 1991, certain municipalities developed their own youth programs. This was especially true of large metropolitan areas beset by waves of violence related to substance abuse and drug trafficking. The goal of these programs was to reduce young people’s vulnerability to addiction and to recruitment into organized crime, in particular by providing supervised activities and guidance as outreach to youth during their spare time, including youth who have left the educational system (PAHO/WHO/GTZ, 2006). Several cities also adopted stricter regulations on alcohol sales to reduce the violence associated with alcohol abuse. These municipal policies were quite successful, as attests the correlation with a noticeable decrease in homicide rates (the indicator most commonly used to measure violence in Colombia).

Youth policies were also introduced at the national level in the 1990s, owing to Colombia’s adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations Guidelines for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (UN resolution 45/112). These international standards were integrated into a number of documents: the Constitution of 1991, which recognizes that youth enjoy specific rights; the two national youth policies (1992 and 1995); and a youth act passed in 1997. The definition of “youth” in these documents is broader than in most countries, comprising persons between the ages of 14 and 26 (or in some cases 29). This initial framework laid out the principles of Colombian youth policies: civic participation, protection and opportunity, and the responsibility of municipal authorities to establish local youth policies.

The national framework was expanded in the 2000s with the implementation of the “Young Colombia” program, as well as a 10-year youth plan in 2005, and the passage of a Youth Citizenship Act in 2013.

Today, youth policies continue to be developed primarily by the country’s municipalities with national-level support from the Young Colombia program. Colombia’s family welfare institute, the Columbian Institute for Family Well-Being (ICBF) is the government agency traditionally responsible for social policy. Its development and youth strategies centre around protection, support, and social services. The primary focus of the ICBF is the prevention of risk factors such as poverty, domestic violence and abuse, substance abuse within the family, and lack of parental supervision. In this light, this institution has a role to play in crime prevention policies and municipal security plans, which include addressing the issues of youth violence and crime prevention (Valdés & Amador, 2013).

Another major issue affecting Colombia’s young people is unemployment, with the most vulnerable urban youth being the most severely affected. In 2010, 47% of youths aged 15 to 19 and 45% of those aged 20 to 24 were unemployed (Secretaría Distrital de Gobierno, 2013). Only in the past ten years has youth employment been made a national priority with the passage of the Entry-level Employment Act of 2010 and the tax reform of 2012. Youth unemployment issues have been also addressed through development policies, notably through the strategic priorities of strengthening education, prolonging compulsory education, and expanding vocational training opportunities.

In 2016, although youth under 29 years of age still accounted for 50% of Colombia’s unemployed, with the unemployment rate for this age group at 15.5% (and 19.5% for youth under 25), this nonetheless signified a 5% decline in the unemployment rate since 2010 (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2016).

2.3 Tertiary prevention and youth restorative justice: the juvenile justice system

The age of criminal responsibility in Colombia is 14, but there is a special criminal justice system, the SRPA, which deals with minors between 14 and 18 years of age. Introduced in 2006 further to the enactment of the Child and Youth Code, the SRPA was gradually put into effect between 2007

6 Colombia Joven

7 Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar
and 2009. It consists of a set of specialized judicial and administrative principles, standards, procedures, and authorities, whose function is to implement a restorative justice process, premised on truth and reparations. As such, it has a pronounced educational focus, which differentiates it from the standard justice system for adults.

The ICBF plays a central role in the supervision of minors in trouble with the law under the SRPA, a special juvenile criminal justice. It provides specific support for minors incarcerated in youth protection facilities and works with the healthcare system to offer young offenders case supervision and assistance with physical and mental health issues. The SRPA framework governing young offenders is therefore separate from the adult judicial and correctional system in that it is under the supervision of social assistance institutions — a boldly innovative approach.

2.4 The National Policy on Citizen Security and Community Cohesion (PNSCC)

The PNSCC adopted in 2011 pursuant to the Citizen Security Act of 2001, represents a paradigm shift from an approach based on law and order and crime control to one centring around “citizen security” and coexistence among all community members.

While the PNSCC recognizes the importance of social prevention in violence and crime reduction, particularly among youth, law enforcement institutions and actors remain central to its application at the local level.

The PNSCC identifies young people between the ages of 12 and 26 as one of its ten priorities, and its main goal is to prevent them from being caught up in criminal networks. The document includes social or primary prevention principles such as family support, building educational capacity, school supervision and support, cultural and leisure activities, and resilience to drugs and violence.

Finally, restorative justice and tertiary prevention structures involving coordination with the SRPA have been incorporated into the PNSCC. Local authorities are responsible for implementing the SRPA-prescribed system for adolescents. More pointedly, local security plans developed within the framework of the PNSCC must specify, in conjunction with the youth policies, how young offenders will be supervised within locally run facilities, and must also provide for vocational training programs for adolescents (SENE), along with programs specifically developed for their rehabilitation. However, an analysis of the integrated policies of three cities (Medellín, Bogotá, and Barranquilla) found each to be very vague as to the specific means and mechanisms that the city would use to coordinate and implement these responsibilities.

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8 Sistema de Responsabilidad Penal para Adolescentes
9 Política Nacional de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana
2.5 The national juvenile delinquency prevention policy: a difficult integration

This policy was developed concomitantly with international violence prevention initiatives including the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines) and the Youth Development and Violence Prevention Program. This latter, ongoing in six Latin American countries and spearheaded by the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), strives to implement coordination mechanisms so as to improve the public policy framework for youth violence.

The policy design process was based on evidence and systematic studies undertaken during a preliminary phase of the initiative. Participation in the design process was expanded to include 23 public agencies and institutions, most of them national in scope. In addition, the research phase involved collection of data on youths from 14 to 28 years of age, notably through the use of focus groups (Mesías Garcia, 2015):

“It was an interdepartmental policy developed by a range of actors in order to give it a higher profile and accentuate the differences put forward.”

This policy focuses on four strategic areas: complete protection, restorative justice, inclusion, and joint responsibility. Primary prevention was excluded from this policy’s field of focus. It prioritized secondary prevention and measures directed at at-risk populations, as well as coordination with the justice system, in particular through the SRPA. As such, the policy constitutes an initial attempt to address issues of youth crime and violence comprehensively, combining the principles of primary and secondary social prevention with tertiary prevention and restorative justice. This novel approach contrasts with traditional sector-specific approaches in which social prevention (development policies), tertiary prevention (the justice system and SRPA), and security policies are dealt with separately.

In the process leading to its approval, the policy faced a number of hurdles. Following several months when its fate seemed in jeopardy, its implementation now seems certain, as we write these lines.

One of the respondents emphasized the role of senior ministerial officials in this near failure:

“This [policy] was not the outcome of an effort begun by these officials; they paid it little attention because there was no comprehensive public security policy into which this prevention policy would fit.” (Interview with Hugo Acero, 2017)

Indeed, this highly integrated multisectoral policy sits in stark contrast with the silo-like workings of the Colombian government in general, particularly with respect to funding. In Colombian public policy, funding is allocated on the basis of strategic policy areas and programs, and disbursed to the corresponding administrative institutions. By contrast, the policy in question is multi-institutional; as a result, the issue of funding became contentious, portending heightened inter-institutional competition, particularly vis-a-vis law enforcement agencies, described by

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several respondents as receiving the lion’s share of the funds despite their lacking the capacity to engage in primary or secondary social prevention.

“The [financial] resources are not intersectoral — substantially more goes to policing and security than to justice.” (Hugo Acero, 2017)

3. Coordination and governance

As regards policies on the reduction and prevention of youth violence and juvenile delinquency, the reality on the ground has to contend with conforming with measures and programs derived from national policies on youth and on crime reduction/prevention, local and municipal citizen security programs, and international norms and standards (Valdés & Amador, 2013). This nesting of often conflicting approaches, devised at different levels of government, complicates on-the-ground situations and may interfere with concrete and coherent action.

3.1 At the national level

In the 1980s, Colombia embarked on the decentralization of its institutional system and its political governance. The local authorities (departments, districts, and municipalities) now have jurisdiction areas related to development and social prevention, such as education, health or youth policy (Maldonaldo, 2011). However, the general strategies in these areas continue to be defined at the national level by government ministries and sector-specific agencies and serve to establish the framework within which local action plans and programs must operate.

The historical context — marked by multiple waves of extreme violence caused by the armed conflict and the drug trade — has also had a profound influence on the decentralization process. The police and other law enforcement agencies have not moved towards decentralized governance; they are still organized in a highly vertical manner in keeping with a national security-based outlook. They remain under the authority of the Ministry of Defence rather than the Ministries of Justice or the Interior. Meanwhile, the local authorities have been assigned responsibility for “citizen security” (Gutiérrez, Barberena, Garay & Ospina, 2010).

Since 2011, public security issues have been developed on the basis of a comprehensive security approach, which also comprises a vision of prevention, as initially articulated by the PNSCC. These responsibilities too have been partially handed over to the municipal authorities, which develop their own strategies and coordination systems.

In practice, decentralization has not had the effect of removing the public security file from the purview of the police and the judicial system with their vertical and hierarchical styles of organization. One of the respondents noted that where security and violence prevention are concerned, “the President’s authority prevails over that of the governors and the mayors, who act as his deputies.”
The silo-like organization of Colombian institutions continues to pose numerous obstacles to the implementation of bona fide multisectoral public policies (PAHO/WHO/GTZ, 2006). There is little cross-sector coordination at the national level; policy development is highly sector-specific, bereft of any real inter-agency coordination or, indeed, formal coordination mechanisms. This study’s respondents confirmed this near-total absence of inter-agency and intersectoral collaboration.

“The extent of collaboration, let alone coordination [between sectors], is very low. There is no public policy to coordinate the different ministries with responsibilities in the areas of prevention and social development, and which in turn are connected with security issues.” (Interview with a Colombian security specialist who has held key positions in the civil service, 2017)

In an effort to institutionalize and formalize its strategy for responding to the monumental challenge posed by Colombia’s territorial heterogeneity and decentralization, the national government has conceptualized a set of mechanisms known as “nation-territory coordination” (articulación nación-territorio) which are to be adopted by every ministry and agency, and incorporated into every public policy. One important aim of this coordination system is to harmonize national funding throughout the country to take account of vast regional income disparities.

3.2 At the local level

Local authorities (departments or municipalities) develop their own policies and action plans based on guidelines and principles determined at the national level. Thus, each national policy on security, development, or youth has a local counterpart. These local policies must be designed so as to address local particularities and priorities, identify strategic measures, and enable the local implementation of national policies.

3.2.1 Social prevention: largely effected through local youth and development policies

Where youth-related issues are concerned, the major cities also develop youth and development policies of their own. While these local policies do not explicitly mention crime and violence prevention, they do encompass the great majority of the corresponding strategic policy areas. They assemble a broader network of actors than found in the security sector and, indeed, include the whole array of social action institutions that work with youth (ICBF, education, health, culture and recreation). Moreover, active public (including youth) participation is a component of these policies.

It is common for these policies to place more emphasis on social and primary prevention than security policies do. While the term “prevention” is used in the sense of public health and protection, it is these local development and youth policies whose content and programs are closest to the principles of social prevention. In effect, they encompass employment and
antipoverty measures, education and vocational training, the family environment and functional parenting, prevention of sexual and domestic violence, participation, etc.\textsuperscript{11}

3.2.2 Local policies and local security plans

Municipalities are in charge of developing their own comprehensive coexistence and citizen security policies,\textsuperscript{12} within the framework of the PNCSS. Underpinning these municipal action plans is a two-pronged — social and situational — approach to prevention that is coordinated with policing and the justice system, as well as information systems, and evaluation processes.

Most Colombian municipalities have now implemented security policies, but often only in the guise of an administrative obligation rather than as a strategic planning tool. Such policies are often developed without inter-institutional coordination or the participation of the actors concerned. Moreover, there is a lack of political will and funding for their implementation (Bulla & Guarín, 2015).

In terms of institutions, the Constitution of 1991 and the PNSCC of 2011 provide the framework for local governance over security and violence-related matters by defining two types of entities:

- Departmental or metropolitan security councils\textsuperscript{13} chaired by the governor or mayor. These bodies are responsible for developing local citizen security and coexistence policies as well as information systems and evaluation mechanisms. It is important to note, however, that despite the integrated approach introduced by these policies, these security councils are made up exclusively of representatives of the law enforcement and justice communities — public security institutions, the police, the army, and the judicial system (Dirección General de la Policía Nacional de Colombia, 2011), to the exclusion of social development, education, and health institutions as well as civil society actors.

- Regional law and order committees\textsuperscript{14} are structurally similar to the security councils and constitute the executive bodies thereof.

The predominant role of police departments in these structures greatly influences the strategies and actions that make up local citizen security policies and plans. The result is that these latter tend to favour a security-oriented approach where in which prevention is largely situational in nature.

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\textsuperscript{11} This paragraph was drafted based on the development and youth policies in effect in the Bogotá and Medellín metropolitan areas, the two largest in the country.

\textsuperscript{12} Política Integral de Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana

\textsuperscript{13} Consejos de Seguridad

\textsuperscript{14} Comités Territoriales de Orden Público
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Moreover, with their highly hierarchical, centralized structure, police forces behave according to an institutional logic that hinders local autonomy; however, such autonomy is indispensible to the effective functioning of coordination structures such as the security councils. A dynamic confirmed by one of this study’s respondents:

“The police set their own objectives independently, and these are not coordinated with the mayor.”

3.2.3 Rural contexts

Colombia is characterized by great heterogeneity, with huge cities and remote rural areas coexisting in the same country (Carmona, Supelano & Osejo, 2015). The country’s rural areas are marginalized in numerous and often mutually reinforcing ways. They may be far from urban areas and services; isolated by topography and geography; deficient in roads and other infrastructure; under the control of armed groups or criminal gangs, and/or lacking in public services. In many isolated rural areas where travel is difficult, public services and access to officials can only be obtained by going to the regional administrative centre.

Consequently, the governability of a region, the degree of control that the government can assert over it, varies enormously throughout the country. Many rural areas exist in a “void of legitimate state authority” and, in its absence, develop local cultures profoundly marked by violence and the absence of boundaries between legal and illegal activity (Gutiérrez, Barberena, Garay & Ospina, 2010, p. 153).

The public authorities have therefore approached violence and crime in these areas as a national security issue, whether they stem from armed conflict or organized crime. The central law enforcement body is the army, and these regions have experienced a situation of militarization for more than 50 years. Under such conditions, prevention does not figure in public strategies.

As former theatres of armed conflict, the country’s rural areas are also now dealing with the profound transformations brought about by the peace process. Regular democratic governance is being reinstated, civilian police forces are taking over from the army, the armed conflict related issues are giving way to issues of citizen security, trust must be re-instilled between the public and the law enforcement authorities, former combatants must be reintegrated into civil society, and victims must be given support.

In these traumatized places, violence occupies a central place; consequently, public action has been slow to make the transition towards processes of peace building, protection, and prevention. Meanwhile, the local communities are struggling to adapt to the new social order under construction (Bulla & Guarín, 2015).

In contrast to the cities, which have been given opportunities to create locally relevant policies in various spheres of action, including security and youth policy, the rural areas lack the financial and institutional resources to develop their own local strategies.
4. Leadership, participation and collaboration in the system of actors

Leadership on security related issues is still ensured, both nationally and locally, by the military and the police. The armed conflict and drug enforcement have not only forged the security context in Colombia, but also played a major role in determining the government’s responses. Consequently, there is a dichotomy between the decentralized approach that gives local authorities the lead role in the implementation of public policies and the extremely hierarchical practices and dynamics profoundly rooted in a police and military culture that regards violence as a national security issue.

While this problem is extremely complex, particularly in Colombia, it has two principal aspects that warrant discussion here.

4.1 Interfaces and coordination

To begin with, the dichotomy between an integrated view and a security-centred view is expressed in structural and functional terms, in the interfaces and coordination between civilian institutions and the police. In Colombia today, both the police and the army report to the Ministry of Defence, a highly unusual state of affairs. In most countries, the Ministry of the Interior or Public Safety has jurisdiction over policing, while the Ministry of Defence is exclusively concerned with matters of national security, particularly in relation to foreign powers. However, a half-century of armed conflict has left a profound mark on Colombia’s institutions, particularly in their approach to public safety and law enforcement. The police and the army remain organized according to an extremely hierarchical and vertical model, and for good reason: national defence is not by nature consistent with decentralization.

This institutional peculiarity of Colombian policing is at odds with the modern vision of public security developed since 1991. This latter vision incorporates a paradigm shift towards an integrated local approach, with prevention issues addressed by multidisciplinary strategies. Thus, policing, which plays a central role in the areas of security and violence prevention, is characterized by a hierarchical logic different from that of the local systems in which the police participate, such as the local and regional security councils. The respondents in our interviews identified this contradiction as one of the main impediments to the real and effective adoption of local security policies.

A second major problem identified is that citizen security and coexistence policies, whether adopted at the national or the municipal level, mainly revolve around the law enforcement and justice institutions, meaning that the police will play the predominant role in security-related interventions on the ground. It is most often they who are the first responders in actual situations of violence prevention. One respondent cited the example of violence prevention programs targeting alcohol abuse on weekend nights. He pointed out that these programs became the de facto purview of the police, as the only agents of the public sector able to intervene at such late hours.
“The only actor available [when these interventions occur] is the police: they are the only ones who operate 24 hours a day... Coordinating interventions in a manner that enables the various actors to do their work, by allocating the relevant responsibilities among them, is a challenge that remains to be met.” (Interview with Boris Yesid, 2017)

This example illustrates how the notion that issues of violence and its prevention are the purview of the police can continue to persist in the public service.

Meanwhile, social prevention is addressed through social development actions without any coordination with violence prevention efforts. It is defined by municipal and national development policies through the ICBF, along with other public institutions (social services, health, education) whose practices are connected with prevention (especially primary prevention). However, these measures are only minimally coordinated with security policies, if at all. The result is to reinforce the notion of a separation between social action and the prevention of violence and crime. In other words, to negate social prevention as a component of public safety.

4.2 Leadership and political vision

While shared jurisdiction exists in theory, the notion that security issues (including prevention) are the purview of the police persists in institutions and among actors and government officials.

On the subject of violence prevention as a strategic priority, this study’s respondents concur that there is a lack of clear-sightedness and political will in this regard. An illustration of this was the fate of the juvenile delinquency prevention policy, a key government priority since 2011, which nevertheless was nearly abandoned. According to the respondents, the policy was almost abandoned because of a change of direction within the Ministry of Justice and a reorientation of priorities. Interestingly, this reversal came at a time of relative political stability and not as the result of a change of government or a new parliamentary majority. Several respondents pointed out that government priorities have recently turned away from comprehensive crime and violence prevention, and they suggested that this tendency was the root cause of the near abandonment of the juvenile delinquency prevention policy.

The rocky political process around this policy has nonetheless thus shone a light on a deeper issue: the lack of a consistent and cohesive long-term vision and action on the part of the government.

5. Information management

The Colombian institutional system generates data of a quality deemed satisfactory by all of the respondents.

“In terms of information systems, Colombia is one of the most advanced countries in Latin America.” (Hugo Acero, 2017)

The three main sources of raw data at the national level are the Forensic Medicine Institute, the National Police, and the justice system. In terms of human development, the 2014–2018 National
Development Plan (PND) provides for the harmonization of information sources on a single platform, the Social Information System (Sistema de Información Social).

During President Santos’ first mandate, from 2011 to 2014, national security surveys were conducted on a regular basis, with the most recent one published in 2015. These surveys are invaluable, particularly in a context where official crime data must be triangulated with figures on unreported crimes, which may be obtained through victimization surveys for example. It would appear, however, according to the respondents, that victimization surveys are not systematically conducted and that the national security surveys program may in fact have been discontinued in the last two years.

At the local level, institutional data is augmented by several initiatives implemented in the major cities, such as the “Bogotá cómo vamos” program launched at the end of the 1990s by the business community and civil society organizations. The project’s aim is to produce and disseminate knowledge about quality-of-life issues. It has an important public safety component, which includes the publishing of analytical reports and victimization and security surveys. This model, adopted in 12 other major urban centres, including Medellín, Cali, and Cartagena, constitutes a particularly effective platform for the production and sharing of information.

Several major cities have incorporated data generation, management, and analysis features into their public policy development. Bogotá’s integrated citizen security and coexistence policy now comprises an institution specifically dedicated to local-level knowledge production. Medellín has developed municipal information systems that provide data on the whole gamut of issues related to crime and violence, but also on human development and socioeconomic indicators.

However, several of the respondents noted major issues related to data sharing and circulation. The sectoral silo-type logic practiced by different Colombian institutions, coupled with the proprietary manner in which they guard their own data, hinder the streamlined management of data. There appears to be a culture of non-transparency to which local police departments and other agencies are particularly prone.

“Colombia has a problem with information sharing and management... The information exists, but each actor has its own data collection system... There is no collaboration.” (Boris Yesid, President, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, 2017)

Inter-institutional data sharing remains problematic, particularly where police data are concerned. Since the evaluation of police forces is closely tied to crime data and statistical outcomes, there is a risk that locally collected data will be altered, or that it will be withheld by certain authorities in cases where transparency is perceived as a liability to them. The respondents stressed the importance of this risk at the local level and its impact on the effectiveness of the local security councils.

One particular problem is that information on minors is not forwarded to the adult criminal justice system, which prevents ensuring follow-up on young offenders. The confidentiality of this
information constitutes a major issue from the standpoint of both information production and the ethical use thereof.

6. **Conclusion**

Violence in its myriad forms — urban, political, domestic, or organized crime-related — constitutes an extremely complex and pervasive problem in Colombia. The various forms of violence, although distinct, each being characterized by its own patterns, structures, causes, and dynamics, are intimately interconnected. These phenomena constitute what is known in sociology as a total social fact; that is, they have a profound structural impact on all tangible and intangible aspects of Colombian society: its institutions and governments; the discourses, representations, and conceptions of its actors; the practices and activities of daily life. Moreover, this social fact is not static in time or space; it changes in response to conditions, whether international, national or local; societal or economic, or political or cultural.

Yet violence affects the land and people in a highly disparate manner: while its indirect effects are felt by the entire population, its direct consequences — how it manifests itself in concrete situations — affect the most vulnerable regions and groups to a wholly disproportionate extent. Indeed, Colombia’s most vulnerable citizens, who are victims of the deep-rooted macrosystemic, social, economic, and regional inequalities afflicting the country, are also confronted with another type of inequality that is just as glaring: they bare the brunt of the impacts of violence. Among these vulnerable groups, youth, and particularly young men, are at the greatest risk of being either the victims or the perpetrators of violence.

Given the scope and intensity of the phenomenon, but also given the need to move ahead on a process of democratic transition and national reconciliation in a country torn apart by political and societal conflict, the Colombian state has had to move beyond traditional conceptions and tools, which are insufficient to cope with a crisis of this magnitude. It has had to develop an innovative approach involving an ambitious national vision on the one hand and renewed local practices on the other. In short, the approach developed since the beginning of the 1990s has two fundamental underpinnings: a response to violence based on social prevention and inequality reduction, and decentralized state action, particularly via an affirmation of the predominant role of local governance.

Colombia has had a number of successful experiences with prevention programs addressing youth crime and violence, and is becoming a leader in this area. Yet challenges persist, particularly as regards coordination systems, collaboration between actors, and the long-term sustainability of public policy action in this area.
1. Introduction

The United States has a relatively high crime rate compared to other high income countries (Sumner et al., 2015). That said, the national homicide rate is relatively low. On the other hand, certain U.S. cities rank among the most dangerous in the world in terms of the number of homicides (WorldAtlas, 2017). The country is also an outlier in terms of its incarceration rate, the highest in the world, with 710 of every 100,000 inhabitants incarcerated in 2015, for a total of 2.3 million prisoners (Sfaya, 2015). However, these figures are not surprising in light of the “tough on crime” ideology and law enforcement policy advocated since the early 1980s. During the same period, the government encouraged the private sector to (re)invest in security, thus leading to the privatization of many prisons. Repressive legislative measures such as “three strikes laws,” “truth-in-sentencing laws” and especially the war on drugs led to the worst prison overcrowding problem in the world, as well as a prison system in which private profits are a consideration (Hallett, 2006 p. 5). Moreover, these measures are intrinsically associated with the problem of racial disparities in incarceration rates – African American men are over-represented. According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics from 2010, persons of colour are five times more likely to be incarcerated than the white population; for Hispanophones, the probability is twice as high (Sakala, 2014). Racial disparity issues also exist in the juvenile justice system. Even today, African American, Latino and Indigenous youth are more likely to suffer punitive measures and incarceration than young Caucasians (Muncie, 2008; Civil Rights Division, 2015). Regarding trends in the number of cases processed by the juvenile justice system, a report produced by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) indicates that this statistic rose significantly beginning in the 1960s, further accelerated after 1985, but has been falling since 2004. To be more specific, this trend applies to drug related offenses and assaults, the categories of crimes which had previously experienced the highest increases (Hockenberry & Puzzanchera, 2015). The response to juvenile delinquency is primarily punitive and repressive in nature, albeit to varying degrees from state to state. For example, the age of criminal responsibility, which is not uniform, varies from one state to another: in certain states it’s seven years of age or, indeed, lower. Finally, the United States is also one of the few countries that has not abolished capital punishment for minors (Marcus, 2004).

2. Youth, crime and violence

In 2015, approximately 73.5 million Americans – 22% of the total population – were under 18. Youth violence and crime are major issues in the United States as they represent the number

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15 U.S. Census Bureau.
three cause of mortality among youth aged 10 to 24 (CDC-DVP, 2015). Physical violence is a common phenomenon among youth: about 25% of youth say that they’ve been in a physical altercation (Kann et al., 2014). Nearly 60,000 youth aged 10 to 24 have received medical care for injuries related to physical attacks. (WISQARS, 2016). Heavy media coverage of violent crimes by young people has led to considerable public debate, as well as a widespread fear of crime. Nevertheless, statistics indicate a significant and continuous decline in juvenile delinquency since the late 1990s (Hockenberry & Puzzanchera, 2015). During the 1980s and 1990s, youth violence reached its zenith and became endemic. This unprecedented growth was attributed to rivalries between gangs, the proliferation of arms, and the growth of drug use (Carr, 2000).

While there has been progress in youth violence prevention, it has been far from sufficient. Violence related to street gangs and drugs is a familiar issue, but continues to occupy an important place in prevention policies; other issues such as harassment or cyber-bullying have only recently emerged as priorities at the national level. Youth gangs are responsible for the majority of the most serious offences and fuel a climate of fear (MRSC, 2016). Police departments report that over a third of their interventions in 2012 were connected with the activities of youth gangs. Moreover, there are an estimated 850,000+ gang members nationwide (Egley, Howell, & Harris, 2014). Belonging to a gang not only increases the risk of committing acts of violence, but also of becoming a victim of violence. The drug trade and drug consumption are closely connected with the phenomenon of gangs (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2007). As a consequence, the prevention of youth gang and drug-related crime and violence is a major issue of concern for both the general public and the authorities in the U.S. As war on drugs type policies certainly attest. Many studies link drugs with crime (Insulza, 2013). However, the most recent survey indicates that, despite the increasing social acceptance of marijuana, marijuana consumption is actually declining (Johnston, O’Malley, Miech, Bachman, & Schulenberg, 2016). That said, about 30% of youth between 12 and 25 have, it would seem, consumed illicit drugs, with marijuana as the most popular choice (Hoover, 2013).

School violence is another significant social problem. With a population of about 50 million pupils and 15 million students, interactions are, of course, extremely numerous. That said, physical, sexual and psychological violence are pervasive. In general, schools remain relatively safe places, despite the many acts of violence and crimes that do occur (Kann et al., 2014). The rate of assaults involving the use of weapons in school environments has also been declining (since 1993). Thus, an average of 7%16 of young people affirm that they have threatened or injured by a peer (Kann et al., 2014).

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16 Rates of youth threatened and injured by a weapon in school vary between 4.3% and 10.9% (these rates are slightly higher in urban environments, i.e., between 4.3% and 11.6%).
In 2013, nearly a quarter of pupils and students said that they had suffered bullying in school at least once. Cyber-bullying is a rather recent but growing problem. Thus, while about 15% of youth were victims in 2013 (Kann et al., 2014), in 2016, 34% of students were victims of cyber-bullying (Hinduja & Patchin, 2016). The number of victims among youth has apparently nearly doubled between 2007 and 2016. The number of cyber-bullies also increased, to include about 16% of youth (Patchin, 2016).

Finally, youth violence is primarily considered a public health problem, as it not only affects the health of young people, but that of communities as well. To envisage violence prevention in terms of a public health based approach makes strategic sense in that exposure to violence plays an important role in triggering mental problems and the spread of infectious diseases (Sumner et al., 2015). Moreover, injuries and loss of life engender considerable costs for the social system and, ultimately, society (CDC-DVP, 2015). Social services and health care are particularly impacted by acts of violence (Mercy, Butchart, Farrington, & Cerdá, 2002). For example, homicides and injuries caused by assaults generate annual losses estimated at 16 billion dollars US, including medical costs and job losses/sick leaves (WISQARS, 2016).

3. Youth violence and its prevention in national policies and strategies

Historically, youth violence was seen as a moral issue, a question of moral failure, to which the only possible response consisted of punishing the offense. Incarceration was the preferred method for protecting both the young offender and society (Dodge, 2001). At the same time, services and policies were developed to reduce the prevalence of youth violence and juvenile delinquency. Beginning in the 1970s, prevention essentially consisted of reducing different types of problematic behaviour, which, however, were addressed separately (e.g., mental health problems, substance abuse, school failure, teenage pregnancies, etc.) (Catalano, Hawkins, Berglund, Pollard, & Arthur, 2002). In the 1980s, this approach was the subject of considerable criticism and prevention programs focusing on healthy child development were advocated as an alternative (Catalano et al., 2002). However, about another decade passed before a comprehensive vision of youth development was gradually adopted by practitioners, political decision-makers and scientists. This comprehensive vision was supported by studies that identified the limitations of the then dominant programs (Pittman, O’Brien, & Kimball, 1993). Moreover, it was not until the early 2000s before there existed a significant body of research focused on evaluating the effectiveness of prevention programs. That said, the virtues of primary prevention have been long advocated by many actors (Weissberg, Kumpfer, & Seligman, 2003).

These recent developments were seconded by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) which, in the late 1980s, was the first U.S. agency to define the problem of youth violence as a public health problem which had attained epidemic, indeed endemic, proportions. This definition facilitated the growing interest in interdisciplinary methods among actors in public health, education and communities/municipalities. Moreover, perceptions of youth violence and
criminality are changing with this vision, thereby bringing rehabilitation and prevention to the fore, as an alternative to retribution and punishment (Kenneth A Dodge, 2001).

3.1 A public health approach

As mentioned above, youth violence was first described as a public health problem by a government agency: the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Its Division of Violence Prevention (DVP) focuses more particularly on youth violence prevention. In effect, the CDC and the DVP work on developing comprehensive and coordinated youth violence prevention approaches. The general objective is to promote prevention and the co-construction of proven social solutions and strategies. The CDC, which works under the authority of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, relies on its solid experience in terms of sharing and disseminating duly evaluated evidence-based research studies. As part of its youth violence prevention efforts, the CDC supports programs that contribute to a deeper understanding of the issues (e.g., the risk and protective factors) and the potential solutions. For example, it funds a biennial survey on youth behaviour\textsuperscript{17} to monitor trends and identify new types of violence. It also funds scientific research to expand its pool of effective programs and strategies (see sidebar 1 – the Centers of Excellence). This investment is necessary, as it enables the CDC to play its role as a provider of preventive strategies.

The CDC has developed a national youth violence prevention approach founded on a public health perspective, which the institution tries to communicate to its national, regional and local partners. The CDC approach is designed to be both comprehensive and coordinated, with a view to ensuring the implementation of evidence based interventions and evaluations. This approach entails a number of key stages (Division of Violence Prevention, 2015):

1) Describe the extent of the youth violence problems and the characteristics and consequences thereof.
2) Monitor youth violence trends.
3) Identify the risk and protective factors.
4) Develop and test youth violence prevention strategies.
5) Promote and ensure the large scale utilization of evidence based strategies.

The public health approach is therefore consistent with an integrative vision requiring interdisciplinary and inter-institutional work dynamics. Essentially, the CDC and the DVP play two roles: 1) act as a facilitator for building partnerships and 2) provide resources and technical support to interested parties, to enable them to implement violence prevention strategies. In a word, they work to facilitate the planning, implementation and evaluation of prevention strategies in communities and cities.

In fact, cities and state governments often feel they lack sufficient resources to fight crime and violence (OJJDP, 2016). All too often, public safety policies produce poor results or, indeed, no

\textsuperscript{17} Youth Risk Behavior Survey.
results in terms of reducing crime. In response, the CDC promotes a preventive approach based on public health and social policies, an approach which employs a series of tools and studies that have been tested and proven effective, and which any actor may put to good use and further enrich. In a word, the CDC is attempting to bridge the borders between theory and practice by disseminating youth violence prevention strategies to local and national actors.

Finally, the CDC has implemented different projects focusing on primary violence prevention. These initiatives are a means for the CDC to assist its local partners. The CDC provides funding programs, information, technical information packages and trainings, as well as a repertory of good practices and evidence based prevention strategies. These various tools are freely available on the CDC website specially designed for this purpose. The CDC encourages the collection and utilization of data and evaluations, as well as the sharing of information and success stories, as this enables it to enrich its database of good practices, which, in turn, will be of use to other partners.

**Sidebar No. 1: the STRYVE project and the Centers for Excellence**

The STRYVE project\(^{18}\) is a CDC developed national initiative for primary prevention of youth violence, based on the public health approach. The CDC offers grants to regional public health institutions interested in becoming the STRYVE project coordinators in their region. Resources designed for the STRYVE project, and made available by the CDC, serve to guide these institutions as they implement their strategic prevention plans, build their networks of partners, and evaluate and share their successes. STRYVE, and ultimately the CDC, emphasize networking and data utilization (and collection) as means to identify the right prevention strategies, adapted to the characteristics of local communities. In practice, local actors are accorded very considerable autonomy.

The CDC provides regular funding to the National Centers for Excellence in Youth Violence Prevention (NCEs). Formerly known as centers for academic excellence, these institutions are university research centres. In 2000, Congress passed a law which led to the creation of the NCEs, institutions mandated to establish the scientific infrastructure necessary for developing evidence based interventions. Since 2005, NCE programs have been working in close collaboration with communities with very high crime rates to help them develop their resilience capacities in the face of youth violence issues (CDC-DVP, undated -a). This funding of NCE led initiatives ultimately enables the CDC to expand its repertory of prevention strategies and good practices, which it makes available via a website. The latter, in turn, is an important source of inspiration for initiatives by local actors.

\(^{18}\) Striving to Reduce Youth Violence Everywhere.
3.2 Interdepartmental collaboration

The United States does not have a national youth violence prevention strategy as such. On the other hand, many national institutions are active in developing and advancing youth violence prevention strategies. There is also a great desire on the part of national agencies to improve coordination mechanisms and, especially, collaboration in order to harmonize youth programs and services.

3.2.1 For comprehensive and multisectoral national strategies

The Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs (IWGYP) is in charge of developing a strategic plan on national collaboration around youth related issues known as “Pathways for Youth.” More generally, the IWGYP is charged with developing coordination and collaboration strategies between the various departments and national agencies in charge of youth related issues. It is composed of representatives from about twenty departments and national agencies involved in supporting youth programs and services (Youth.gov, undated).

Stakeholders expect the development of a strategic plan for national collaboration to enable more fluid and organized communication between actors at the national level, as well as at the state and local levels. More specifically, the goal of such a plan is, first of all, to coordinate the efforts of all actors and facilitate access to resources and services, in order to optimize the performance of youth programs and initiatives. Secondly, a strategic plan would identify the areas where it’s necessary to standardize procedures and ensure harmonization with the national strategy. To accomplish these goals, the strategic plan for national collaboration was designed to promote dissemination of good practices and support actors (whether governmental, community or private sector) in the adoption of evidence based approaches (IWGYP, 2017). As we shall see below, the national institutions in charge of youth issues attach great importance to the evidence base supporting interventions and strategies. Finally, youth participation occupies an important place in the strategic plan, as youth must be fully involved to ensure improvement in youth programs. Consequently, a young person must no longer be considered as simply as a generator of data points to be collected, but rather as a partner capable of helping agencies and actors develop messages adapted to the real lives of young people, as well as identify their current problems and issues (IWGYP, 2013). The working group has, moreover, given itself a mandate to encourage partnership between youth and adults. Aware of the important role of youth in the implementation of youth programs, the IWGYP created the website Youth Engaged 4 Change, a project to support youth interested in contributing to social change, be it at the personal level or at the community and national levels (YE4C, undated).

The fight against youth violence demands a multisectoral approach. Cognizant that this issue cannot be resolved solely through a justice system-centric approach, the Justice Department and the Department of Education, along with other national agencies, joined forces to bring about change at the national level. Arguing on the basis of the scientific literature, this group of agencies successfully convinced the federal government that youth violence is not a problem without solutions (OJJDP, 2016). In so doing, they refuted the pessimistic perceptions of the 1980s
and 1990s, when youth policies were essentially based on fear rather than facts – a state of affairs which led many states to institute excessively punitive laws (Zimring, 2000). As a result of the abovementioned initiative of a group of departments and national agencies, the federal government has shifted from an approach based on public safety toward a public health approach (OJJDP, 2016).

One of the government's priorities is an overall strategy to enable the integration of a variety of actors and set guidelines. To this end, a shared framework was developed by the OJJDP and the CDC that encompasses the principles of youth violence reduction and the promotion of well-being. The objective is to create a paradigm and common language conducive to unity and participation. In a context populated by a variety of diverse actors and institutions working to reduce youth violence, this common framework serves to harmonize the initiatives of all actors (OJJDP & CDC, 2016).

In its quest for a strategic youth violence prevention plan, the OJJDP funded three initiatives in 2010: the National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention, the Community-Based Violence Prevention Program and the Defending Childhood Initiative. Together, these three initiatives form a strategic framework for youth violence prevention, which underscores the multisectoral approach, the importance of well designed coordination and the advantages of adopting the social prevention approach (OJJDP, 2016).

3.2.2 State strategies and action plans

A number of youth councils and commissions at the state level also have actions plans or strategies. This is a growing trend, confirmed by the "Ready by 21" biennial survey. Increasingly, these youth policy coordination agencies are working to harmonize their action plans with those of other states. Furthermore, a growing number of actors are adopting the principle of evidence based activities and decisions, as well as developing information sharing systems (E. Gaines & McNary, 2016; The Forum, 2012).

3.2.3 The National Forum

In 2010, the White House, the Justice Department and the Department of Education founded the National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention. Designed as a space for dialogue, its objective is to raise awareness around the issues of youth and gang violence and put these issues on the national agenda. In addition, the National Forum seeks to strengthen the capacities of municipalities to confront youth violence through coordination strategies and the sharing of evidence based information (National Forum, 2011). The National Forum model is notable in that it is based on a collaboration between national and local institutions with the aim of encouraging their members to rethink their youth violence prevention strategies and activities. To this end, a national partnership has been formed to help cities develop comprehensive youth and gang
violence prevention strategies. In this collaboration, cities are responsible for the development and implementation phases. On the other hand, the role of national institutions, and more particularly the National Forum, is to facilitate networking among actors and provide support or, to be more specific, to develop networks of cities and optimize support structures to facilitate local actors’ access to the resources provided by the federal government (National Forum, 2011).

3.3 Networks of cities

3.3.1 UNITY – a network of major American cities

Big cities in the United States face unique youth violence issues that are not comparable to those of less populous regions. In light of this reality, in 2005, the CDC and the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control created the UNITY project. Designed to complement the national STRYVE initiative, UNITY advocates a public health approach and argues that an investment in prevention allows governments to reduce spending as well as raise the economic productivity of the most disadvantaged communities (Prevention Institute, 2007).

A network of cities was therefore formed with the objective of exploiting the cumulative knowledge on violence prevention and the good practices developed by different government agencies, as well as other organizations, both public and private (Prevention Institute, 2010a). To this end, a survey of 12 cities was done in 2006-2007 to determine the nature and scope of the issues, as well as describe the different strategies implemented. The survey found that most major urban centres do not have comprehensive prevention strategies; that their approaches essentially centre on maintaining order and criminal justice; that monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are lacking; and, finally, that gang violence is the most salient issue (Weiss, 2008).

UNITY’s mission is to coordinate the network of cities, provide members with guidance on the implementation of sustainable and effective practices, facilitate exchanges between actors, inform political decision-makers and advocate in favour of a national strategy (Prevention Institute, undated).

3.3.2 The U.S. conference of Mayors

For cities with populations of 30,000 or more, the United States Conference of Mayors represents a platform for exchange and the co-construction of municipal policies by municipal governments, as well as an instrument for strengthening the relationship between the federal government and cities. Conferences are organized twice a year to bring mayors together to discuss problems and propose solutions. In 2015, a report was written to summarize the various strategies adopted and problems encountered in the fight against youth violence. Aware that a comprehensive approach is necessary to analyze and understand youth violence and that intersectoral collaboration is necessary.

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19 Among the participating national agencies were the Departments of Justice, Education, Health and Human Services.

20 Urban Networks to Increase Thriving Youth.
3.4 The national strategies against drugs, fire arms and street gangs

In principle, the approaches taken concerning issues such drugs, gangs and fire arms are comprehensive and integrated (Decker, 2008; Mair, Teret, & Frattaroli, 2005; CIPC, 2015). At the national level, the modes of operation in the fight against drugs and the fight against gang violence are essentially the same. In both cases, a national agency was created in response to the issue, i.e., the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the National Gang Center (NGC), respectively. Their missions consist of providing information, resources and technical assistance to politicians and sector professionals. Secondly, these national agencies have developed what are intended as comprehensive intersectoral strategies, i.e., strategies that integrate prevention, intervention, repression and community reintegration programs. The National Drug Control Strategy and the OJJDP’s comprehensive gang model also strongly emphasize collaboration with the national, state, local and tribal actors to promote partnerships which play a crucial role in violence prevention. To this end, both strategies seek to build communities’ capacities in preventing violence and crime connected with drugs and/or gangs. The National Drug Control Strategy prescribes regular assessments of progress towards its defined objectives. Similarly, the National Gang Center conducts annual surveys on the status of gangs (Decker, 2008; Executive Office, 2016; CIPC, 2015).

Repression remains the primary response, particularly in relation to gang violence. Although most actors, including some police departments, consider this approach less effective than prevention, for example, methods based on repression, prosecution and punishment are, for many communities, the only possible responses. Lacking the requisite financial and technical resources, certain local actors are unable to develop alternatives (Decker, 2008). The National Drug Control Strategy, on the other hand, integrates both the public health and the public safety approaches. This allows it to combine direct or indirect substance abuse prevention initiatives with the fight against drug related crime (Executive Office, 2016).

4. Coordination and governance

The process of implementing youth violence prevention strategies is based on a decentralized model. Cities plan and implement programs and, to the extent possible, develop action plans. Funding, on the other hand, is essentially provided by the states, which are responsible for setting public policy. States have great latitude in terms of which measures and policies they wish to support. Consequently, prevention measures are highly developed in certain states, while in others punitive approaches, solely based on policing are favoured. The federal government’s role consists of proposing national strategies and practices as guidelines for state and local
governments in their prevention and justice policies for minors. That said, although the federal government supports a bottom-up approach (where information and good practices emerge at the local level before they are adopted by decision-makers at the national level), it also imposes, in a certain fashion, the underlying principles of its national strategies on the states and cities: dealing with violence from a public health approach, deploying comprehensive evidence based strategies, etc. The idea, then, is to utilize resources from the federal government to integrate a variety of information and experiences from local actors in order to create a comprehensive approach to prevention to orient government agencies (both federal and state), as well as actors on the ground.

4.1 At the national level

As explained above, national agencies focus on developing national strategies and a national vision of violence prevention. They also emphasize the importance of coordination and horizontal and vertical partnerships. It’s worth examining why the federal government adopted this approach. In 2004, the White House working group on disadvantaged youth found that the complexity of the problems that disadvantaged youth confront is only surpassed by the complexity of the national system (Ferber, Gaines, & Goodman, 2005). In effect, several hundred national programs are managed by a dozen national agencies, each with its own vision and approach. The same situation prevails at the state level and in cities (Ferber et al., 2005).

This complexity explains why the CDC and the Justice Department form partnerships: it allows them to send a coherent message on prevention strategies and youth policy in general. According to an interviewee who works at DVP the public health approach has two great strengths: it facilitates partnership development and the collection of a variety of data.

According to one of our interviewees, it’s important to underline that national partnerships are not the result of formal mechanisms, but rather of agreements concluded between different national institutions with a common goal. For example, the Stopbullying.gov initiative is the result of a collaboration between the Departments of Education and Justice, based on common objectives, such as providing the public with access to information on bullying.

4.2 At the state level

A variety of national agencies support their state partners in the task of establishing a system of intersectoral collaboration capable of designing strategic youth violence prevention plans adapted to local needs and characteristics. In practice, national institutions, including the White House, play a support role by providing technical and financial resources, and expertise to interested parties. They also act as facilitators in relation to implementing comprehensive evidence based strategies. More specifically, stakeholders are encouraged to make evidence based decisions. In practice, that requires the systematizing of data collection and analysis, as well as employing the different violence prevention strategies with the greatest potential for success.

Working groups supported by the DVP must select their partners and define the latters’ roles in a prevention strategy. To this end, they can count on the CDC’s resources and accumulated
prevention experience. In fact, the CDC recently published a document cataloguing a set of evidence based youth violence prevention strategies.\(^{21}\) According to a respondent working at the DVP, working groups can also use this tool as a guide on how to select the most appropriate government agency to put in charge of management and implementation. In the area of gang violence prevention strategies, the OJJDP as well draws on its experience to propose a list of the advantages and disadvantages of putting different government agencies in charge (United States Department of Justice, 2010). In a word, these resources enable working groups to designate the appropriate lead government agency, in accordance with the type of prevention strategy they wish to put in place.

That said, our interviewee explained that since structures and characteristics vary from state to state, the roles and responsibilities of actors vary as well. In the interests of forming diversified working groups, the CDC turns initially to its network of actors. However, it also seeks to expand its pool of partners by encouraging the involvement of non conventional actors, such as the business community for example.

The OJJDP, in collaboration with State Advisory Groups (SAGs), is also responsible for encouraging state justice systems to comply with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). In effect, the OJJDP and the SAGs support the states in the upholding of four fundamental protections for young offenders through the funding provided to the states and their respective justice systems.

### 4.2.1 The councils and commissions

A priori, all American states have at least one organization charged with coordinating their children and youth related public policies (The Forum, 2012). Every two years, the “Ready 21” survey is carried out with these coordination agencies – generally called councils, commissions or cabinets. Typically composed of diverse members (i.e., representatives from state governmental agencies, community groups, the private sector and civil society), these councils, it has been determined, have considerable potential in terms of their capacity to harmonize the actions of diverse youth agencies. The decision-making power of this type of organization is augmented when it is located in a government office enabling it to collaborate with other departments (Bonilla Moreno, Gaines, & Evennou, 2014). The creation of an organization following an order in council can represent a good start, but this neither guarantees stability nor political support. In effect, many such organizations lament their lack of political support and funding (Bonilla Moreno et al., 2014; E. Gaines & McNary, 2016; The Forum, 2012). Moreover, the recent federal budget cuts of 2013 may have had an indirect impact on their activities (Bonilla Moreno et al., 2014).

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4.3 At the local level

Municipal governments are responsible for designing and implementing prevention strategies. According to the UNITY project and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, political decision-makers are committed to a decentralized approach on youth violence prevention strategies. In effect, stakeholders regularly meet in assemblies to exchange views and take decisions, which are subsequently communicated to the federal government and Congress in an effort to influence the legislative process.

Increasingly, many youth councils and commissions in cities are coming together to form coalitions. This trend is due to the work of national agencies like the CDC and the Justice Department, which seek to encourage intergovernmental and intersectoral collaboration, as well as provide local actors with the tools to create their own strategies. For example, the OJJDP’s “comprehensive gang model” counsels the formation of a steering committee, vested with decision-making authority, to ensure the planning and implementation of a local gang violence prevention strategy. Such committees are composed of key representatives from the community and local organizations. To facilitate implementation, the steering committee would work to create and maintain a rapport between the relevant agencies and the community (U.S. Department of Justice, 2010).

That said, according to a study participant, many municipalities make the mistake of adopting a single prevention strategy. It is not sufficient to convince communities of the merits of adopting prevention programs unless comprehensive and coordinated strategic plans are also developed. Isolated initiatives like a program against bullying, a family therapy based strategy or conflict mediation would be errors according to our interviewee. What facilitates the establishing of a comprehensive strategy is the practice of working in collaboration with a network of diverse partners – hence the importance of support from national agencies like the CDC.

5. Leadership, collaboration and participation in the system of actors

Typically, the development of national strategies\(^\text{22}\) is characterized by shared decision-making and governance. Youth violence prevention is among the most complex policy challenges and cannot be resolved through a single approach or vision under the direction of a sole agency. Nor would an overlapping tangle of actors and actions represent a better solution (Ferber et al., 2005). As a result, collaboration initiatives, based on a shared responsibility model, have been formed between different national agencies (OJJDP, 2016). For the IWGYP working group, the virtues of a multisectoral partnership and collaboration are not limited to improving prevention strategies at the local level; they also facilitate feedback mechanisms, which help to determine how federal government initiatives translate at the local level.

\(^\text{22}\) Examples include the strategic plan for national collaboration on youth related issues known as Pathways for Youth, the Shared Framework or even the National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention.
5.1 Leadership and collaboration

The United States does not have a national agency charged with youth violence prevention, which is a responsibility under state jurisdiction. Nevertheless, many initiatives are led and funded by the Justice Department and the Department of Health and Human Services or, to be more precise, the Bureau of Justice Administration, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Division of Violence Prevention and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, which all develop projects and fund violence prevention research. In the interests of promoting a system of vertical and horizontal partnerships (Shaw, 2001), emphasis has been recently placed on developing a strategic youth violence prevention plan. National agencies exercise a certain influence on states regarding which approaches to take when the latter develop their prevention strategies. Although approaches differ from state to state, more and more actors are adopting the principle of evidence-based decisions and now envisage prevention in a more comprehensive manner, as opposed to dealing with violence on a narrow issue by issue basis. As a result, and in keeping with the recommendations of national agencies, a growing number of youth councils and commissions report the creation (or planned creation) of strategies or action plans (E. Gaines & McNary, 2016). Also evident is a growing interest in partnerships and inter-state harmonization of policies and actions.

That said, most funding for violence prevention programs comes from the state level (Bonilla Moreno et al., 2014; E. Gaines & McNary, 2016). Each governmental sector funds its own youth prevention programs: the health sector generally funds early prevention programs; the justice department mostly supports treatment programs for young offenders; and the education sector funds prioritizes school programs. In effect, each state decides on and implements its own prevention strategies in accordance with its priority issues and the resources at its disposal.

In contrast, working groups are composed of actors from a variety of fields, including law enforcement, education, public health, the justice system, etc. Although they share the same objective, they must nevertheless be open to different prevention approaches in order to carry out actions on the ground. The view that youth violence demands above all a public safety approach remains very strong at the state level. This can slow down and complicate a working group’s efforts. According to our interviewee, whereas certain working groups achieve a consensus rapidly, for others, consensus is more difficult, notably when the police and justice system are not open to the idea of social and primary prevention as a useful complement to the law enforcement approach.

5.2 Participation

The CDC, the OJJDP and other national agencies prioritize the participation of actors at different levels. The CDC supports participation in the planning and implementation of prevention strategies. In a participatory process, elected officials and representatives from community groups and the business community all take part in defining the problems and solutions. The different
roles and the agencies in charge are identified by the strategic plan or, alternatively, by an action plan developed by a working group at the local level.

Considerable outreach efforts are made to youth and the general public to help governments identify the problems and propose solutions. The federal government accords great importance to youth participation in the creation and implementation of prevention programs. For example, during the development phase of the “Pathways for Youth” national strategic plan, the IWGYP working group invited public participation to help identify youth related problems and issues during a series of public consultation events (IWGYP, 2016). Moreover, a draft version of the strategic plan was made available for consultation on the government’s “Youth.gov” webpage for a period of two years, with the object of obtaining public validation. This initiative facilitated public input in the form of comments and suggestions (IWGYP, 2016). During the UNITY project in 2007, youth and communities were encouraged to participate in identifying propitious and/or necessary prevention strategies for reducing violence in their cities (Prevention Institute, 2007).

6. **Information management**

Data analysis and collection is done at the local level. However, these processes tend not to be effected in a systematic or continuous manner. Many actors at the state or local level do not sufficiently base their policies on the information available to them. Another issue, Dr. Gerstenblith of the National Justice Institute observes that the public safety programs in schools are not subject to rigorous evaluation (NIJ, 2016). In this context, many national actors are working to raise their partners’ awareness of the importance of data-based actions and decisions, as well as to put the necessary tools at their disposal.

One of our respondents who works at DVP has noticed a change in perception among state and national actors, who now consider the approach based on criminal justice as insufficient for resolving the problems of youth violence and crime. As they turn towards prevention methods, increasing numbers of actors are making use of the resources available on the CDC website. To further encourage this trend, it’s crucial to increase the visibility of these resources, added our interviewee (interviewee No. 1).

A number of different monitoring systems generate data on youth violence and crime at the national, state and local levels. The National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) collects detailed information on the circumstances of deaths. Such information can be useful to the community (David-Ferdon et al., 2016). For example, in Jersey City, New Jersey, the data provided by the NVDRS raised questions about the problem of gang violence. Once the police department was apprised of this new violence profile, the reduction of gang violence immediately became a new priority in Jersey City (CDC-DVP, undated -b). The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) records information from multiple sources on non-mortal injuries, caused by acts of violence, which were treated in a health care establishment. This detailed database makes it possible to analyze trends and inform the competent authorities, which can then adapt youth policies and programs accordingly. The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) collects information on schoolchildren to monitor high risk behaviour, including physical violence,
bullying, bringing weapons to school, etc. The information in this database comes from surveys done by the CDC, states, counties, schools and communities, as well as education and public health agencies. The different agencies associated with justice systems are another source of information for databases on violence and, more particularly, juvenile delinquency. The Justice Department, the FBI and police departments (state and local) all make their databases available. Finally, many communities and educational institutions conduct their own surveys on youth behaviour and assess the performance of organizations that work with children and youth. These efforts, implemented to evaluate program impacts, are bearing fruit. In effect, evidence based prevention has clearly gained popularity in recent decades (David-Ferdon et al., 2016).

On the other hand, the Justice Department deplores the under-reporting of acts of violence in the United States. In effect, although the majority of homicides are reported to the authorities, non-fatal acts of violence are under-represented in national databases (Sumner et al., 2015). In many cases, injuries that are caused by assaults are not recognized as such. In effect, health professionals are not necessarily trained to recognize these types of injuries (Comstock, Mallonee, & Jordan, 2005). Furthermore, under-reporting also occurs due to the fragmented nature of tracking systems, which are not equipped to make such connections and/or to communicate information to the appropriate actors and databases (Sumner et al., 2015).

7. Conclusion

In the United States, the Justice Department and to, be more precise, the OJJDP are the most active agencies in the area of youth violence prevention. As for the CDC, its work mainly focuses on primary prevention strategies. Due to the decentralized nature of the country, the role of national agencies consists of putting forward a national approach with a view to harmonizing strategies and practices and providing states with guidelines on youth violence prevention. Moreover, the latter conduct and fund many research projects, which enables them to expand their repertories of publicly available resources.

The federal government provides technical support and grant programs to incentivize local actors and decision-makers to set up well designed comprehensive prevention programs. The CDC tends to support primary prevention programs based on a public health approach. The Justice Department and the OJJDP mainly fund juvenile justice related programs and activities. However, they also assist local justice systems to ensure compliance with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA) in order to guarantee better protection for youth in trouble with the law across the country. The most common (and most evaluated) social prevention strategies are: programs on parenting and families (e.g., functional family therapy); early childhood education programs; therapeutic interventions and counseling; school programs (e.g., anti-bullying); and community programs targeting underprivileged communities and Indigenous populations (Shaw, 2001; Sumner et al., 2015).
A number of departments and agencies fund youth related prevention projects, including the IWGYP working group, which works to coordinate efforts to optimize the visibility of, and access to, this broad pool of funding sources. Another of these many agencies is the “My brother’s Keeper” program, launched by the White House in 2013. This national initiative seeks to improve opportunities for persons of colour in the United States. To that end, its working group coordinates programs and funding for allocation to interested parties. Private actors are invited to make financial contributions to increase the program’s resources. In addition, the program’s working group disseminates and publicizes evidence based policies and practices. Many communities and governments have received grants under this program (White House, 2016)

Finally, for many local and state governments, policing and criminal justice approaches remain the primary response to youth violence and crime. As attests the large number of persons incarcerated, including youth (Muncie, 2008; Sfaya, 2015). It’s important for working groups charged with developing prevention strategies at the local level to understand their members’ diverse points of view and demonstrate a willingness to envisage youth violence as a complex social problem, for which prevention strategies can complement public safety policies.
CHAPTER 6. FRANCE

1. **Introduction**

According to the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), children and youth aged 10 to 24 were 18% of the population of France in 2016. However, 21% of the criminal cases prosecuted in the justice system involved young offenders, i.e., juvenile delinquents are over-represented (Infostat Justice, 2016). Under French legislation there exists no written principle prescribing exemption from criminal responsibility for minors. This means that there is no age limit under which one may not be found guilty of an offence. However, rather than a principle of non-criminal responsibility based on age, there exists instead the principle of responsibility based on a minor’s capacity for discernment. Moreover, a minor convicted of an offence may receive a lighter sentence. Thus, a 13 year old who is convicted of a criminal offence may not receive a prison sentence and may only be sentenced to educational measures for example. The age of criminal majority, i.e., the age upon which an offender is subject to common criminal law and no longer benefits from non-criminal responsibility based on age, is eighteen. However, certain minors over sixteen may be considered adults in terms of criminal justice.

Over the years, the status of youth in France has deteriorated. A study in 2016 determined that a quarter of youth 18-24 live under the poverty line (Pouchard, 2016). The unemployment rate for young workers under 25 is 24% (Peugny, 2017).

These issues are even more prevalent among French youth of immigrant origin, particularly those of North African and sub-Saharan African extraction (Cusset, Garner, Harfi, Lainé, & Marguerit, 2015). This social inequality is important because the career paths of young persons are unquestionably influenced by their socioeconomic background. Moreover, France is the country where a person’s social origin has the greatest impact on academic success (OECD, 2015). In January 2017, *le défenseur des droits* (human right advocate) Jacques Toubon released the results of a survey of 5,000 persons which indicates that young men perceived as black or Arab are 20 times as likely to be asked to show their ID (Défenseur des droits, 2016). Nevertheless, despite these issues, no public policy actions specifically target youth of immigrant origin. Instead, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, commonly referred to as *les banlieues*, are the target of reforms under the auspices of urban policy. In fact, these neighbourhoods do, in many cases, have large populations of immigrant origin. In other words, public policy addresses the particular status and issues affecting youth of immigrant origin indirectly, through their neighbourhoods, via urban policy.
Finally, there is the issue of radicalization, which has become salient in French society and public policy. Although a recent phenomenon, it affected nearly 2,000 French minors by late 2016 (Cornevin, 2016).

2. The French model and territorialization

2.1 A tradition of social prevention of crime under pressure as public policy shifts towards situational prevention and repression

The 1990s saw an increasing turn towards situational crime prevention, which was seen as an alternative to social prevention measures. In France, this has taken the form of an ever increasing use of video surveillance cameras as an instrument of crime prevention. In fact, video surveillance was one of the four means of action put forward in the 2009 National Crime Prevention and Victim Assistance Plan (Plan national de prévention de la délinquance et d’aide aux victimes) drafted by the Interdepartmental Committee on Crime Prevention (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquence) (Hebberecht & Baillergeau, 2012). This same approach reappeared in the 2013-2017 National Delinquency Prevention Strategy (Stratégie nationale de prévention de la délinquance), in which the budget allocated to video surveillance accounted for over a third of the funding dedicated to crime prevention.

That being said, it’s important to note that France’s welfare state and social structure ensure a certain upholding of its tradition of social prevention, particularly with respect to juvenile delinquency prevention, despite the growing interest in situational prevention methods. In a word, social crime prevention has not disappeared in France. Policies consistent with the primary social prevention policy framework, such as measures to promote parenting skills and prevent high risk behaviour (suicide, drug addiction), have been maintained and, in fact, target a wider population. The same is true of secondary prevention measures, which are largely based in schools and include, notably, programs against truancy or school failure. Their target population is mainly youth in under-privileged neighbourhoods living in dangerous conditions and at risk of falling into delinquency (De Maillard & Germain, 2012). Moreover, a 2002 analysis by Sina on the approach adopted by municipal public safety authorities found that although 26% of local security contracts centred on situational prevention, 18% of said contracts include primary social prevention measures targeting parents and children (e.g., cultural activities and drop-out prevention measures) and 56% provided for secondary social prevention measures (De Maillard, 2005). Moreover, according to one of the present study’s respondents, secondary prevention in particular plays a central role in the 2013 National Delinquency Prevention Strategy.

"Beginning in 2013, the approach was to have actors mobilize, identify individual situations and youth at risk, i.e., engage in secondary prevention. In short, we identify youth with characteristics deriving from their environment, personality, personal failures and faults, which put them at higher risk of being exposed to crime, to reoffending and to radicalization as well, since they are often the same individuals."
Interestingly, local implementation of this strategy on the ground seems, however, to be more based on primary prevention actions, as the Standing Committee on the Evaluation of Crime Prevention Policy found in its December 2016 evaluation report on youth crime prevention. A point confirmed, moreover, by one of our interviewees, the head of a local crime prevention agency (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2016).

The approach underpinning youth policy is also resolutely social. In effect, as early as 1982, the Bonnemaison report advocated, in addition to neighbourhood social development, the implementation of crosscutting and territorialized measures for youth, involving numerous partners and affecting all aspects of a young person’s life, in terms of education and employment, as well as in relation to exclusion (Loncle, 2006; Nicole-Drancourt, 2006). On 25 January last, the communiqué from the Ministry of Urban Policy, Youth and Sports reiterated that this approach remains pertinent and affirmed that all aspects of the lives of youth, be it employment, health or housing, must be addressed by public policies.

Finally, urban policies are also based on a philosophy of social prevention as their focus is on urban renewal and development, as well as on improving the overall living conditions of the residents of disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015). In effect, urban contracts consist of three simultaneous core components: an economic component, i.e., the development of economic activity and employment, especially among youth; a social component, notably consisting of improvements in living conditions and social diversity; and an urban component, taking the form of urban renewal measures (Les contrats de ville, 2015).

In parallel with this transformation of the French crime prevention model, henceforth characterized by the coexistence of social and situational prevention, repression, it would seem, has come to play an increasingly greater role since the 1980s. Thus, an increasingly clear linkage has formed between prevention and repression (De Maillard, 2005). According to Maillard (2005), certain observers fear that France is making the transition from a Social State to a Penal State. An analysis of the trends in political discourse, on both the right and the left, does little to refute the concerns of these observers. In effect, political discourse is ever more focused on law enforcement, public order and a punitive populist discourse. The trends in juvenile justice mirror this trend towards punitive policy.

2.2 Urban policy

Many authors (David, 2001; Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015) date the dawn of urban policy in France back to 1977. Thereafter, the evolution of urban policy was punctuated by the various episodes of urban violence that shook les banlieues (the suburbs) in confrontations pitting youth, for the most part, against the police. Thus, in the early
1980s, riots in les banlieues of Lyon sparked an awareness of the malaise reigning in les banlieues in general and an acceleration of urban policy initiatives (Raude, 2015). This was also the period when the territorial, interdepartmental and contractual dimensions of urban policy first appeared (Observatoire régional de l'intégration et de la ville, 2012), partly as a follow-up to the recommendations of the Dudebout report of 1983 on disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Following this report, social development actions were implemented in neighbourhoods to avert the physical deterioration of buildings and to improve social conditions (Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015). As for the territorialization of urban policy, this shift was facilitated by the general decentralization process initiated in 1982, which implied a transfer of jurisdictions from the Central State towards the territorial (i.e., regional and local) collectivities. Thus, began the partnership between the State and the territorial collectivities. As for the interdepartmental dimension of urban policy, this really took off with the creation in 1988 of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cities (Comité interministériel des villes—CIV), as the decision-making body for urban policy, and the Délégation interministérielle à la ville (renamed Secrétariat général du CIV in 2009), as the implementing and facilitating agency. Both still exist.

The 1990s as well were marked by episodes of urban violence, mainly involving youth and law enforcement agencies. So much so that les banlieues became a national priority (Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la Ville, 2012). Additional resources, in particular massive financial investments, were mobilized and urban policy was institutionalized with the creation, in 1990, of a Ministry of Urban Policy and urban sub-prefects (Raude, 2015). Nevertheless, despite these efforts, and attempts to simplify existing urban policy mechanisms, more than fifteen years after the initial policies in favour of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the objectives of social equality and cohesion have yet to be attained and the malaise in these neighbourhoods has continued to mount (Raude, 2015).

The 2000s were marked by a series of laws and policies on improving life in neighbourhoods, taken by successive governments, the results of which have been, however, sharply criticized. In 2005, three weeks of confrontations between the youth of les banlieues and the police led to a new round of massive investments in these neighbourhoods. Three years later, after a period of roundtable coordination, the new president of France launched the plan “Espoir banlieues, une dynamique pour la France” (Suburbs of Hope, a Dynamic for France). This large scale recovery plan, dubbed a “Marshall plan for the Suburbs” by some observers, targeted 270 neighbourhoods (Raude, 2015). Once again, the goal was to reduce the economic and social development gap between different banlieues in France. To that end, this plan included measures in various sectors, including education, employment, public safety and community life. However, as la Cour des comptes (Court of Audits) noted, this new initiative as well proved ineffective in reducing the inequalities between neighbourhoods. Furthermore, the implementation of the planned measures tailed off progressively (Raude, 2015). A new government took power in 2012 and launched a roundtable consultation process that same year to rethink urban policies. This led to the adoption of the Urban programming and Social Cohesion Act (loi sur la programmation urbaine et la cohésion sociale), known as the Lamy Act, in 2014. This law, the most recent legislation on urban public policy, defined its object as follows: it “concerns a policy of urban cohesion and national
and local solidarity towards disadvantaged neighbourhoods and their residents,” based on the conclusion of urban contracts between the State and districts that adopt an integrated approach aimed at improving all aspects of their residents’ daily lives. Thus, the three pillars of urban policy in France are: social cohesion; living conditions and urban renewal; and economic development and employment (Raude, 2015). According to the government website “Qu’est-ce que la politique de la ville?, 2016),” 5.5 million persons presently live in the 1,500 neighbourhoods targeted by urban policy due to their high concentrations of low-income persons.

2.3 Youth policies

The evolution of youth policy in France reflects society’s complex image of young people, who are sometimes considered a resource, sometimes as individuals at risk.

Beginning in the 2000s, in addition to the issues of unemployment, health and training, the question of young people’s autonomy emerged in a context where their lives are marked by long years of schooling and difficulties in entering the labour market. Multisectoral policies were developed in response to this issue. Thus, in 2009, wide-ranging consultations began among several ministries within the Interdepartmental Committee on Youth Issues (Comité interministériel de la jeunesse). These efforts culminated in two governmental action plans with commitments on measures concerning information, vocational training and professionalization. The same year, the Commission on Youth Policy, composed notably of representatives from youth movements, experts, academics, community groups, territorial collectivities and parliamentarians, produced a Green Paper containing 57 proposals on youth policy. This document proposed measures on youth autonomy, education and employment, as well as, more peripherally, housing and health (L’émergence d’une politique de la Jeunesse, 2010).

Furthermore, in 2009, a Youth Policy Experimentation Fund (Fond d’expérimentation pour la jeunesse) was created, with the goal of creating and funding innovative youth policies (L’émergence d’une politique de la Jeunesse, 2010). This funding of new initiatives by actors on the ground enables experiments with new practices and the evaluation of the effectiveness thereof prior to any potential replication or generalization. The experiments funded since the fund’s creation have emphasized formal education, employment, professional integration, as well as health, housing and culture, in accordance with the priorities identified by the different youth policies adopted since 2009 (Fonds d’expérimentation pour la jeunesse, 2012).

The most recent public policy on youth was adopted on 21 February 2013 by the twenty-four ministries in the Interdepartmental Committee on Youth Issues and is entitled Priorité jeunesse (Making Youth a Priority). This policy prescribed the same priorities as the ones identified in the Youth Policy Commission’s 2009 Green Paper. Furthermore, for the first time, the 2013 policy emphasized youth participation in public policy debates in a manner that represented a certain shift towards co-construction of youth related policies. To this end, the plan provided for the
creation of a National Youth Conference, as a space for exchange and sharing between youth, their organizations, the territorial collectivities, social partners and other youth community groups. The government is also banking on the French Youth Forum (Forum français de la jeunesse), created in 2012, which brings together all organizations managed and run by youth (Comité interministériel de la Jeunesse, 2013).

Recently, in a communiqué on youth policy, dated 25 January 2017, the Minister of Urban Policy, Youth and Sports reiterated that public policies must have local roots and that what is required is a truly comprehensive approach taking account of all aspects of young people’s lives. In keeping with preceding public policies, the minister also emphasized education and work, as well as health and housing. Finally, the minister announced the setting up of an advisory board on youth policy (conseil d’orientation des politiques de jeunesse).

In effect, on January 26, 2017, in response to a request made by youth organizations, the prime minister established a new multisectoral forum for reflection on youth related issues: the Youth Policies Advisory Board (Conseil d’orientation des politiques de jeunesse—COPL). The COPL counts 79 members, including 12 from government ministries, notably Social Affairs, Culture, Education, Employment, Higher Education, Youth, Justice, Housing, Health and Urban Policy, as well as representatives from territorial collectivities, youth and their organizations, community groups and social partners. This new body reflects the recognition that wider ranging reflection on youth policies is needed, specifically reflection on how to integrate all areas affecting the lives of youth during the policy design process. Furthermore, the COPL is intended to give youth a greater voice and associate them more closely with the policies affecting them. Envisaged as a meeting place and a forum for dialogue between the stakeholders involved in youth-related policies, the COPL provides input on draft legislation and addresses proposals to the government aimed at improving the status of youth. It’s mission also includes assessing and critiquing youth policies.

2.4 Prevention of violence in schools

School is an essential part of young people’s lives. However, as discussed above, schools may be plagued by violence, particularly in the form of bullying and cyber-bullying and, more recently, radicalization. In this context, a number of measures and public policies have been adopted to prevent school violence.

In 2005, the government adopted a participatory and territorial approach when it set up health and citizenship education committees in every school. Mandated to elaborate a school violence prevention plan, each committee is chaired by the school’s principal and may include representatives from the teaching staff, parents and pupils, as well as from district representatives and institutions (notably, the police and the gendarmerie, i.e., the French military police). Moreover, they are supported by the departmental health and citizenship education committees, which serve as intermediaries for relaying the major policy priorities set by the academic committees. The goal of this mechanism is to implement comprehensive policies and actions
based on the situation and priorities of each territory and on the resources and structures available locally (i.e., based on the existing education, health and urban policies).

Since 2006, school violence prevention has been addressed via interdepartmental action with the collaboration of the ministries of Education, Justice and the Interior. The objective was not to define strategic orientations, but rather to take concrete measures to address actual security concerns confronting actors on the ground. This led to the formalization and systematization of information sharing protocols between the public prosecutor’s office and school principals, as well as operations conducted by the police and the gendarmerie which have enhanced security in the areas adjacent to surrounding schools, a concern which remains an important priority.

In 2012, another interdepartmental – and multisectoral – initiative was established in the form of an interdepartmental mission charged with preventing and combating school violence. This mission includes the participation of different ministries (Interior, Education, Health, Women’s Rights, Sport and Youth...) and representatives of the State, as well as persons from the education sector (teachers, school principals...) and academe. The object of this agency is to associate research with concrete action. Thus, in addition to synthesizing scientific knowledge on the subject, this structure has been charged with the tasks of disseminating such knowledge through trainings, assistance in identifying situations of violence and providing advice to guide public policy action.

The urgent importance accorded to combating and preventing school violence, in particular bullying, was reiterated the following year in the Framework and Programming Act for the Reform of the Republic’s Schools (Loi d’orientation et de programmation pour la refondation de l’école de la République), passed on 8 July 2013, which established that educational establishments must be safe places. Later that year, the Ministry of National Education launched a national campaign against bullying, which included measures to raise awareness and mobilize the stakeholders on the ground. In particular, the Ministry of Education developed a guide on school cyberviolence for use by teachers, principals and academic advisors. This guide summarizes the scientific knowledge on the question of cyber violence and provides information on a few prevention methods and techniques for identifying signs of victimization. For example, it included a procedure for communicating information and alerting parents, the justice system and the president of the General Council in the event the teaching staff is advised of an alarming case.

Current school violence prevention policy consists of raising awareness among parents, teacher training (Agir contre la violence, 2014) and actions to strengthen partnerships with other prevention professionals (social services, community groups, territorial collectivities...) and law enforcement agencies (the police and gendarmerie). In addition, measures are in place to combat school failure and security assessments are done of areas adjacent to schools (Agir contre la violence, 2014). A notable example of collaboration between schools and law enforcement agencies is the introduction of police-gendarmerie school safety liaison officers to maintain
contact with principals and intervene on prevention issues, as well as in crisis situations (Agir contre la violence, 2014).

2.5 Prevention of radicalization

Radicalization prevention really took off in France in 2014 when the Interior Ministry released its plan for combating violent radicalization and terrorist networks. This plan created the General Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (SG-CIPDR). This committee, which the Prime Minister chairs, assembles 19 ministries, including the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Foreign Affairs, National Education, Higher Education and Research, Defence, Health, Women’s Rights and the Minister of State for Urban Policy, Youth and Sport. Its secretariat coordinates a network of partners and actors with the objects of promoting multidisciplinary action and managing the Interdepartmental Delinquency Prevention Fund. The CIPDR is responsible for coordinating the crime prevention action plan in collaboration with the ministries concerned, including the Ministries of National Education, and Higher Education and Research (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance, 2015). In effect, certain measures to contain youth radicalization have been taken. On 29 April 2014, the Minister of the Interior established monitoring units, under the aegis of the prefecture. These units are charged with identifying, reporting and accompanying persons, particularly youth, identified as radicalized or at risk of radicalization, and mobilizing the competent authorities, as well as the concerned actors on the ground (police, the national employment service, community groups). Under this mechanism, the prefects work in collaboration with the Ministry of National Education, via school principals, to facilitate the identification, reporting and monitoring of students at risk (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance, 2015). The educational environment is also a place for raising awareness of radicalization issues. To this end, in late 2015, a how-to booklet on identifying radicalization was disseminated to professionals, especially school principals (Agir contre la violence, 2014). The following year an interdepartmental guide on radicalization prevention was published. Developed by a working group of ministries involved in radicalization prevention, this guide was designed to help actors improve their efforts in accompanying and managing persons at risk. Reiterating the important preventive role played by schools, this guide envisages implanting radicalization advisors in each school establishment and department. Named by the principal and the chief education officer, respectively, their role is to ensure a liaison between schools and prefectures, in particular the latters’ monitoring units (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance, 2016).

2.6 Delinquency prevention policies

The Bonnemaison Report of 1982, entitled “Face à la délinquance : prévention, répression, solidarité” (Facing Delinquency: Prevention, Repression, Solidarity) is a cornerstone of crime prevention in France. This report, tabled by the Mayors’ Commission on Public Safety, advocated three reforms: greater territorialization of crime prevention, a stronger role for mayors and an end to the distinction between prevention and repression (De Maillard, 2005). Fifteen years later, in
1997, this territorialization could count on a new tool for facilitating collaboration between municipalities and the central government: the local security contracts (contrats locaux de sécurité—CLS) (Vie publique, 2009). These contracts are a reflection of the understanding that crime is caused by multiple factors, which are in turn addressed by a plethora of different actors. The goal of a CLS, then, is to organize an active and permanent partnership between the various stakeholders (De Maillard, 2005). In 2002, The Local Councils for Public Safety and Crime Prevention (Conseils locaux de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance—CLSPDs) and the Departmental Prevention Councils (Conseils départementaux de la prévention) were created to replace the former structure. It was not until 2007, however, that the CLSPDs took charge of managing and coordinating the CLSs (“Les politiques locales de sécurité,” 2009). Today, these elements all remain pillars of crime prevention in France, as prescribed by the 2013 National Crime Prevention Strategy.

This strategy was released in 2013 by the Interdepartmental Committee on the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization (CIPDR), a body chaired by the Prime Minister. Eleven ministries sit on this committee, including, notably, the Ministries of the Interior, Justice, National Education, Higher Education and Research, Defence, Health and Social Cohesion, Labour, Housing, Urban Policy, Youth and Sport. This national strategy defined three action priorities: youth exposed to delinquency; violence against women, violence in families and victim support; and public order. In effect, the prevention of juvenile delinquency comes under the umbrella of a structure established at the national level. Nevertheless, the strategy is based on a deconcentrated approach, intended to facilitate appropriate responses to a wide variety of local situations. In effect, the respective responsibilities of the State and territorial collectivities are subject to review at the departmental and district levels.

The form the National Strategy actually takes at the departmental level is determined under the aegis of the prefect. The prefect conducts broad consultations and coordination, notably with the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the relevant departments of the State, in order to adapt orientations defined at the national level to the department’s specific context. This, in a nutshell, is how departmental crime prevention plans are elaborated.

Subsequently, the orientations defined in this departmental plan are translated into local orientations, duly adjusted to take account of the issues and priorities of each district. The body responsible for making these local adjustments is the CLSPD – or, in certain cases, the Interdistrict Crime Prevention Council (Conseil intercommunal de prévention de la délinquance—CISPD). Established in 2007 and chaired by the mayor, the CLSPD is the lead local agency and central actor in crime prevention. The district level expression of the departmental plan is integrated into a local action plan, elaborated by the CLSPD, which also includes an assessment of the issues confronting the district and the available resources. This local action plan is then formalized – in a process involving the prefect, mayor, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the president of the

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General Council – either as a CLS contract or as a Territorial Public Safety and Crime Prevention Strategy (Stratégie territoriale de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance—STSPD).

From an operational perspective, district level operational groups monitor youth identified as at risk of falling into crime or reoffending. Very often, these young persons may come under the purview of multiple intervention areas, as they may be grappling with multiple issues. Consequently, these operational groups are comprised of competent practitioners capable of professionally supervising at risk youth and proposing intervention actions, generally entailing the involvement of the social services sector, the education sector or employment integration. These operational groups serve to centralize and pool knowledge on the local mechanisms and structures, which may be of benefit to youth, as well as gather individual data points for identifying at risk youth. In effect, the challenge at the local level is to effectively coordinate existing resources. For every youth identified, the operational group designates a case officer to coordinate the various actions to be implemented.

The implementation of the mechanisms prescribed under the National Strategy, and that of the corresponding means of action, is partly funded by the Interdepartmental Crime Prevention Fund. Funding also comes from the general appropriations of the different ministries participating in the CIPDR, as well as from the regions and districts. Actions funded via this diverse funding structure enjoy a degree of sustainability and may establish local roots. Since 2013, youth crime prevention actions have been considered a funding priority and, as such, tend to absorb as much as half of available appropriations. Finally, funding is oriented towards actions based on good local practices.

The Strategy provides for the evaluation of funding appropriations and, more generally, that of the implementation of its mechanisms and structures. In effect, the Standing Commission for the Evaluation of Crime Prevention Policy, (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance), created in 2010 by the Prime Minister, published an evaluation report on youth crime prevention structures in December 2016. These evaluations may influence future iterations of the Strategy, which is scheduled to end in 2017.

3. Coordination and integration

As already mentioned, the efficient coordination of actors is essential to the effectiveness of public policies, and this is the case at – and between – every level of government.

3.1 Horizontal coordination

Horizontal coordination mechanisms concern the organization of linkages between different actors at the same level of government, be it national or local.

3.1.1 The national level

The national level’s principal responsibility is to design public policies and establish the major strategic orientations. However, as we’ve just seen, the various public policies contributing to
Youth violence prevention touch on many different aspects and therefore, even within any given policy, different policy areas are involved (public safety, education, urban policy, etc.) This means that any notion of involving all ministries concerned in the policy development process would imply interdepartmental co-construction of all policies. For most interdepartmental committees – such as the Interdepartmental Committee on Youth, the Interdepartmental Committee on Cities or the Interdepartmental Committee on the Prevention of Crime and Radicalization – this interdepartmental cooperation in the elaboration of public policies takes place within the decision-making agency.

Cooperation at the national level extends to civil society actors (social partners, representatives of youth, teachers, specialists from academia...) and territorial collectivities, particularly in relation to youth policy. In this type of cooperation, the national agencies bringing these various actors together are usually think tanks or advisory bodies lacking in decision-making authority in terms of setting public policies. For example, the Youth Policies Advisory Board (Conseil d'orientation des politiques de jeunesse), which is composed of a dozen ministries, territorial collectivities, young persons and youth organizations, community groups and social services partners, is an advisory body which generates ideas to enrich public policy development.

3.1.2 The local level

At the local level, a double coordination structure exists.

First of all, there is coordination between actors intervening in the context of given multisectoral policies. As we have seen, most policies that impact youth violence prevention, to a greater or lesser extent, involve very diverse interventions, touching on different aspects of a young person's life. This is true for urban policy, youth policy and crime prevention strategy, particularly, where the areas of employment, education, housing, social and psychological development issues are in play. The same applies to public safety and justice issues. These policies require the support of all concerned actors, including actors who work in different areas, but whose actions are connected. In practice, this can be quite complex when different actors are not accustomed to working together or when they have different approaches to issues. Ensuring better collaboration between all actors is a challenge, which is why more and more coordination interfaces are emerging. As a result, professionals have emerged within certain structures with one main task: ensuring a liaison with partners and working in concert with them to achieve common objectives (Mission permanente d'évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2014). This is the role played by CLSPD coordinators, for example, who are in charge of technical support and monitoring policies adopted by the council – policies which he or she helped to design. His or her mission is to translate strategic orientations into actions by defining the implementation modalities and ensuring their execution. As a CLSPD coordinator explained to us, this is done through the organizing of working meetings of course, but also by making connections between different actors to determine the right actions for implementing general initiatives or for intervening in relation to an individual case. The heart of his or her mission is to promote
partnership. This role is appreciated by partners, particularly the police and the gendarmerie, because the presence of a coordinator makes it possible for actors who don’t normally work together, or who are not in close proximity, to communicate (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2013). Similarly, there is an increasing trend in police departments to designate persons in charge of interface issues with other actors. This is the case, for example, with national education “liaisons” who are police department resource persons assigned to educational institutions (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2016). As for the Ministry of National Education, it has placed “radicalization advisors” in every educational institution with the mandate of liaising between schools and the prefecture (Comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance, 2016).

On the other hand, different policies are themselves intrinsically inter-related, due to their cross-cutting and multisectoral nature. In effect, the objectives and areas of intervention of different policies are sometimes the same and/or overlap. This was confirmed by one of our interview subjects. In charge of implementing crime prevention actions in an inter-municipal area, she explained that, in her view, general youth policy is an instrument of violence prevention. Many youth policy actions are implemented via schools, youth services and sports – just as violence prevention actions are. According to her, “indirectly, it [youth policy] is prevention” and on the ground all policies are connected. A similar overlap also applies to urban policy and crime prevention policy. In effect, these two types of prevention policies have always been connected because they originated in the same context of the fight against insecurity and urban violence. They have the same priorities. Thus, on the one hand, crime prevention actions take into account and integrate the urban social cohesion contracts of urban policy. On the other hand, local security contracts, constitute the “security” component of urban social cohesion contracts (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2014). Be that as it may, according to the Standing Commission for Evaluation (2014) coordination between urban policy instruments and crime prevention instruments is quite poor and leads above all to overlapping structures. In practice, efficient coordination between different policies depends more on the individual efforts of actors on the ground than on the structures implemented at the institutional level.

3.2 Vertical coordination: contractualization

In France, the vertical coordination of public policies has taken the form of territorialization (i.e., the deconcentration of certain responsibilities towards lower levels of government). As for public policy on youth violence prevention, vertical coordination is largely based on the contractualization of relations between the national government and local levels of government. Currently, the two main types of contracts relevant to youth violence prevention are urban social cohesion contracts and local security contracts. These contracts are not, however, an expression of total decentralization. Rather, they constitute an additional interface for negotiations between the local representatives of the central State, the municipalities and their partners. In particular, these contracts define each actor’s roles and responsibilities. Although actors on the ground are beginning to better understand each actor’s functions and the goal of these contracts, this takes
time. According to de Maillard (2005), the proliferation of contracts and the existence of both urban contracts and local security contracts has created a certain confusion. Aside from the uncertainty around the functioning and evolution of such contracts, the connections and relations between the different types of contracts were unclear to local actors. Furthermore, the legislation does not precisely define who the CLSPDs’ stakeholder partners are or who is charged with enforcing CLS contracts, aside from the mayor and the prefect as the representative of the central State. The mayor has the authority to select the actors he deems appropriate, which allows him or her to maintain maneuvering room. This structure also allows CLSPDs to truly adapt to the context of a given territory. In effect, partners are selected in accordance with the priority issues specified in the contract. This facilitates adaptation to local situations. There is a concern that this freedom may result in increased repressive measures when the actors selected are from the law enforcement community, such as the police or the gendarmerie (Centre international pour la prévention de la criminalité, 2016). Although that is a possibility, it does not seem to be the case in France, as many of these contracts involve actors from the education or the social services sectors. Moreover, when actors from law enforcement institutions are involved, they tend to implement purely preventive actions such as maintaining a presence just outside of schools with the object of encouraging dialogue, as opposed to making arrests.

Funding is a matter of key importance in vertical coordination. It’s worth noting that while the funding of initiatives on the ground comes from different levels of government, there does exist a willingness to diversify funding sources. Specific funds are in fact associated with each policy, such as, for example, the Interdepartmental Crime Prevention Fund or credits dedicated to urban policy. However, these funds tend to be twinned with the ordinary appropriations available to a district. Thus, while certain specific actions are funded by grants from a specific fund, the districts also benefit from general administrative appropriations from different ministries or from the regional government, which are not allocated to specific projects. This funding structure facilitates ensuring greater longevity for specific initiatives. It also reduces the inequalities between districts, particularly in urban policy, as ordinary funding is appropriated in the same fashion nationwide (Comité interministériel de la Jeunesse, 2013; Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015). That said, the local actors responsible for designing and implementing actions are facing major budget cuts, which call into question the feasibility of certain initiatives.

“We have an annual budget, but it’s true that there are more and more budget restrictions. We will obtain subsidies for certain actions from the (State) Interdepartmental Crime Prevention Fund or, if not, we can obtain funding from the General Directorate for Territorial Equalization (direction générale de l’Egalité des territoires). That said, it’s true that the budget restrictions are relatively important.”
4. Participation, leadership and collaboration

4.1 Participation

To determine which actors are included in a given coordination system and the degree of their involvement, it’s necessary to examine the question of participation.

In general, the process of developing and implementing public policies is participatory – in light of the number of issues addressed, public policies are intrinsically participatory (Comité interministériel de la Jeunesse, 2013; Raude, 2015). Moreover, due to their multisectoral character, public policies often entail the intervention of actors from different professional environments. Of course, the nature and scope of such participation varies from one actor to another.

The national government plays a strong central role in public policy development. In effect, policies are elaborated at the national level. Local government, for its part, is responsible for elaborating the locally adapted versions of strategies decided at the national level. As such, local governments are central actors in decisions bearing on the concrete implementation of strategic orientations.

The law enforcement community (police and gendarmerie) are key, indeed privileged, partners in youth violence prevention related policies. In addition to this sector’s participation in policy development at the national level, by way of its internal input at the Interior Ministry, it also contributes to the implementation of actions at the local level. The law enforcement community thus participates in numerous initiatives in crime prevention, urban policy, radicalization prevention and combating school violence. It’s interesting to note that actors whose main role is law enforcement are in fact key partners in prevention activities.

As for the associative sector (i.e., community groups), although its participation in the elaboration of public policies at the national level is starting to emerge in relation to youth policy, it remains largely excluded from the policy design process at the national level and, very often, at the local level as well. And yet, observers often underline the important role of community groups, particularly in relation to urban policy. In effect, grassroots associations have a key role in implementing public policies. Present on the ground in districts, it is the associative sector that implements orientations. According to the Observatory for Urban Integration (Observatoire de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012), community groups “are often seen as field operators and not as partners” (p. 23).

According to many professionals and researchers, residents must support initiatives and feel they are affected for such initiatives to bear fruit. However, although there is indeed an apparent willingness to see residents as partners, and this has true since the dawn of urban policy in 1977, this willingness rarely materializes on the ground (Observatoire régional de l’intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015). For example, recent reforms and legislation have further strengthened the principle of co-construction of public policies (especially urban policy) with the creation of citizens’ councils in working class neighbourhoods. However, this seems to have little significant effect in practice. In effect, as no specific procedures for participation are prescribed by law, it’s up
to the mayor, or to the CLSPD coordinator on crime prevention issues, to decide on the degree of participation. Consequently, this often takes the form of mere consultations or official statements and press releases (Mission permanente d'évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2013; Observatoire régional de l'intégration et de la ville, 2012; Raude, 2015). As Maillard noted in 2005, residents are not seen as partners. Nevertheless, certain researchers (Raude, 2015) note a positive evolution and not only in legal documents, but also in the discourse of actors and elected officials.

Finally, regarding young people, whose support is essential to the success of the policies for which they are the target population, their involvement in the development of strategies and policies is limited to youth policy. The 2000s saw the emergence of a willingness to let youth have their say and become partners in the co-construction of youth policies. For example, the Youth Policies Advisory Board includes both youth and youth organizations. However, this body has no decision-making authority and for the moment is only a forum for reflection and dialogue.

### 4.2 Leadership

Public policy analysis requires examining the central role of facilitating and mobilizing the network of actors involved in any given policy. This analysis includes identifying the leading actors, if necessary.

In France, this leadership role was affected by the decentralization process launched in 1982. Decentralization implies a transfer of financial resources and decision-making powers to representatives of the State in the regions, departments and municipalities. The objective: to encourage local initiatives. As a result, the municipalities acquired powers in urban planning, the departments in social services and the regions in economic policy (De Maillard, 2005). In the area of youth violence prevention, the departments were able to establish a certain leadership. As were the municipalities, to an even greater extent.

Although orientations, strategies and policies are developed at the national level, they are nonetheless implemented at the departmental and municipal levels. Thus, although the central state defines the contours, cities have the authority to adapt policies to the local situation and local priorities. Mayors, then, are lead actors driving strategic orientations and policy at the local level.

The municipalities also assume the leadership role in the development and implementation of concrete actions aligned with the strategic orientations in urban policy and crime prevention. More specifically, this leadership role is ensured by the mayors and CLSPD coordinators. As for preventing radicalization and school violence, the local level's role consists more of implementing actions decided by the prefect or school principals. Leadership in this instance is, therefore, in the hands of the department.
However, as the Standing Commission notes (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2014), even where leadership is ensured at the local level by the mayor, certain policy areas have not been decentralized, notably justice and public safety. And yet, law enforcement agencies and the justice system are important partners in policy implementation. In short, the State retains nonetheless a certain control and oversight authority.

4.3 Collaboration

As we have seen, coordination, particularly interdepartmental coordination, is very strong in France. Let’s now take a closer look at this coordination.

At the national level, so called functional coordination is the norm. In effect, ministries often collaborate during the elaboration of different public policies, in accordance with protocols and procedures which seem well established. This has been the case for several decades.

At the local level, the degree of collaboration between different actors depends on their partnership relations (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2013). In practice, collaboration includes a strong interpersonal dimension. Actors working together must above all know and trust each other if collaboration is to go beyond pro forma coordination within structures defined at the national level. This interpersonal dimension was confirmed by an actor on the ground who explained to us that she has excellent partnerships that facilitate her coordination work.

“As for difficulties, I don’t have many. I’m lucky to have excellent partnerships. What facilitates a coordinator’s work is to have partners that one has known for a long time.”

According to actors on the ground, it’s important to let partners become familiar with each other’s work over time, as well as, indeed above all, get to know each other personally. This is a long process, but a crucial one for developing a relationship of trust. It’s this relationship of trust that guarantees healthy collaboration in the future. To this end, limiting turnover among actors is recommended. However, this is the opposite of what sometimes happens with certain actors, notably CLSPD coordinators, despite their key role in crime prevention partnerships. According to the Standing Commission, it would be wise to do more to ensure that actors who have succeeded in creating strong partnerships remain in their positions for longer periods, to avoid having to constantly recommence the process of building relations of trust, so essential to collaboration (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2013, 2016).

The willingness of persons to work together in a more proactive fashion is essential. In effect, even when no formal collaboration networks exist, certain actors, such as CLSPD coordinators for example, create informal internal networks of their professional peers in order to exchange experiences and points of view. (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2013). One of our interviewees informed us that it was her practice to spontaneously contact the coordinators of other municipalities, particularly new coordinators, to organize meetings.
“In certain districts, when new coordinators arrived, I invited them to come to different meetings and they came.”

If familiarity with interlocutors and trust generally facilitate a certain collaboration between actors, this takes time and initial contacts may be marked by distrust. This is especially the case between institutional actors and community actors. Certain institutional actors, notably CLSPD coordinators, don’t know all the community groups working in their area. This leads them, out of a lack of trust, to avoid working with unfamiliar associations and to concentrate on the community groups whose work they do know.

“We don’t necessarily have access to what is known as a community group’s objectives contract. Therefore, we don’t really know what they do on the ground or get reports on their results. So, based on that I am extremely prudent. […] It really is difficult for a coordinator to be able to work with certain associations, due to a total lack of knowledge about them.”

Community actors who work with youth often adopt a therapeutic relationship with them. Consequently, these actors may be reticent to work with institutional actors, whom they see as advocates of an authoritarian and repressive philosophy which they do not share (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2016). On this issue, the Standing Commission noted in 2014 and 2013 that it was incumbent on mayors and CLSPD coordinators to reconcile the different, sometimes contradictory, professional cultures of different local actors.

5. Information, data and knowledge sharing

Many different types of information are shared by actors involved in youth violence prevention. As a practical matter, professionals must be able to exchange information on young persons and their situations. Furthermore, knowledge of a more general theoretical and/or scientific character needs to be more widely shared.

5.1 Sharing confidential information

As the 2013 National Crime Prevention Strategy explains, one of the essential conditions for prevention work on individual case files is the ability of actors to exchange information on minors who are under some form of supervision. This point was reiterated by one of our interviewees, who is involved in youth crime prevention at a national agency. Professionals must be able to discuss individual cases and situations and must have access to personal and confidential information held by other services. Consequently, conditions for secure information transmission must be put in place; otherwise, certain actors may refuse to participate in multisectoral prevention policies.
“To identify youth, to implement this policy, is something we cannot do [...] if the conditions under which one can cite names have not been defined and made secure [...] one needs to be able to mention the situation of so and so, in such a way where we don’t find ourselves working with professionals who refuse to take part in this policy. [...] Information exchange is essential, we can’t implement an individualized action if we can’t identify situations within a secure framework.”

The question of information sharing is all the more delicate in cases involving young persons, as the Evaluation Report on Youth Crime Prevention reminds us (Mission permanente d’évaluation de la politique de prévention de la délinquance, 2016). In effect, juvenile delinquency is an area where public safety imperatives intersect with interventions of a social services character. However, interventions in social services require the establishing of a relation of trust with youth, based in particular on a certain confidentiality. It can therefore be delicate for case workers to find the right balance between confidentiality and the need to keep certain institutions informed.

The government has been long aware of this issue. Thus, on March 5, 2007, it adopted a law that established a framework on information sharing in crime prevention. Under this law, the CLSPDs must adopt internal regulations formalizing their information transmission procedures. Moreover, this law stipulates that only operational units responsible for monitoring individuals shall have access to confidential information. In addition, under the 2013 National Crime Prevention Strategy, the districts must adopt an ethics charter, which authorizes information sharing and conforms with the model prescribed by the SG-CIPDR.

5.2 Knowledge sharing

France has a number of public sector research centres specializing in public safety and crime, such as the INHSJ (National Institute for Advanced Studies on Public Safety and Justice) and the CESDIP (Centre for Sociological Research on the Law and Penal Institutions), which produce and disseminate new findings and knowledge in this area.

Official crime statistics in France are published by the National Statistics and Economic Studies Institute (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques—INSEE) which has been mandated, since its creation following the Second World War, to produce, analyze and publish official statistics on census data, the economy, incomes and employment, education and the environment, etc. Its independence from the government is guaranteed by law. INSEE also produces statistics on crime, public safety issues and the justice system. More specifically, crime statistics are produced on the number of persons indicted per crime or offence and are disaggregated by gender and age. Data on victims, disaggregated according to gender and type of offence, is also available. As is survey data on public opinion on crime related issues. With regard to the justice system, information is available on the number of convictions per type of offence, sentencing patterns per type of conviction, as well as demographic data on the persons under justice system control, whether in custody or not. This data is available, without charge, up to the departmental level (Rapport « l’Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques collecte, produit, analyse et diffuse des informations sur l’économie et la société françaises »), which therefore enables comparative analyses between different departments.
Finally, most ministries have their own statistical office (« Les services statistiques ministériels (SSM) », 2016).

6. Conclusion

In France, youth violence has become a major issue over the last thirty years, especially under the influence of the various macro-systemic factors that have generated profound inequalities in French society. Youth violence-related issues are primarily envisaged and addressed from the vantage points of crime prevention, youth policies and development strategies targeting the most disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods.

The traditional social prevention approach, which favoured a strategy of reducing inequalities, has been superseded, since the 1990s, by a perspective very tightly articulated around targeted secondary prevention and tough-on-crime policies.

Moreover, the French institutional and administrative system has been undergoing profound transformations since the early 1980s, due to a decentralization process, which, however, is still beset by many internal issues and shortcomings. The present context, then, is characterized by both centralizing and decentralizing dynamics, which influence the various systems of actors, often concurrently and simultaneously. These opposing dynamics imply major coordination problems, particularly at the local level.

A number of decentralization processes are at work in relation to violence prevention, two of which merit particular attention: the territorialization of public policies and the contractualization of relations between the State and local collectivities.

Public participation is another important issue, which, however, when it comes to the design and implementation processes of strategies and public policies, is either too often dismissed or is not systematically integrated. In particular, civil society and youth represent, at best, no more than secondary actors with advisory roles, despite their status as the central target populations of these processes.
1. Introduction

Norway, like the other Nordic countries has adopted the so-called “Scandinavian model,” which is characterized by a very strong State and public action decisively oriented towards social policies and a comprehensive prevention approach to issues such as violence, health care or exclusion. In fact, Norway is one of the most socially developed countries in the world, with the highest human development index\(^{23}\) and the lowest Gini coefficient on the planet.\(^{24}\)

Norway has very low violence and crime rates. According to Statistics Norway’s 2016 National Victimization Survey, only 3.5% of Norwegians were exposed to, or threatened with, acts of violence, and 5.6% felt threatened by such acts over the 12 preceding months. These statistics, moreover, have been on a consistent downward trend.\(^{25}\) Furthermore, the country’s homicide rate of 0.6 per 100,000 inhabitants, is one of the lowest in the world.\(^{26}\) Finally, the Norwegian model is often lauded for its policing practices, which employ little violence: between 2002 and 2014, 18 persons were wounded and 2 were killed by the Norwegian police (Groll, 2015).

Young Norwegians, like youth elsewhere, are more widely affected by violence and crime than the rest of the population (Busic, 2012). That said, although youth violence rates are higher, they too are decreasing, in line with the general downward trend: thus, according to Statistics Norway’s victimization surveys, the rate of young men between 16 and 24 who report that they were victims of acts – or threats – of violence during the preceding year fell from 14% in 2007 to 7% in 2012; for young women in the same age bracket, this figure fell from 6% to 4% over the same period.\(^{27}\) In general, one observes a continuous reduction in youth crime: between 2007 and 2015, the number of crimes and offences recorded for persons under 30 decreased by 28%. Moreover, this fall occurred in all categories of crimes and offences, including drug use, assault (acts of violence), property crimes and sexual violence.\(^{28}\)

Finally, it’s interesting to note that young Norwegians generally express confidence concerning the future and their place in society. In 2014, the Ungdata youth survey showed for example that


\(^{24}\) According to the rankings of the World Bank: [http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables](http://wdi.worldbank.org/tables)


only 14% of adolescents 14 to 16 envisaged being unemployed one day. This optimism largely explains why few young Norwegians turn towards criminal behaviour and activities (Bjørgo, 2016).

What factors led to such a marked improvement in violence and crime related issues among young Norwegians? To what extent did public policy action, particularly in the form of national strategies, contribute to this improvement? Pertinent questions, as these positive results occurred during a period which followed an earlier period of increases in youth violence and crime, during the late 1990s and the early 2000s. It should be noted, however, that the latter phenomenon concerned very small numbers of youth, who were mainly involved in drug consumption and trafficking related activities, as well as property crimes such as theft or vandalism (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 2003). Moreover, during the same period, another problem emerged: urban gangs, whose members were largely youth from immigrant backgrounds grappling with growing integration issues (Bjørgo, 2016). As awareness of the new social challenges confronting the Norwegian model grew, public policy was adapted and several specific policies were developed that produced the positive results apparent today.

2. The Scandinavian model and comprehensive prevention

Norway is characterized by a Scandinavian type model; i.e., a comprehensive and inclusive social security system, which combines a wide range of publicly provided services (e.g., free health care and education, pensions and unemployment insurance) and progressive social policies (e.g., defence of minority rights, reduction of inequalities, protection of vulnerable populations, emphasis on community and participation) based on universalist principles (Kildal & Kuhnle, 2007). The social prevention approach is a fundamental component of the Scandinavian model. It is based on three essential pillars: collaboration and cooperation; early intervention; and the production and sharing of information and knowledge (Egge & Gundhus, 2012).

The issues of crime and violence are also envisaged through the prism of social prevention, which encompasses all factors connected with marginalization and exclusion (Takala, 1999). In this approach, children and youth are central priorities of strategic action (Finnish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2005). Furthermore, this comprehensive vision is premised on a continuum between the social prevention of crime and violence, on the one hand, and social action by the Welfare State, on the other. In effect, the latter is considered an indispensable condition for the former (Council of Europe, 2000).

Thus, if one wishes to map Norway’s youth violence strategy, one must consider several of the main policy areas at the heart of Welfare State public policy, including youth policies, the prevention of school violence and bullying, crime prevention and the principles of restorative justice, as applied to minors.
2.1 A strong and integrated youth policy: historic cornerstone of the Norwegian model

Norwegian public policy, particularly as regards youth, combines the Welfare State model with a Scandinavian approach oriented towards encouraging strong youth engagement in the community. In effect, youth policies have been essential pillars of governmental action since the middle of the last century. These policies, moreover, integrate very strong civil society involvement (Wolf et al., 2004). From the very outset, these policies have rested on two cornerstones: the national Ministry of Sport and Leisure (with advisory input from the National Youth Council) and a vast pool of highly active grassroots youth sector NGOs, which focus on leisure activities, community engagement and citizenship, and life skills training (Wolf et al., 2004).

From the perspective of policy design, these policies employ a broad definition of youth. In effect, youth is defined as the period encompassing all stages of life in the transition from childhood (a stage characterized by a life centring on the family and dependence on parents) to adult life (characterized by stability, economic independence and the formation of one’s own family).

Since the 1980s, and more particularly since the dawn of the new millennium, this approach has been questioned and has evolved to enable a better adapted response to the changes in Norwegian society, including the challenge of integrating youth from immigrant backgrounds or the Sami minority, changes in family structures, and social and economic inequalities. Thus, at the turn of the millennium, several reports on youth issues were debated in the Norwegian parliament. These reports all noted the major difficulties confronted by the most vulnerable children and youth (violence, economic inequalities, discrimination, substance abuse issues, lack of employment prospects, mental health and wellness issues) and all emphasized the necessity of adopting preventive strategies (Wolf et al., 2004).

These public policy debates culminated in the National Youth Policy (NYP), which was introduced in 2002 by the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion and its Department of Children and Youth Policies. The NYP, which remains in force to this day, covers very broad-ranging issues and is quite comprehensive in its youth development ambitions. It encompasses, in effect, numerous primary prevention policy areas, including fighting discrimination, promoting mental health, articulating social services to enhance the protection of vulnerable children and youth,

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29 According to Statistics Norway, youth from immigrant backgrounds represented 15.5% of all persons in this age bracket in 2016 vs. 11% in 2009. This demographic is highly concentrated in urban centres, especially in the Norwegian metropolis of Oslo where they account for 34% of all persons under 25, a figure which exceeds 50% in certain neighbourhoods. https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/artikler-og-publikasjoner/barn-og unge-vokste-med-innvandrerbakgrunn

30 The Samis or Saami are an indigenous people in the area encompassing the northern regions of Sweden, Norway and Finland, as well as the Kola Peninsula in Russia.

31 It is interesting to note that this institution, formerly named the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, was renamed, in 2005, the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion to better reflect its mission in the context of the campaigns against different types of discrimination undertaken by the Norwegian government in response to the new challenges mentioned above.
labour market integration and fighting youth unemployment, public health, and preventing substance abuse and unwanted teen pregnancies.

This policy also introduced the foundations for secondary prevention by developing intervention strategies for youth with behavioural issues, particularly violence related issues. In its prioritizing of youth at risk, including youth occasionally in trouble with the law, this policy favours therapeutic and behavioural approaches, applied research and an integration of the services and agencies in charge of youth (i.e., services and agencies at the midway point between social services and the justice system) to enable a rapid and rational response. A number of these types of youth policy programs were introduced in 2001, then subsequently expanded after evaluation.

In addition, the NYP established linkages with other strategic plans and public policies. In particular, it integrated certain components – i.e., those addressing troubled youth with violence and/or antisocial behaviour issues, and/or conflicts with the law – with the restorative justice system and the Juvenile Delinquency Action Plan.

The 2001 Youth Policy was the subject of an evaluation report in 2003, done by the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs (since renamed the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion). This evaluation examined a very broad range of issues in its analysis, including youth participation and activities, mental health issues, economic and social exclusion, racism and juvenile delinquency (Døvøy, 2005; Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 2003). It nonetheless managed to identify several major shortcomings in existing youth policies: interventions of available services that are too slow to provide appropriate assistance to children at risk and their families; insufficient cooperation between agencies and services; weak legitimacy of youth protection in public opinion; a lack of political awareness; and insufficient engagement by said services at the municipal level (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 2003).

While Norwegian youth policy is very broad, integrating as it does the issues and challenges that youth confront in their entirety, its primary purpose is to serve as a general strategic framework. One of its principal operational characteristics is the structuring of policy around targeted action plans, generally developed over a shorter term, in response to specific issues. Thus, in relation to youth violence prevention, one can identify several specific policy areas that require action plans: protecting youth against violence, fighting school violence, preventing crime among children and youth, and tertiary prevention and restorative justice. The latter, moreover, is central to the Norwegian justice system, especially as regards minors.

### 2.2 Schools and anti-bullying programs as young people’s initial awareness of violence

In 1983, the suicide of three adolescent victims of bullying propelled this issue to the top of the public agenda and led to the development of the Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, a pioneering initiative in this field, which was subsequently widely adopted around the world (Steifert & Ray, 2012). In light of this program’s excellent results (Olweus & Limber, 2010), in 2001
it was expanded, with some modifications, to include every primary and secondary school in Norway.

Subsequently, in 2002, the government published a Manifesto against Bullying, which summarized its intentions and action plan for combating this type of violence. Moreover, this document also integrated gender issues and the fight against sexual harassment. In 2016, it was renewed for the 2016-2018 period, in close cooperation with the stakeholders involved in its implementation, including, notably, the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, the Education Union and the National Association of Primary and Secondary School Parents’ Committees.

2.3 The turn of the millennium and the development of a crime prevention policy

Violence and crime prevention in Norway is seen through the prism of a broader set of issues, including the social prevention of inequalities, exclusion and violence. In effect, the emphasis is on the development of harmonious human relations and safe environments (Council of Europe, 2000). Highly child and youth centred, this prevention approach favours social and developmental prevention (Egge & Gundhus, 2012). When situational type prevention actions are envisaged, they are regarded as secondary. Every major public policy area is mobilized, including social assistance, health, education and public safety.

The first Action Plan against Juvenile Delinquency, covering the 2000-2004 period, was adopted in 1999, as a response to Parliamentary Report No. 17 (1999-2000) on juvenile delinquency. Its principal objectives were to improve and strengthen coordination of prevention efforts and develop measures for children and youth with behaviour problems, including young gang members and youth in trouble with the law. From its very conception, this initial action plan was the product of close collaboration between the following ministries: Children and Family Affairs, Justice, Education, Social Affairs, Health, and Local Government and Regional Development.

The first Action Plan identified 6 main priorities: coherent and coordinated prevention activities; the school environment; free time and the community environment; supervision of children and youth demonstrating behaviour problems (secondary prevention) and; supervision of youth in trouble with the law and youth members of criminal gangs. In effect, this plan was consistent with and further detailed the priorities defined by the NYP. Primarily geared towards improving operationalization systems, this plan introduced the SLT model for harmonizing local crime prevention initiatives, which is detailed in the next section.

From 2005 to 2013, the Labour Party governed as a majority government and, therefore, had a free rein in developing its public policies, including its social and prevention policies. During this period, three successive crime prevention action plans were adopted, the last one for the 2013-2016 period. This plan, which retained a youth-centred orientation, integrated all structures and actions connected with not only secondary prevention, but also restorative justice and tertiary prevention. The priority intervention areas centred on school violence prevention, preventing substance abuse, support for young victims of violence, support for youth led community action.
initiatives, promotion of mental health and the systematic development of restorative justice measures.

In operational terms, the 2013–2016 Action Plan identified three priorities: intersectoral cooperation, particularly at the municipal level; knowledge production and information sharing; and the adoption – and further development – of certain aspects of the SLT model (discussed in detail in the next section). The Plan also identified 35 actions, specifying in each case the ministry responsible for its development and implementation. Furthermore, it’s worth noting – and this a recurring characteristic of the Norwegian system – that this national Action Plan, like most policies of this type, identified overall priorities, leaving the ministries, and especially the local authorities, latitude to define their own strategies and design their own actions in accordance with the specific context and local needs. In effect, one of the chief paradigms of Norwegian institutions is decentralization accompanied by great autonomy (a crucial point in relation to certain aspects of coordination described below).

In 2015, a conservative coalition was elected to govern the country. This development led to significant shifts in government policy on crime and violence, particularly in relation to youth. More specifically, there has been a certain shift from the social approach towards a more situational prevention model and, secondly, there is an incipient weakening of the institutional system underlying prevention at the national level. This latter point shall be further developed below.

3. Coordination, collaboration, participation and leadership: the integrated Norwegian model

The Norwegian system is organized on the basis of three administrative levels: the central level, the counties and the districts. Decentralization has been a foundational principle in the Norwegian political and institutional system since the XIXth century when many responsibilities were devolved towards the local level (Blom-Hansen, Borge, & Dahlberg, 2010).

3.1 The national level

The national level and Norwegian governmental institutions provide the legislative framework, some funding and technical support services to local authorities. National funding consists of non-differentiated (i.e., general) appropriations, which leave local actors considerable maneuvering room to identify their own priorities, elaborate their own strategies and allocate financial and human resources, as needs dictate.

Actions plans serve as guidelines for public action, but in a manner consistent with this decentralized structure. In relation to public safety and violence and crime prevention, national structures provide support and assistance, while the majority of coordination mechanisms are developed closer to the ground, at the local level.
As for the myriad dimensions of youth violence, different national agencies are charged with developing strategic plans on specific policy areas, including, notably, the Ministries of Justice and Policing (public safety and crime prevention), Health and Social Services (social policies and public health), Education (school violence, education programs on different types of violence) and Children and Social Equality (youth policies). In each of these policy areas, the competent or lead ministry is responsible for developing the corresponding action plan. However, in practice, policy design is multidisciplinary and participatory, as the other concerned ministries and agencies are included in this process via their participation in an interdepartmental committee. Moreover, various stakeholders, such as research institutes or civil society, are also consulted during the policy design process. Action plans generally translate the priorities defined during a change of government or, alternatively, are the fruits of a process of policy reflection, initiated with the tabling of a parliamentary report. This ensures a certain political consensus, which facilitates continuity and coherence in public action over time (NOVA, 2008).

In the area of crime and violence prevention, a specific institution oversees these issues with a multidisciplinary perspective: the National Crime Prevention Council or KRÅD (Kriminalitetsforebyggende Rad). Founded in 1980, the KRÅD model was based on existing organizations in Denmark and Sweden. An autonomous structure within the Ministry of Justice, its members are appointed every three years by said ministry. Similar councils exist in every Scandinavian country and, indeed, work in collaboration.

KRÅD’s mission is to promote cooperation on crime prevention among public institutions and authorities, civil society and the private sector, as well as provide them with accompaniment and support in the implementation of prevention strategies. Moreover, the Council also plays a central role in research, knowledge production and the evaluation of public policies. KRÅD, then, is not a coordination agency, but rather a body that provides expertise and plays an advisory role. In particular, it was KRÅD that facilitated Norway’s importing and adaptation of the Danish SSP model,32 which enabled the establishment of SLTs nationwide (see section 3.3.1a for detailed description of this coordination model).

In 2015, KRÅD was replaced by the Competence Centre for Crime Prevention (KfK), which largely took up the former’s mission in terms of expertise, knowledge dissemination and support. Under the authority of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety, the KfK works in close collaboration with several other agencies and ministries (Health, Labour and Social Affairs, Local Government and Modernization, Children, Equality and Inclusion, Education and Research, and Culture). This change in structure occurred after the 2013 national elections, which brought a conservative coalition to power after eight years of Labour Party governance. In practice, this transition translated into a drastic reduction in the organization’s size and mission: today, the KfK is composed of about a dozen persons and constitutes an advisory board with considerably less scope in its knowledge production, assistance and support roles.

32 School Social Police
3.2 The regional level

The regional level (i.e., the counties) represents an intermediate level of government, which, relatively speaking, assumes considerably fewer responsibilities than the local authorities. Its principal responsibilities and investments are in the areas of higher education, hospital services, transportation, culture and regional land use planning.

The regional level has some responsibilities that are related to violence and crime prevention or youth policy, notably the coordination of social assistance institutions, including those serving families and children, and managing care for dependent persons.

In addition, the regional authorities provide assistance and support to the local authorities, which are responsible for most of the work on the ground. In particular, the regional level ensures the circulation of knowledge and information, facilitates networking by practitioners and professionals, and organizes events, conferences and dissemination solutions.

3.3 The local level

As previously mentioned, governance in Norway is the product of a major decentralization process: today, local authorities are in charge of numerous jurisdictions and enjoy considerable autonomy. As a result, the focus of many national strategies is on building local capacities. To a large extent, public action is concentrated at the local level; thus, in 2010, 20% of the labour force was employed by the local civil service (Blom-Hansen et al., 2010).

In the 1960s, the municipalities launched youth programs centring on leisure activities and community engagement. Today, as a general rule, it is the municipal authorities which oversee the development and implementation of prevention policies through their local plans and programs, in the areas of youth policy, public health, social work and community security. A key feature of municipal action around youth violence issues is that it is entirely integrated with the system of coordination and close collaboration between actors on the ground, decision-makers and representatives from institutions known as the SLT model.

3.3.1 SLT: a model for harmonizing local crime prevention initiatives

This model for coordinating local crime prevention is an adaptation of the Danish SSP model, which Norway adopted in 1989 and instituted in municipalities across the country in the 1990s. Its function is to assemble the actors on the ground – from the social services sector (including health care), law enforcement and the schools – in order to identify local issues and define concerted strategies. As with all social prevention policy, particularly in relation to violence and crime, this model focuses in particular on children, youth and their environment (family, school, leisure activities, community). Most municipalities restrict the scope of their activities to minors or, in a few cases, to youth under 23.
What distinguishes this model from other coordination models is its structure, which does not further burden the system of actors by superimposing an external coordination dynamic, but is instead predicated on facilitating synergies between resources on the ground. It’s very important to emphasize that the implementation of the SLT model in municipalities is done on a voluntary basis. It is not mandatory. Moreover, local authorities enjoy great decision-making latitude with respect to implementing national action plans. By 2012, 190 of the country’s 428 municipalities had developed their own SLT systems (Egge & Gundhus, 2012). The KfK plays a crucial role (formerly played by KRÅD) in accompanying municipalities that wish to set up an SLT system by providing advice and support during the start-up phases. In addition, municipalities may obtain funding from the government to implement an SLT system, in the form of grants jointly allocated by the KfK (KRÅD) and the Ministry of Health.

Implementing the model only entails a light institutional structure comprised of an oversight committee (composed of high level municipal decision-makers charged with identifying the main guidelines), a working group (with representatives from the different services and agencies concerned) to define, coordinate and evaluate actions, and a liaison-coordinator to facilitate day-to-day, rapid and adaptable mobilization of the network, as well as ensure optimal communication between actors on the ground. Each coordinator is based in a police district (the model’s basic territorial unit). Oslo, the country’s largest metropolis with a population of over 500,000, is something of a special case and, accordingly, the system there is more complex: it includes 15 SLT coordinators, as well as an SLT general secretary for the agglomeration as a whole.

The SLT model is premised on the broad, evolving and organic participation of the members of its working groups, which include different types of actors, civil servants and representatives from civil society and the private sector. In effect, the composition of these committees is designed to vary in accordance with the local social fabric to ensure that they optimally reflect each district’s specificities. Broadly, an SLT essentially facilitates networking among all local actors working with youth: i.e., the schools, social services, health services, youth organizations, municipal services, the police, the justice system, mediators, community groups and civil society.

Coordination in any given SLT does not follow officially prescribed protocols or mechanisms: the intention is to leave local actors with full latitude for developing their own ways of working together, their own ways of determining the participants, types of interactions, frequency of meetings, etc.

The effectiveness of an SLT coordinator is based on his or her detailed knowledge of the district’s issues, actors and resources, as well as on the people skills needed to facilitate networking among the appropriate actors on any given issue.\textsuperscript{33} One of the SLT’s primary objectives is to ensure that

\textsuperscript{33} This model, in which the coordinator is a key resource for ensuring a liaison between the different agencies involved in a file, is also used in other types of violence related issues where rapid personalized responses are required, such as cases of domestic violence, for example. In a word, the coordinator’s role is to promote synergies in order to identify priorities and move files forward (NOVA, 2008).
the intervention system is optimally reactive in the face of a given youth’s needs, whether one-off or chronic, or, alternatively, in relation to a broader issue. In this way, the attention and efforts of all are as much directed towards actions plans and general strategic plans as they are towards the day-to-day effectiveness of all actors, which is how the coordinator we interviewed summarized the challenge.

“For my monitoring committee, I produce a periodic action plan and progress reports, but my work mainly consists of taking the pulse of youth in my district and taking the required actions accordingly. Part of our actions must obviously be more universal and long term, but we also need short term responses, rapid responses. I try to maintain a balance between the two” (Interlocutor 7).

In effect, the SLT takes charge of a variety of responsibilities and issues, including: effective implementation of programs and initiatives; coordinating actors; monitoring individual youth case files, either as victims or potential victims (e.g., cases of domestic violence), or as individuals at risk and/or in trouble with the law. In short, this system integrates the entire spectrum of work done by local actors, from general issues to specific case files.

“As soon as something happens with a youth, I receive an SMS and get in contact with my network to so as to get to work as quickly as possible. Our strategy, when working on cases of juvenile violence, is to start by engaging in mitigation. Once everyone has calmed down and the anger has dissipated, we start our long term work with parents and youths” (interlocutor 7).

Finally, the SLT system also coordinates with municipal public safety, in particular via the Police Boards (Politiråd), introduced in 2007 following the Labour Party’s arrival in power. These Police Boards constitute a second coordination structure at the local level, one which focuses on coordination between law enforcement and municipal services. The mandate of these boards is above all one of public safety. That said, in accordance with the logic of the Scandinavian model, public safety also includes an essential prevention dimension. In 2012, 86% of Norwegian municipalities had a Police Board. Although a Police Board’s mandate covers the entire population, youth and children do constitute priority groups: consequently, these structures coordinate with the SLT system which, of course, specifically targets youth. The differences and synergies between these two systems derive from the differences in their respective missions: whereas police boards develop strategies and action plans to ensure a coherent public safety policy at the local level, the SLT system is above all an executive coordination tool for ensuring harmonized and effective work by actors on the ground.

4. **Leadership, collaboration and participation**

Collaboration is a key factor in the success of the SLT model, which sees the human relations between actors as central to coordination and recognizes the crucial importance of the individual and collective capacities of a system of actors to work together, on a long term basis. In this
context, the SLT coordinator plays an indispensable role as network facilitator (Strype, Gundhus, Egge, & Ødegård, 2014). In short, the SLT model rests on a vision of coordination as a practice founded on information sharing and synergies in resources, and not on a structure and protocols governing the relations between actors.

“[Broad and integrative participation] is exactly what the SLT is about – it connects people together. When the Danes developed this model, they realized that, if they want it to function, someone needed to be in charge: i.e., the SLT coordinator. It's a little unique because I constantly work both inside AND around the system as I try to glue all the parts together. First of all, things are based on interpersonal relations. When I call a meeting, when people meet, it's so much easier [than going through the conventional and impersonal institutional channels] because they know who they're dealing with, with whom they are in contact. This really accelerates the process” (Interlocutor 7).

The decentralization and the development of local competencies, which accompanied the establishment of the SLTs, have rendered local systems very independent and autonomous in their functioning. Leadership is rooted at the local level. That makes these coordination systems very resilient in the face of change, including political change. In fact, the SLT coordinator we interviewed informed us that major changes such as the election of a new government, the development of new juvenile delinquency policies or the transformation of the KRADs into smaller less powerful structures have had little or no influence on the SLT's local management or for that matter its work or the tenor of the plans and programs it develops.

That said, it’s important to emphasize that in Norway, the social prevention of violence and crime, particularly as regards youth, is a principle shared by all traditional parties, whether progressive or conservative. This consensus enables greater coherence in prevention policies, as the latter are less subject to significant disruption following changes in government. Not that there are no nuances worth noting, however, between the social prevention of the left, which is more focused on reducing inequalities, and the conservative approach, which is more oriented towards strengthening the values and resilience of groups at risk of engaging in problematic behaviours (Egge & Gundhus, 2012).

5. Information, data and knowledge sharing

Founded in 1876, Statistics Norway is charged with the production of national statistics, a function that includes integrating all data produced by different institutions, including justice system and law enforcement data. Information is also produced at the local level by municipal services and police districts, as well as a network of civil society organizations.

In addition, this data is complemented by surveys designed to collect “grey statistics” (i.e., crime statistics for unreported offences) on both victims and perpetrators. In particular, the Ungdata survey has been collecting data from youth since 2009. Ungdata is a comprehensive survey on youth, which covers their lifestyles, relationships, activities, health, wellbeing and communities, as well as issues related to drugs and alcohol consumption, and antisocial and criminal behaviour,
such as violence and bullying. Conducted at the municipal level in primary and secondary schools, this survey is coordinated at the national level by NOVA, which is affiliated with the University of Oslo and considered one of the country's premier social sciences research centres.

However, this data, which is based on the voluntary participation of youth, is not without serious credibility issues, particularly in relation to its questions on the consumption of illicit substances. Moreover, there exists a lack of trust in institutions among certain young persons, notably those of immigrant origin who are wary of the risk of self-incrimination. The SLT coordinator we interviewed shared her critique regarding this type of data.

“These surveys based on self-reporting are flawed, especially when you use them in very ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. The population I work with in my district come from as many countries as there are in the UN, with many different cultures as well! However, these different cultures all have one thing in common: they don’t trust the authorities” (interlocutor 7).

In addition, the country’s regional differences also raise issues concerning disparities in the production and access to quality information, most notably between an urbanized south and the rest of the country, which is often isolated and very rural. Beginning in the early 2000s, this issue was addressed with the creation of clusters of competencies in regional or national networks to improve the circulation of information. Nevertheless, these information sharing systems have several limitations, notably due to the often strict confidentiality rules applicable to children, which different agencies must follow, and which are an impediment to communication (NOVA, 2008). This issue was also underlined by the SLT coordinator we interviewed.

“As with all inter-professional relations, confidentiality is a problem. The various participating actors all have their own definitions. This is my main grievance with the SLT: they adopted the Danish model, but did not import the corresponding laws. In the area of crime prevention, the actors in the Danish SSP are legally exempt from their obligation to maintain confidentiality during their meetings” (interlocutor 7).

Moreover, the process of integrating, analyzing and publishing data is centralized. The result: delays between data production and data availability. This issue hampers the work of SLT actors who depend on real time knowledge on the ground. Such actors would benefit from a certain decentralization in data sharing to permit direct provision of data from the local police department, for example, which would facilitate access to fresh and regularly updated data.

“It’s difficult to assess [the quality of data] because this data has a very short shelf life. In fact, one gets a much better reading of what’s going on during our meetings than you do from official data. Official stats are obviously used as indicators, but, most of the time, things have already changed a lot by the time this data gets to us. I would prefer a monthly update directly from the police districts, especially on youth crime, in order to make comparisons [with my own district], as well as in the context of our collaboration with other districts. Another problem is that this data is
published per municipality, which doesn’t tell us much about what’s happening at the local level [i.e., in the districts]” (Interlocutor 7)

6. Conclusion

Social prevention constitutes a paradigm in Norway. As such, it is a touchstone around which political visions are articulated, different administrative levels structured, and the actors of the different sectors oriented, along with stakeholders from civil society and the private sector. This consensus contributes greatly to the success and sustainability of prevention policies. Thus, following the growth in gang related crime and violence, at the turn of the millennium, social prevention policies were implemented and bore fruit in the form of considerable progress on these issues (Bjørgo, 2016).

While the SLT model developed over the last 25 years does include a place and central role for the police, it essentially develops socially oriented actions and programs, without relying on policing type methods and approaches centring on crime reduction. This constitutes a major difference with most other local crime prevention coordination models in developed countries, such as England, for example (Egge & Gundhus, 2012). Furthermore, the SLT model’s management approach is not based on crime reduction objectives, efficiency indicators or performance standards. On the other hand, as participating SLT agencies are obliged to comply with these types of performance requirements, this creates tensions that are not conducive to intersectoral collaboration, as each entity is under pressure to prioritize to its own short term results (Egge & Gundhus, 2012).

The Norwegian model faces several major challenges. Yes, prevention as developed under the Scandinavian paradigm remains a constant, underpinning all actions and practices. While this constitutes a fundamental strength, it can also become an impediment to the introduction of more specific programs, according to Nova’s analysis (2008). In that regard, the government does appear to be increasing its emphasis on targeted action plans.

In addition, in recent years, Norway has seen the emergence and deepening of major issues directly connected with youth violence. First of all, drug consumption appears to be a growing challenge in Norway, particularly among urban youth. Marit Egge and Helene Gundhus (2012) underline the increasing criminalization and, consequently, marginalization of drug users. These researchers conclude that “in the shadows of the Nordic Welfare State system, the losers are the drug addicts.” Secondly, the migratory crisis that has been affecting Europe in recent years represents another major challenge for violence and crime prevention strategies, particularly in relation to minors.

Finally, like many countries, particularly in Europe, Norway is confronted with the great contemporary challenge of averting violent radicalization. In Norway, this phenomenon takes two main forms, ideologically speaking: violent Islamism and the ideologies of the extreme right. It’s worth mentioning that the attacks perpetrated by Anders Breivik on 22 July 2011 represented the bloodiest event in Norway since the Second World War. In 2010, the government launched the
first Action Plan to Prevent Radicalization and Violent Extremism. A second version followed in 2014. These two plans based their approach and efforts on the same basic crime prevention principles and underlined the importance of replicating proven successes in local coordination of crime prevention strategies (Ministry of Public Safety of Norway, 2014).
CHAPTER 8. COMPARISONS

The comparison process was organized around three comparison matrices. The first examines the different strategic approaches developed in the survey countries by comparing their contexts and key issues. The second matrix looks at the vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms. The third matrix examines the qualitative aspects of coordination systems in relation to collaboration, leadership and consensus around youth violence prevention issues. Information management issues are addressed in a cross-cutting manner throughout the comparison process.

1. Strategic approaches to youth violence prevention
### Table 1: Comparison matrix - Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Structural framework</th>
<th>Degree of integration</th>
<th>Sectoral measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>End of Apartheid: political, social and institutional transition</td>
<td>Two strategy frameworks and one policy framework ensure a certain integration:</td>
<td>Crime prevention policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A systemic &quot;culture of violence,&quot; which particularly affects youth, both as victims and perpetrators</td>
<td>- The National Development Policy</td>
<td>Social policies to reduce poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growing school violence issues</td>
<td>- The National Crime Prevention Strategy (a highly integrated vision)</td>
<td>Youth policies, particularly to address employment issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social and economic exclusion issues, which particularly affect youth</td>
<td>- the youth development policy framework</td>
<td>School violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gender issues and racial discrimination are major issues</td>
<td>The youth violence prevention approach is sectoral: integration remains partial</td>
<td>Public safety policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Children and youth protection policies</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tertiary prevention and restorative justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td>An evidence based approach</td>
<td>Strategy frameworks are rather more sectoral than integrative</td>
<td>No federal youth policy (constitutionally, youth policy is a jurisdiction of the provinces and territories). Youth strategies in certain provinces and municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violence, substance abuse and poverty issues in Indigenous communities</td>
<td>At both federal and provincial levels, gov’t ministries find it difficult to ensure interdepartmental integration of their actions and interventions</td>
<td>National Crime Prevention Strategy</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Street gang issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>RCMP’s national youth strategy: reducing youth crime and victimization → prevention and youth diversion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Youth substance abuse issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>National Anti-Drug Strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Anti-Gang Strategy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>School violence prevention: policies at the provincial level, but not the federal level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
<td>Peace process</td>
<td>Strategy framework: the National</td>
<td>Social policies to reduce poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Youth involvement in violence is particularly high</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Plan</td>
<td>Youth violence prevention policies are very fragmented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Proposal to ensure integration in the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention Policy</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Youth policies, particularly re supervised free-time activities</td>
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<td>Public safety policies</td>
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<td>Children and youth protection policies</td>
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<td>Tertiary prevention and restorative justice</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Rising fear of crime</td>
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<td>Terrorism</td>
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<td>Tradition of social prevention</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increasing importance of situational</td>
<td>Strategy framework: The National Crime Prevention Strategy. Integration in this strategy of certain general education, employment and justice policy mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second strategy framework: a multisectoral youth policy encompassing employment,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Youth policy: a comprehensive approach, but mainly focused on education and employment</td>
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<td>Urban policy</td>
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<td>Prevention of violence and radicalization in school environments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prevention and repression</td>
<td>education, housing, health... No specific policy addressing school violence prevention, which is very fragmented among numerous institutions and measures...</td>
<td>National Crime Prevention Strategy – Policy priority two focuses on youth exposed to delinquency</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td>Social changes Emerging issues: school violence, drug abuse, radicalization Growing youth violence issues</td>
<td>Thematic policy frameworks Integrated policies in terms of policy implementation at the municipal level</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive youth policies School violence prevention Children and youth protection policies Social policies Crime prevention policies</td>
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</table>
1.1 Place occupied by youth violence prevention in national strategies

None of the survey countries has a strategy or policy specifically dedicated to youth violence prevention. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, there is the enormity and breadth of an issue, which encompasses many dimensions, realities and particular problems. Secondly, developing such a strategy would require surmounting the complex political and institutional logics specific to each country, which govern how and why this issue mobilizes several sectors of the government, as well as numerous public agencies and institutions.

Violence prevention does not as such constitute a specific policy area associated with a determined set of policies and strategies. This may be attributed to the fact that are various types of violence, which imply a wide range of issues, actors and dimensions. Consequently, it would be very difficult, indeed outright impossible, to elaborate a single youth violence prevention strategy which: integrates all types of violence, along with every context and process; covers both victims and perpetrators; addresses social, primary, secondary and tertiary prevention; coordinates all of the institutional actors concerned, at all levels, and does so operationally in a coherent and effective manner.

Youth violence prevention issues are in practice addressed by a range of public policies, of which the content, organization and dimensions vary in accordance with the frameworks, approaches and measures mentioned above. In this first section, we therefore focused on the specific components of strategies which address youth violence prevention. In effect, this comparative analysis identifies the different ways the survey countries address issues of violence through different approaches, types of prevention and institutional sectors. Our first comparison matrix focused on three main areas of analysis.

- Structural frameworks, approaches and paradigms (column 1 of the matrix);
- Degree of integration of the different components of youth violence prevention policy in different national strategies and policies (column 2);
- The policy areas, sectoral and multisectoral, where youth violence prevention measures are found (column 3).

1.1.1 Approaches and paradigms in strategy frameworks on youth violence prevention

First of all, different approaches are followed in the various survey countries. The social approach, most often associated with primary type prevention, is quite widely endorsed: France, Norway, Colombia and South Africa favour this approach. In practice, the social approach takes different forms in accordance with the cultures and characteristics of different countries.

In South Africa and Colombia, social prevention is very closely connected with the reduction of inequality and poverty, as well as national socioeconomic development, which is considered an essential condition for violence prevention (as the different forms of violence are fundamentally associated with macro-systemic conditions).
In Europe, France and Norway have followed two different models of social prevention since the middle of the 20th century, based on two very distinct visions of the Welfare State: with France pursuing an egalitarian and republican ideal, and Norway embodying the principles of community and social harmony.

As for Canada, its approach is founded on a pragmatic vision of social prevention, distinct from the universalist character of European models. Its approach is rooted in an Anglo-Saxon perspective which favours targeted prevention, constructed around specific issues. Thus, although social policies exist in Canada and provide a reliable social safety net, they do not explicitly constitute elements of primary violence prevention.

Finally, the United States favours a conception that accords relatively little attention to macro-systemic dimensions and primary social prevention approaches, such as reducing discrimination and inequality. Instead, its approach to youth violence is based on two perspectives: a public health approach spearheaded by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and secondly an approach focusing on crime prevention through targeted interventions and evidence based programs. It is very important to underline that there is a vast range of policies in the U.S. This is because jurisdiction over most of the responsibilities connected with addressing and preventing violence, most notably the administration of justice, a classic sovereign power of the State, falls to the country’s fifty states. Consequently, how young perpetrators of violent offenses are treated differs radically from one state to another.

In taking a closer look at how these strategic frameworks are constituted and how they function within their respective national contexts, it’s interesting to examine the role played by seminal documents, such as constitutions, in both public policy development and the approaches taken to issues of violence. Colombia and South Africa have relatively new constitutions, dating back to the 1990s. In both cases, the Constitution was specifically drafted with the goal of (re)defining the country in a traumatic context marked by very high levels of political violence. Moreover, in both cases, the Constitution represented a social project and a basis for building peace and unity, which emphasized the objectives of equality, prosperity and peace. Both support a more open and progressive vision of democracy, most particularly through the creation of decentralized institutions. As such, these frameworks per se constitute strategies for realizing the future of these countries and shape discourse on public action. Finally, they enshrine renewed institutional systems and imply profound changes in structures and the practices of public actors, changes which, logically, may only be sustainably and comprehensively established over the long term. Thus, in these two countries, one observes a dichotomy between a legislative and institutional framework shaped by a commitment to transition, to a change of system, and the practices and ways of functioning which, within these very institutions and indeed throughout society, remain largely influenced by the old system’s political institutions, mores and ways of doing things. As a consequence, public policies, developed in accordance with newly adopted principles and structures, face a major challenge: they must be realized in contexts with complex dynamics, characterized by serious inconsistencies, conflicts and tensions. This relative mismatch between government strategies and the environments in which they are implemented is found at all levels.
and profoundly affects every dimension and indicator examined by this study: actors’ competencies and capacities, particularly at the local level; problematic conceptions of collaboration and competition, if not outright distrust between stakeholders; highly hierarchical and centralized institutional practices favouring sectoral approaches; conceptions and representation of actors in relation to issues of violence, and concrete practices which are often restricted to law enforcement and justice system activities; and limited leadership within institutions and the different levels of governance.

It’s worth emphasizing the shift, apparent in the findings of this study, towards a more repressive approach to youth violence and crime, which is mainly expressed in two ways: first, the increasing importance of violence and crime reduction strategies based on so-called situational prevention (through urban design measures and policing); secondly, the expansion in the justice system’s field of action through the inclusion of tertiary prevention, which is generally restricted to justice institutions and the correctional system. There is, however, one notable exception to this shift: Norway still bases an essential part of its identity and institutions on the Welfare State model, and is maintaining an approach rooted in social prevention, despite certain trends which are gradually integrating situational type prevention.

1.2 Degree of integration of the different components of youth violence prevention policy in different national strategies and policies.

In each of the survey countries, the strategic approaches to tackling youth violence had a cross-cutting character, involving several major public policy areas. That said, the degree of policy integration varied from one survey country to another. This led us to wonder how different public policies are envisaged in relation to each other, i.e., whether they constitute isolated entities or form a coherent system. Theoretically, one could define an integration scale, ranging from a purely sectoral approach, where each major public policy is seen as totally independent and autonomous (the so-called “silo” approach), to a systemic vision, where each public policy is an interdependent element of totally interconnected public action within a coherent overall strategy.

Of course, these two opposite poles are theoretical and constitute ideal types: in reality, the strategic configurations studied in this research were all located between them, i.e., along a continuum where certain characteristics of each existed simultaneously. So, rather than thinking in terms of a one-dimensional integration scale, it makes more sense to identify the integrative dimensions or factors, on the one hand, and the dimensions or factors contributing to fragmentation, on the other.

First of all, it’s worth noting that the two case studies from so-called emerging countries, i.e., South Africa and Colombia, employ a general planning tool in the form of their respective National Development Plans, which are generally for five or ten year periods. These plans define a government’s strategic priorities in the medium term. They are integrated planning tools that establish an overall framework for public policy development. A direct descendant of the policies promoted by major international organizations and development agencies, in theory, these plans constitute a highly integrated form of public policy development, which identifies the major policy...
area priorities, objectives and tools in terms of specific public policies and strategies. For low and middle income countries, national development plans represent an essential tool, particularly in relation to financial planning.

It’s very interesting to note that, in the context of their respective national development plans, Colombia and South Africa both formulate their youth violence prevention related priorities in terms of three main policy areas: public safety, child and youth protection, and social and economic development. Strategic orientations are developed for each of these policy areas. One or more key agencies are then identified as responsible for developing the appropriate policies in each policy area, policies which may be sectoral or focusing on specific issues.

Ranking, as they do, among the highest income nations on the planet, the other survey countries do not have National Development Plans. Moreover, as none of the survey countries elaborated a strategic coordination framework specifically dedicated to youth violence prevention, this comparative study sought to identify the various approaches to coordinating different sectors during the elaboration of specific public policies. Broadly, one may, in effect, distinguish between approaches that are more sectoral in character (also know as silo-type approaches) vs. approaches that are more multisectoral or integrated.

Canada and Norway present the highest degree of integration of youth violence related issues in their respective national strategies. In effect, although violence isn’t specifically mentioned per se, Canada’s National Crime Prevention Strategy and Norway’s Crime Prevention Plan each advance a vision that is, de facto, quite integrated and includes an emphasis on youth, as well as a very broad multidimensional approach. The National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), which South Africa introduced in 1996, also proposed a highly integrated approach to these questions. However, the implementation of the NCPS, a very innovative document in many respects, proved much more sectoral and much less multidisciplinary than the approach it advocated.

1.3 The policy areas, sectoral and multisectoral, where the components of youth violence prevention policy are found.

In general, different multisectoral policy areas can be identified: social policies, youth policies, education policies, crime prevention policies, as well as justice system and law enforcement policies per se. Let’s note that these broad multisectoral policy areas exist in both countries with a National Development Plan and countries where no such plan exists. For each of these policy areas, several types of national agencies are involved in developing specific strategies and policies:

- Social policies: social services (support for families and youth in difficulty), urban services agencies (land use planning, basic urban services, transportation and other municipal services), economic development and anti-poverty agencies (training and labour market integration), health care agencies and institutions;
These broad policy areas are integrative in the sense that they imply the existence of shared jurisdictions among different institutional sectors. That said, such integration is subject to a number of limiting factors, greatly nuancing the degree of integration observed in practice: whether responsibilities are shared or centralized; the internal organizational dynamics of policies and strategies in different policy areas; and overall coordination between strategies in different major policy areas. Finally, it should be noted that developing multisectoral strategies in any given policy area is a complex process, which generally requires more time and effort than so-called sectoral policies and presents higher risks of the emergence of dynamics that generate differing opinions, conflicts or competition between institutional actors, thereby posing considerable limits to effective public action.

2. **Coordination models and how they function**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Type of institutional model</th>
<th>Vertical coordination</th>
<th>Horizontal coordination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A decentralized state with interdependent levels of government</td>
<td>Public policy development remains strongly influenced by sectoral “silo” type dynamics</td>
<td>National level:</td>
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<td>Policy implementation still essentially follows the vertical hierarchical lines established by institutions</td>
<td>- Multisectoral coordination is non-systematic. Public policies are still essentially developed internally in each institution, cluster or sector</td>
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<td>It is the local level which must ensure general coordination of public policies on the ground</td>
<td>- Efforts to integrate different policies, notably by forming “clusters” of governmental agencies. However, a sectoral institutional logic remains very strong within said policy area clusters</td>
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<td>Degree of decentralization varies greatly from one sector to another</td>
<td>Local level:</td>
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<td>In particular, there remains a marked centralization of law enforcement agencies (SAPS)</td>
<td>- Where the actual implementation of strategies and public policies largely takes place</td>
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<td>Deficiencies in terms of funding and capacity building: several strategies and policies developed by successive governments were highly integrative (e.g., the NCPS) and accorded great importance to prevention. However, the vertical implementation thereof favoured certain aspects while neglecting others</td>
<td>- Local coordination systems have been installed, particularly in large cities, but the nationwide systematization thereof remains a challenge</td>
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<td>- Different and sometimes contradictory institutional logics (due notably to differing degrees of decentralization) hinder effective local level collaboration</td>
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<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
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<td><strong>A federal state</strong>&lt;br&gt;Crime prevention is not a specifically federal jurisdiction. It is the shared responsibility of the federal, provincial and territorial governments&lt;br&gt;RCMP, Ministries of Justice and PS: primary and secondary prevention&lt;br&gt;CSC: tertiary prevention</td>
<td><strong>A partially decentralized institutional system:</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Relative autonomy of municipalities, notably re social, youth and citizen security policies&lt;br&gt;- Structure and functioning of</td>
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<td><strong>Federal, provincial and territorial relations:</strong>&lt;br&gt;- The FPT (federal-provincial-territorial) Working Group, co-managed by the federal, provincial and territorial governments, develops strategic orientations and policies&lt;br&gt;- PS project officers work with the provincial governments</td>
<td><strong>Public policy development proceeds along strong sectoral lines</strong>&lt;br&gt;No formal inter-institutional coordination mechanism. In practice, cooperation is limited&lt;br&gt;The degrees of decentralization and vertical coordination dynamics differ from sector to sector:&lt;br&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Consultations to avoid duplication of work</strong>&lt;br&gt;At the federal level:&lt;br&gt;- one-off collaborations on specific/precisely defined initiatives&lt;br&gt;- Interdepartmental Crime Prevention Committee&lt;br&gt;- Mandate letters to the ministries from the Prime Minister’s Office: hence a certain coordination between the different ministries</td>
<td><strong>Poor coordination at the national level.</strong>&lt;br&gt;At the local level:&lt;br&gt;- Municipalities must elaborate their own local strategic plans for all major national public policies&lt;br&gt;- These plans include specific</td>
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<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A federal state</td>
<td>A centralized state</td>
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<td>States have considerable autonomy in matters of juvenile justice</td>
<td>Decentralization was initiated in 1982, but not in matters of public safety and justice administration (the core activities of a sovereign state)</td>
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<td>The federal gov’t’s role is essentially to support municipalities and local actors with tools, program implementation methodologies, research and policy evaluations</td>
<td>National strategies tend to be adapted to local contexts</td>
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<td>The OJJDP oversees the state justice systems and offers technical and financial support</td>
<td>Contractualization: a coordination mechanism between the central gov’t and the local level (departmental and municipal) which is extremely formalized, demarcated and defined by laws</td>
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<td>The states are responsible for funding youth projects</td>
<td>At the national level:</td>
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<td>Political will exists to create a national dialogue on youth violence and put this issue on the national agenda, and build capacities at the local level</td>
<td>- The National Crime Prevention Strategy, designed by an interdepartmental committee composed of 11 ministries</td>
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<td>National agencies and the White House offer grant programs</td>
<td>- Youth policy as well derives from the work of an interdepartmental committee</td>
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**National Prevention Strategies for Youth Violence: An International Comparative Study**

- Major decentralization of community security towards the municipalities
- Strong centralization of the law enforcement and justice system sectors

Notion of Nation-Territory Coordination: each public policy must include a coordination system at the local level

- Divergent institutional logics between different levels of gov’t hamper local coordination

At the federal level:
- The Interdepartmental Working Group on Youth Programs (IWGYP) includes 20 federal departments and agencies
- The Coordination Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

At the local level:
Working groups supported by different federal departments with the goal of implementing community based prevention strategies with partnerships between law enforcement agencies, different community services, residents, etc.
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Country</strong></th>
<th><strong>System</strong></th>
<th><strong>National Policies</strong></th>
<th><strong>At the National Level</strong></th>
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</table>
| **Norway** | A decentralized system | National policies provide strategic orientations in response to specific issues placed on the public agenda, notably by parliamentary reports | At the national level:  
- National policies are multisectoral, but prescribe no specific coordination |

Relations between the local and national levels:  
- Structure of collaboration defined by national legislation  
- Representatives of the central State in local agencies  
- Funding largely provided by national funding sources

Assembling 11 ministries  
Policies and strategies are often the result of collaboration between different ministries, actors...

At the local level:  
- Sharing confidential information on youth and their situations a major issue  
  ➔ necessary legal mechanisms are in place  
- Key actors in coordination: the mayor and the CLSPD coordinator at the operational level  
- The CLSPD "steering mechanism": the mayor, administrative actors, district services...  
- A multisectoral and social prevention approach: crime prevention based on actions in school environment and on justice system...  
- Inter-district coordination: sharing of good practices  

Crime prevention strategies and youth policy are connected
| National institutions constitute a source of technical support, guidelines and funding. The regional level provides a platform for networking and support. | - Policies are developed by a lead ministry, but their design is coordinated and coherent in relation to other policies. At the municipal level: | - Municipal coordination is not predetermined by any systematic framework. - The municipalities elaborate their own action plans, as well as flexible coordination mechanisms adapted to local conditions. - The SLT model, which oversees coordination of youth crime and violence issues, is characterized by its light and very flexible structure. Reactivity is central to the SLT’s objectives. |
2.1 Horizontal coordination at the national level

The first comparison matrix allowed us to see the degrees of integration in the different policies and strategies addressing youth violence prevention. As that comparison made clear, sectoral and integrated approaches coexist in each country. The second comparison matrix enables the examining of these national systems of policies and strategies in terms of their horizontal coordination mechanisms. This allows us to identify several key factors affecting the functioning and effectiveness of national coordination of youth violence prevention policies and strategies: how responsibilities are allocated and shared; the internal organizational dynamics of each policy and strategy; and the coordination between different policies and strategies.

First of all, the **attribution of responsibilities and administrative hierarchies** is extremely important when it comes to establishing a true multidisciplinary dynamic in the development and implementation of public policy strategies. Typically, two alternative types of mechanisms are used. The first consists of attributing leadership over policy design and implementation to a **single agency charged with assigning specific responsibilities to the other institutional partners**. There are more disadvantages than advantages to this way of doing things. Certainly, this approach does permit rapid policy development, and perhaps even quite rapid implementation, as there is no requirement to work in a collaborative and coordinated manner. However, this approach sidelines all the secondary multisectoral actors from the strategy design process, thereby encouraging their disengagement, partial or total, from the policy issue in question, even if they are included in theory.

There are several examples of this phenomenon in our survey countries, particularly in relation to crime prevention strategies. As we’ve observed above, such strategies are, in practice, very often placed under the direction of the police or the justice system and suffer from a disengagement of other types of actors. This, notably, was the case in South Africa where the involvement of a vast range of actors in the initial policy in 1996 gave way to far more hierarchical architectures under the direction of the police or the Ministry of Justice. Subsequent policies led to a relative disengagement of other institutions and ministries. This issue has also been raised in the Canadian context, where we observed a relatively weak degree of interdepartmental integration and a tendency to address specific policy areas, such as crime prevention, from a more or less sectoral perspective.

The second type of mechanism addresses the **internal organizational dynamics of specific policies and strategies, as well as coordination with other policies and strategies.** These mechanisms may take the form of thematic poles assembling different ministries and agencies around major policy areas such as security or economic development, as is the case in South Africa with its system of “clusters,” which was introduced with the precise objective of facilitating enhanced integration of different institutions in the development of national strategies and policies. On a more short term basis, multidisciplinary structures may also be formed to develop a particular strategy. Such commissions (or boards) generally bring together governmental institutions, departments and agencies, but may also include representatives from civil society.
This form of integration is very widespread and is found in all of our survey countries. Once formed, these structures take charge of the design and coordination of policies at the national level. Their functioning may be hierarchical with a lead agency taking charge of the process and overseeing its implementation. Alternatively, a more horizontal structure is possible, where leadership is ensured by a steering committee acting in an autonomous manner.

France offers a particularly instructive example as its institutional system is based on this type of mechanism. This is quite evident regarding horizontal coordination, particularly at the national level. In France, there is in effect a high degree of integration of national policies and strategies, largely ensured by a very dense multidisciplinary and inter-institutional coordination system, based on commissions and boards which assemble representatives from the relevant stakeholders. This is also true of implementation at the local level, where the same inter-institutional structures are replicated.

These multisectoral processes are complex and often generate conflicts, competition or differences in methods among stakeholders. Frequently, this often means that a longer period (indeed, often several years) is required to complete a strategy’s design phase. Moreover, the proper functioning of these multidisciplinary coordination structures often conflicts with the various silo-type sectoral dynamics in play within each institution, which hinders the development and implementation of truly integrated policies and strategies. One can find examples of these silo-type dynamics in several strategies and policies, even though they had been developed in a multisectoral manner. In such cases, integration amounts, in practice, to the distribution of individual responsibilities in accordance with the different sectoral strategic orientations described in the policy. This phenomenon was present in several of the crime prevention policies we examined. In effect, these policies designated one lead agency per strategic policy area, without however ensuring the integration of these different policy areas or providing for coordination mechanisms between them. In practice, many of these multidisciplinary strategies take the form of a juxtaposition of policies subsequently implemented by each agency in accordance with its own silo-type sectoral logic.

This situation reflects the historical processes whereby states were structured as an assemblage of sectoral institutions characterized by very distinct institutional logics. This, it would appear, makes it’s very difficult to introduce ways of designing and applying national strategies and policies in totally integrated manner. Consequently, multisectoral integration often falls, in practice, to local governance systems, which, although they are “downstream” in relation to the entire process, must ensure the coordination and coherence of public action on the ground. This constitutes a major challenge for systems of local actors, who must demonstrate great resilience, a capacity for effective collaboration, as well as very solid technical skills. The question, then, is not the designing of integrated national strategies as such, but rather designing strategic frameworks to enable the integration of different sectoral logics at the local level: in a word, strategy designed nationally must facilitate coherent and harmonious implementation locally.
2.2 Vertical coordination and nested levels of government.

Different vertical coordination systems reflect the dichotomy alluded to above between strategic thinking aimed at national integration and strategic thinking with the principal objective of facilitating local integration of public action. This, in fact, speaks to a profound qualitative difference between different decentralization processes. To be more specific, herein lies one of the principal differences between deconcentrated systems and truly decentralized systems.

In effect, there exist vertical coordination mechanisms which reproduce, at the regional and local levels, replicas of national coordination structures in order to enable local implementation. This funnel-like model ensures vertical top-down implementation. It is characteristic of countries with a centralizing tradition which are embarking on a gradual decentralization process. This model does not, however, culminate in fully decentralized systems. In fact, such systems face very persistent inertia factors, especially within institutions and administrations that maintain strong vertical tendencies despite their seemingly decentralized structures: this is what we defined as deconcentration in Chapter 1.

Foremost among these countries, France constitutes a particularly interesting example, which softened its traditional funnel-type model through the introduction of decentralizing tools such as the differentiated territorialization of public action and local contracts. These two mechanisms tend to short-circuit the model based on the hierarchical nesting of levels of government which still forms the foundation of vertical coordination in France. In effect, two systemic logics coexist in France, the deconcentrated approach, which remains subject to a very strong vertical hierarchy, and the decentralized approach, thanks to the introduction of new structures and mechanisms.

In contrast, fully decentralized vertical coordination systems identify, for each level of governance, a series of complementary jurisdictions and responsibilities. Typically, the national level defines the strategic orientations and provides support in terms of funding, technical expertise and policy evaluations; the regional levels play a support role as well, by facilitating networking and managing certain institutions (e.g., health care, education, etc.); as for the local level, it ensures strategic planning adapted to the local context, and develops autonomous, inclusive and resilient local coordination systems. This type of vertical coordination is typical of the so-called Scandinavian model, whose Norwegian expression we closely examined. The United States offers another example, notably in relation to juvenile delinquency prevention. Thus, in the U.S., the federal government only plays a very minor role by providing a certain technical and financial support; as for the states, they intervene indirectly, notably via the provision of health care services, social assistance and education; it is the cities which develop, direct and implement their own crime prevention strategies. That said, one mustn't automatically consider the federal model as an ideal type of decentralization, as the Canadian case demonstrates. In effect, not only does the Canadian federal government conserve a certain importance in the development of prevention and public safety strategies, but each province in turn nuances the picture of federalism as a model of decentralization. For example, in Quebec, the provincial government
develops its own crime prevention policy. On the other hand, in relation to public safety issues, the cities are given greater latitude in strategic planning.

The principal difference which emerges from our examination of the different systems of vertical coordination resides in the nature and function of the interfaces between different levels of government: hierarchical in the case of a deconcentrated system, complementary in that of a decentralized system. Of course, in many case studies, notably among countries with a centralizing tradition which have only recently decentralized their institutions or are in the process of doing so, there exist vertical coordination systems, which include both types of interfaces.

France, South Africa and Colombia belong to this category of country. These countries have all initiated a decentralization process with the aim of giving local systems of governance greater powers and responsibilities. These decentralization processes have thus encouraged the emergence and constitution of more or less autonomous and independent local systems of governance, depending on the country in question and the degree of decentralization achieved. On the other hand, many national institutions, agencies and government departments have conserved internal cultures that remain highly centralizing. Consequently, when the development and implementation of national strategies depends on such governmental agencies and departments, they tend to reproduce their centralizing tendencies, thereby generating contradictions with decentralizing structures, which are mainly present at the local level.

2.2.1 The interface, an innovative concept for analyzing, elaborating and evaluating public policies and their implementation.

The notion of an interface is essentially defined as a contact point (or surface) between two different systems, structures or entities. Interfaces are found everywhere and at every level: between institutions, between coordination structures, between groups of actors, between individuals. This concept is a tool that allows us to examine every type of interaction found in a system of actors, including coordination systems.

The analysis of such systems is no longer solely done in terms of coordination structures and mechanisms, as they may also be considered from a systemic perspective by examining the form, density and nature specific to each interaction between different elements of the system. Thus, one may, with the same tool, analyze, among other things: the interactions between two systems, for example prevention institutions and the justice system; relations between police departments and communities; and interpersonal relations between the different individuals in a coordination system at the local level.

This is useful for two crucial issues in public policy:

1. Elaborating policies and strategies by addressing the different types of interactions between actors, in a differentiated manner, to ensure interfaces adapted to the specificities of each type of interaction.

2. Evaluating coordination systems by fully examining interactions: i.e., their form, structure, dynamics, density and quality.
2.3 Local coordination

Local coordination systems are of paramount importance in the implementation of youth violence prevention strategies and policies. This is one of this study’s principal conclusions. Moreover, this fact is well known and widely discussed in the literature. Three sets of issues are particularly salient in the study of local coordination systems: 1) the nature and functioning of coordination structures and mechanisms; 2) the local coordination institutional logics introduced by national strategies and the adaptability thereof to particular contexts; and finally 3) the coexistence within coordination structures of institutional logics that are different, divergent and indeed contradictory.

2.3.1 Local coordination paradigms

First of all, this study identified two main types of local coordination. The first is based on coordination structures, such as local committees or councils, which serve as a steering committee with decision-making and coordination responsibilities. The establishment of such structures is often prescribed in national policies and strategies which define, in a more or less detailed and adaptable manner, their format, nature, membership, procedures and internal governance.

This is the most common type of local coordination in the national systems examined in this study, one which can take many different forms, in both centralized and decentralized systems. What’s important to understand is that this type of coordination is not defined by the degree of independence and autonomy at the local level, but rather by the paradigms framing the conception of what local coordination consists of. Thus, most local coordination structures reproduce a pre-determined model and ways of functioning, which can raise issues in terms of representative participation by all stakeholders, the reactivity of such systems to the situations they may encounter, and the rapid and efficient circulation of information. These three points are precisely the principal problems that we identified in connection with this type of local coordination.

The second main type of local coordination is based on a coordination model, i.e., a methodology rather than just a structure. The chief difference with the first type of coordination is that this methodology provides tools and practices rather than a pre-determined normative framework. It introduces a networking approach to local coordination which is based on one essential quality: the circulation of information. Thus, what is central to this coordination system is not the formal structure, but rather it is the quality and density of the information exchanged.

A notable example is the SLT model, deployed in the Scandinavian countries, which provides local actors with non-binding work tools, while leaving them with full latitude to determine their own formal structures and select participants as they see fit. More specifically, as we saw with the Norwegian model, structures exist in the form of councils, but are not the essential components of the coordination system, which is thought of as an organic network composed of said councils,
as well as all other relevant actors. In this network-system, where information constitutes the basis of interactions, the coordinator acts as an emulator, chairperson and facilitator ensuring efficient and high quality exchanges of information. This is also the principle underlying the Hubs model, introduced in several vulnerable communities in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan and which offers a solution to local coordination problems by actively facilitating exchanges of information: “[the Hub], is not a thing, place or entity: it’s a conversation” (D. McFee & Taylor, 2014). This model of coordination is also found in the United States in the form of the working groups supported by the CDC’s Division of Violence Prevention. In effect, this national agency assists in the forming of these working groups and provides technical support for the implementation of comprehensive prevention strategies. Finally, this model also exists in France, which, to implement its crime prevention policies, notably, deploys coordinators and specialists specifically dedicated to facilitating communications and interfaces between institutions, as well as between policies and sectors, at the local level.

This notion of the interface as a contact surface formed by interactions and exchanges of information is a central concept and finding of our study, as well as a valuable tool for designing, operating and evaluating coordination systems, most particularly at the local level.

2.3.2 Adaptability of national strategies to local coordination contexts.

A second aspect of local coordination, which emerged from this study, is the difficulty of designing national strategies which may be adapted to all local contexts. This is particularly problematic in countries characterized by major regional differences of various kinds. For example, there is the problem of violence, which may vary in intensity and in the forms it takes (armed conflict, gangs, organized crime). Geographical or territorial characteristics may vary as well (e.g., differences between urban and rural areas). As may regional endowments in economic, human or material resources.

In this regard, Colombia offers a particularly striking example. Due to its enormous regional differences, this country has had to grapple with the issue of articulating its national policies with very diverse local realities. This culminated in new way of designing the State’s strategic planning, particularly through the Nation-Territory operational concept of policy articulation, as well as through policy development that privileged regional priorities as much as thematic policy priorities, public safety being a notable example.

France offers an interesting example of local adaptation of national policy, one which included a major shift to local variations of national strategies, notably in relation to crime prevention, and which also turned towards depending on a contractualization of relations between the central authorities and cities. Moreover, beginning in the 2000s, much work was done to build the capacities of local coordination systems, to render them more interconnected and efficient, notably by increasing the number of coordinators. These coordinators also play a major role in forming informal, horizontal networks, which become privileged forums for sharing knowledge.
2.3.3 Divergent institutional logics within local coordination systems

A third issue regarding local coordination systems emerged from our study. It concerns the institutional logics at work in different stakeholder institutions. In effect, each one operates in accordance with its own philosophy, paradigms and practices. Governmental structures, for example, may prove particularly averse to change or slow in adapting to it. This raises two major issues that were identified during this study: differences in degrees of decentralization and divergent priorities, which may both seriously hamper local coordination.

First of all, not all institutions follow the same decentralization processes. Thus, as our study notes, in several countries law enforcement agencies and the justice system tend to remain more centralized than social assistance, health or education services. This poses a major problem for local systems, which must intervene locally, take decisions and ensure horizontal coordination of their interventions, despite the fact that several partners obey a sometimes very powerful vertical institutional logic, which generally supplants local priorities and decisions taken locally.

Secondly, the existence of different institutional logics can translate into defensive attitudes or competition between the different stakeholders at the local level. A danger markedly increased when real competition exists for essential resources, when stakeholders’ objectives are divergent, or indeed opposed, or when their internal regulations limit the exchange of information.

3. The qualitative dimensions of coordination systems: collaboration, leadership and participation

Beyond the narrow consideration of coordination mechanisms and structures, the systemic approach that this study privileges has allowed us to take into account the qualitative and dynamic dimensions of coordination systems and, thereby, identify several important findings.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Leadership and consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National level:</td>
<td>National level:</td>
<td>National level:</td>
<td>Leadership:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- In theory, according to the Constitution and post-apartheid values, participation is central to political processes</td>
<td>- competition/distrust between ministries and sectors</td>
<td>- problem of institutional leadership: absence of a lead agency to oversee public prevention policy as a whole</td>
<td>- idem at the local level, where prevention is fragmented among different institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- However, participation processes vary and are not systematized: certain policies were developed in a highly participatory manner (NCPS), while others were elaborated in a centralized and vertical fashion (NCCS)</td>
<td>- functional coordination within clusters</td>
<td>- The SAPS is, de facto, the institution which takes charge of most prevention actions through its crime prevention department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local level:</td>
<td>Local level:</td>
<td>Consensus:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Participation is being systematized, notably via coordination agencies such as the CSFs. In practice, diverse situations exist and the implementation of processes to foster participation remains problematic</td>
<td>- functional coordination at the municipal level</td>
<td>- Contradiction between a very theoretical consensus around the values of post-apartheid South Africa, expressed in the Constitution and in policies such as the NCPS, and the vagaries of political discourse, which has been hardening for about a decade</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Participation:

- In theory, according to the Constitution and post-apartheid values, participation is central to political processes.
- However, participation processes vary and are not systematized: certain policies were developed in a highly participatory manner (NCPS), while others were elaborated in a centralized and vertical fashion (NCCS).

Leadership and consensus:

- Problem of institutional leadership: absence of a lead agency to oversee public prevention policy as a whole.
- Idem at the local level, where prevention is fragmented among different institutions.
- The SAPS is, de facto, the institution which takes charge of most prevention actions through its crime prevention department.

Consensus:

- Contradiction between a very theoretical consensus around the values of post-apartheid South Africa, expressed in the Constitution and in policies such as the NCPS, and the vagaries of political discourse, which has been hardening for about a decade.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>At the federal level:</th>
<th>Great attention accorded to avoiding duplication by 2 different levels of gov’t → coordination and consultation between ministries at the federal level, as well as between the federal, provincial and territorial governments. However, this is not flawless → willingness and a certain shift towards working less in silos at the federal and provincial levels. In Canada, there’s an effort to equalize social conditions and social policies between the different provinces → harmonization of practices. Major shortfalls in collaboration with Indigenous communities At the operational level:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- In processes where initiatives are renewed or created, the government must collaborate with and consult all key ministries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Policy making is never done in isolation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- PS does not work closely enough with the Ministry of Indigenous and Northern Affairs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leadership:</td>
<td>Lack of strategic consistency and periodic reorientations of strategy due to the electoral cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ensured by Public Safety Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consensus:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- in general, everybody works in the same direction at the institutional level</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- open debate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- clear allocation of roles and responsibilities, which is essential</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- aside from the CSC, the same prevention approach prevails in the different ministries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>At the national level:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Participation processes are not systematic in public policy development</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Several recent national policies were elaborated with a broad participatory process (e.g., the Policy on Juvenile Delinquency Prevention), which included consultations with civil society and workshops with youth</td>
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At the local level:
- Local situations are very heterogeneous. In general, universal participation of stakeholders is not systematic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the national level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Functional collaboration between different government agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- However, due to highly sectoral functioning, limited collaboration is required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the local level:
- The municipalities have a major responsibility in elaborating local approaches to collaboration among stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Municipal governments occupy a leadership role in social prevention at the local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- At the national level, the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF) plays a central role in social prevention policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Law enforcement agencies largely assume de facto responsibility for violence prevention and community security on the ground, especially at the local level</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- There is a political consensus in Colombia on the necessity of large scale violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Consensus exists as well on poverty reduction and the leading role of social policies in reducing violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| - Political differences still exist on the priorities to be given to different types of violence (urban, ...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United States</th>
<th>At the national level:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Involvement of civil society, as well as youth, in information sharing and implementation of strategies and programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- At the local level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Citizen engagement, especially among youth, is strongly encouraged, as is, consequently, the development of local projects</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the national level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Strong will to create a national dialogue with the participation of all levels and civil society actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National collaboration around pressuring the government into making youth violence prevention into a national priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National collaboration around specific issues (gangs, drugs, bullying in schools) and on improving vertical and horizontal coordination</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the state level:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Every state has at least one youth council or commission. A growing willingness to coordinate efforts and share information</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a leading role in primary violence prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention plays a leading role in crime prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The federal gov’t leads by providing guidelines, technical and funding support, and by promoting research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local gov’t leads in terms of setting up and implementing programs</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Considerable diversity at the state level. Certain states favour political, drug-trafficking related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A certain lack of long term policy coherence is evident, notably in the ups and downs of the development of the juvenile delinquency prevention policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### France

**At the local level:**
- Often, the different ministries concerned participate in the development of public policies.
- Participation of civil society actors is common in relation to youth policy. Notable willingness to include more youth.

**At the local level:**
- Participation in the CLSPDs: in theory very diverse (justice system, community groups, gov’t representatives), but in reality, these structures tend to mainly include actors from the justice system, police and gov’t, with few...

**At the national level:**
- Strong inter-institutional collaboration, in the form of collaboration structures (councils, commissions, committees).

**At the national level:**
- Lack of familiarity with certain actors.
- Difficulties in finding associative sector partners that coordinators trust.
- No great difficulties in coordination. Interpersonal relations are the key factor.
- In certain districts, coordinators have considerable autonomy vis-

**Leadership:**
Leadership at the local level is assured by the mayor and the CLSPD crime prevention and social prevention coordinators.

**Consensus:**
It takes time for all partners to know each others’ roles and responsibilities, the work to be done... especially at the local level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>At the national level:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Systematic participation of stakeholders in public policy design, particularly from academia and civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At the local level:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Systematic participation of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Participating actors are not predetermined, but rather are selected on a case by case basis, as needs and the local context dictate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Prevention Strategies for Youth Violence: An International Comparative Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain associative sector actors, who should be integrated into the implementation of policy measures, are not present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presently, there is no youth participation, but a will exists to change that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>à-vis their hierarchies: this is very important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information sharing between coordinators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of relations of trust between partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Strong local leadership articulated around municipalities and coordinators in specific policy areas, particularly within the SLT system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consensus:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Strong political consensus, both national and local, around questions of social prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Notable differences do exist, but only have a moderate effect on long term coherence of public policies</td>
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</table>
3.1 Participation

Evidently, it is not standard practice to integrate the participation and consultation of a broad range of actors (satellite agencies and public institutions, NGOs, civil society and communities) in the designing of strategies and public policies or, for that matter, in the implementation and evaluation thereof. In general, civil society and communities only play episodic, secondary and advisory roles throughout the design, implementation and evaluation processes of the youth violence prevention aspects of strategies and policies. Youth in particular, who are of course at the heart of these issues and policies, are very largely absent, or under-represented in these processes.

Local coordination systems in particular face several major issues in relation to participation. First of all – and this echoes the logic of vertical coordination systems based on deconcentration – one of the main obstacles to effective and representative participation of local stakeholders resides in the very fact that public policies are designed at the national level. In effect, the majority of policies envisaged systematically determine the conditions of local participation in the original policy document. This practice makes it difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of participation in a context sensitive manner. That leads to the exclusion of several categories of stakeholders, chiefly large swathes of the community fabric and civil society, including youth and other groups targeted by these initiatives.

Secondly, even when the systems in place allow for a more inclusive participation of local stakeholders, one very often sees a clear hierarchy. There are the core actors, around whom the coordination systems coalesce, and who exercise the strongest influence on decision-making. In so doing, they shape local action in accordance with their own priorities and conceptions. Satellite actors, on the other hand, are found on the fringes of coordination systems and exercise relatively little influence, if that, on any part of the local coordination and implementation process.

In general, the main actors traditionally centre around the police-justice system tandem, local governance authorities like the mayor’s office and, to a lesser extent, representatives from national institutions such as the social services (whether deconcentrated or decentralized).

This preponderance of certain actors creates conditions which greatly influence the nature and form that local action takes. As we have seen in several case studies, the centrality of the police-justice system tandem strongly coincides with local action that is no longer seen in terms of a comprehensive response to issues of violence, but rather as a targeted response to law enforcement issues.

It’s very interesting to observe the change in how youth violence is perceived as one progressively moves from the global level to the local level. At the international level, it is fully understood that violence is a complex multi-faceted phenomenon, particularly from a comprehensive public health perspective. This vision is developed and propagated by a vast system of actors (international organizations, NGOs, academe, civil society, etc.) At the national level, youth
violence issues are then integrated by differentiated systems of actors, which largely act independently of each other, i.e., according to the logic of separate policy silos discussed above. Thus, violence related issues are fragmented and addressed by different policy areas: social policies, child and youth protection, education and, finally, criminal justice (i.e., the police-justice system tandem).

These divisions have a profound effect on local systems of actors. Clearly, as policy moves toward the local level, coordination is mainly exercised as a function of public safety, traditionally the domain of the police-justice system tandem. As a result, the question of youth violence as a coherent set of issues to be addressed in an integrated fashion does not exist per se at the local level. Furthermore, political priorities have largely favoured justice and law enforcement institutions in terms of funding, capacity building and centralization. All of these factors contribute to placing public safety and the police-justice system tandem at the very core of the local system of actors.

That said, one must be careful to not draw hasty conclusions regarding who and what is responsible for this state of affairs. For example, in South Africa or Colombia, where law enforcement agencies are indeed the principal violence prevention actors at the local level, this no doubt partly reflects a certain resistance to change, i.e., to a better allocation of responsibilities within the local systems of actors. That said, the status quo is widely supported by most actors (including non core actors) who have internalized the leading role of certain actors, in particular the police-justice system tandem.

Moreover, a number of nuances merit attention. Most notably, the Norwegian model constitutes an exception in that the systems of local actors there do not confer a central place to the police or the justice system, which are instead stakeholders with equal standing, in constant communication with the other sectors. In effect, Norway’s core priorities include State action that privileges protection and social development, as well as a real and profound decentralization, which strongly attenuates the vertical tendencies found in different sectors of public action.

Participation, then, is something which goes far beyond consultation and the mobilization of a broad range of stakeholders for the development and implementation of a strategy or a public policy. It also goes beyond the quest for effectiveness or consensus around public action. Participation is a process that crucially affects systems of actors in relation to their conceptions, paradigms, functioning and the outcomes they generate. It defines hierarchical relationships, formal or informal, internalized or not, which, in turn, have a first order influence on how problems are formulated and responses identified.

3.2 Collaboration

First of all, it’s necessary to understand that the realities on the ground of collaboration affect collective structures (institutions, organizations) and individuals differently.

In coordination systems, effectiveness requires a collaborative construction of interactions between different entities. The form and dynamics of relations between collective structures, such
as institutions, civil society organizations like NGOs or community level institutions (neighbourhoods, churches, schools, etc.), are rooted in conceptions and representations, values, leadership and practices. This qualitative character of collaboration implies a certain inertia: improvements in a coordination system’s effectiveness and interconnectivity do not automatically mean that the interactions between the system’s different elements will improve in their density and quality. **Consequently, collaboration must be seen as distinct from coordination and treated accordingly.** This conclusion emerges from each of the case studies included in this study and constitutes one of its key findings. These qualitative relations differ in nature depending on whether they are expressed in or between public institutions and agencies or between institutions and civil society organizations or in relations with communities.

The quality and density of **inter-institutional collaboration** depends on two main factors. Firstly, there are the internal factors, such as practices favouring transparency and openness, values that are oriented towards the general interest rather than an insular organizational culture, and strong leadership in favour of developing collaborative multisectoral approaches. Secondly, there are the external factors, shaped by conditions which either favour or hamper collaboration. For example, interagency competition for funding constitutes a major obstacle to full collaboration. At the local level, each agency’s confidentiality rules may also seriously restrict information sharing and hinder the development of fully collaborative relations. In every survey country, this was a major problem, mentioned by numerous local actors.

Collaboration between governmental institutions and civil society varies greatly, in accordance with the specific context, which not only encompasses national, regional and local factors, but also considerations such as the types of organizations and types of strategies and public policies.

One of the more recurrent aspects in all survey countries concerns the **more or less problematic relations between the institutions and actors of the police-justice system tandem, on the one hand, and the institutions and actors of civil society and communities (especially if the latter are under-privileged), on the other.** These relations are often based on mistrust with deep historical roots. Consequently, the relations between these two poles of essential actors must constitute a priority in any efforts to improve coordination systems and render them more effective, particularly at the local level.

Although coordination systems are effectively based on collective entities, be they institutional or community based, quite formal or more or less informal, day to day coordination activities depend to a very large extent on individuals and interpersonal relations: **in a word, coordination systems are essentially human systems.** This is particularly true in relation to local implementation, where the work on the ground is undertaken by community actors, decision-makers, representatives and citizens. In effect, the psychology of the relevant actors represents a fundamental aspect of effective collaboration.
3.2.1 Resilience, inertia and the integration of change in coordination systems

Although resilience is a positive quality for systems, one which enables them to navigate destabilizing conditions by adapting to them, this quality may also take the more negative guise of inertia. In effect, the capacity to persever under difficult conditions favours a certain adaptation: opting for the “least effort,” i.e., sticking exclusively to existing structures, dynamics and ways of functioning. Thus, should an “outside” decision impose a change on a resilient system’s orientation (e.g., a political decision to transition a centralized institutional system towards a decentralized one) it will likely trigger this type of response, i.e., an adaptation which favours existing structures, mechanisms, practices and conceptions. In a word, institutional inertia.

Thus, whenever one designs a public policy or elaborates a strategic plan, one must ask: what changes does this imply? What changes are imposed on institutional systems? What are the potential bottlenecks and sources of inertia? Consequently, the implementation of a new strategy or a different policy must absolutely be contemplated in terms of institutional change and introduced using the appropriate tools. Mentoring and change management activities, for example, must be integrated to ensure that existing systems are able to make the internal changes required to ensure efficient adaptation.

3.3 Political and institutional leadership

The questions of leadership and consensus are closely connected, which is why we grouped them together in the same column of our comparison matrix. In effect, if leadership is to be effective, it must be recognized and endorsed by a consensus of stakeholders. The final two sections of this comparison then must be considered in conjunction, as must the resulting conclusions.

Our review of the literature and the findings of this study both underline the fact that leadership constitutes an important factor in the development and successful implementation of prevention strategies and policies, in particular due to the challenges posed by their multidimensional character. Moreover, the establishing of strong and effective leadership at every stage of the public policy action process has become a priority in strategic planning. Thus, all of the contemporary strategies and policies that we have examined in this study clearly identify the lead institutions and their responsibilities.

This comparative study has enabled us to identify several types and forms of leadership. Multisectoral institutional leadership consists of putting an agency, such as a government ministry, in charge of developing and implementing a multidisciplinary strategy. In Norway, for example, crime prevention policy is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety. That said, in practice, policy development entails very close inter-institutional collaboration. Secondly, there is sectoral institutional leadership, which is based on a silo-type institutional logic, where a single agency takes charge of a given policy issue and develops and implements a strategy independently. In South Africa, for example, the South African Police Service (SAPS)
developed its own crime prevention strategy, within its internal prevention department. Finally, there is a third form of leadership: **inter-institutional cooperation formalized through the setting up of independent agencies** (commissions, boards or interdepartmental committees). The internal leadership within these agencies is structured by its hierarchical member organizations. This is the case in France, for example, where the system for developing and implementing major strategies and public policies is largely based on this type of system. These models of institutional leadership are applicable to all levels of governance.

There are, however, a number of recurrent issues. The first concerns establishing effective multidisciplinary leadership in the face of entrenched competitive, indeed conflictual, relations between public sector agencies, institutions and ministries, around the question of leadership. In effect, leadership is often perceived by actors as an essentially hierarchical matter which defines power relationships. This makes it difficult to install a conception of leadership that is more collaborative than competitive, as attests the situation in South Africa.

Closely connected with this first issue is a second issue, identified by this study: the question of political leadership. First of all, **it’s necessary to distinguish between political leadership and institutional leadership**, which represent two very different realities, as much in their forms, dynamics and effects as in their relevant time frames. Political leadership, often referred to as political will, constitutes a force for cohesion and an impetus for change, which is often the source of necessary institutional transformations. This study identified several examples, notably in Colombia and South Africa, two countries which had to politically rethink their public policy paradigms and ways of functioning, in their entirety. Similarly, strong local political leadership in several large cities, particularly in Colombia, made it possible to develop ambitious local strategies and promising practices.

However, political leadership confronts a major limitation: the short timelines imposed by election cycles. This reality is prejudicial to strategic efforts, particularly with respect to preventive actions, which, by definition, require a long term vision. It is therefore essential that political actors share a consensus around basic values, priorities and strategic orientations if prevention is to be successful, particularly in the case of youth violence prevention.

### 3.4 Political consensus and institutional resilience: State policies vs. government policies

Another point of comparison that this study identified resides in the distinction between, on the one hand, a strategy of public action enjoying a certain consensus and relative long term coherence (i.e., a State policy) and, on the other hand, the very divergent – indeed opposing – strategies, successively developed following changes in government (i.e., government policy). This distinction is largely a function of two key elements: **consensus and political stability** on the one hand, and **the solidity and resilience of institutions** on the other. In several of the survey countries, the approaches to violence and violence prevention, as well as the principles underlying action on juvenile violence, are based on a series of fundamental principles enjoying a broad consensus across the political landscape, as well as among frontline practitioners and the general
public. Norway, for example, constitutes an excellent example of a very broad consensus around a social approach to prevention, the importance of the Welfare State in the Norwegian model and the necessity of a certain social justice to combat the problems of violence and crime. Of the six countries considered in this study, it is in Norway where consensus is the most solidly rooted in both discourse and practices. In contrast, the fate in South Africa of the National Crime Prevention Strategy of 1996 is a good illustration of the difficulties that that country experienced in finding a political consensus around these questions, despite the fact that this strategy was, on paper, particularly ambitious, integrative and promising. Its abandonment, after a few short years, then its later return as a source of inspiration for policy development in the 2010-2012 period, illustrates what a great challenge it is to implement coherent long term governmental action. The success of different prevention policies, whatever their inherent qualities may be, is prejudiced by these kinds of long term dynamics.

The consequences of State policies and government policies may also vary as a function of the resilience of institutions and their capacity to engage in coherent action despite a certain political instability. Returning to the example of South Africa, it’s very much worth underlining that the abandoning of the NCSP in 2000 did not, however, sound the death knell of prevention, as certain institutions continued to develop these types of approaches, in particular the municipal governments of major cities, as well as the national police services of the SAPS. These actions, particularly the creation of the Community Security Forums, laid, in part, the groundwork for approaches developed under more recent public policies. Thus, the resilience of these institutions enabled continuity in certain prevention approaches notwithstanding brusque changes in government strategy.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, two important elements must be highlighted: on the one hand, the big issues that emerged, and, on the other the innovative responses and solutions that were put forward.

With regards to the major issues faced, we wish to retain and note a few that appear to be critical and shared across countries in the case-studies we observed. There is an international consensus and a consensus in the scientific community that violence, particularly among youth, should be treated as a phenomenon in its own right. Despite this, no country in this study has managed to put together an integrated strategy to deal with the problem of violence in youth. This is a very fragmented problem with regards to national strategy, without any real multisector integration that would allow the development of a coherent and systematic response.

Globally, we are witnessing a reduction in large scale preventative measures (also referred to as primary or social preventions), in favour of targeted (or secondary) measures. Increasingly, we are also seeing the strengthening of judiciary responses, either by increased repression, or by extending the role of justice, most notably with regards to tertiary prevention systems. Macro-systemic factors of violence, such as socio-economic inequality, lack of access to quality public services (particularly in terms of education and vocational training) are gradually abandoned or relegated as secondary strategies in the prevention of violence.

With regards to coordination, this study allowed us to evaluate the critical importance of the local level, not only in the operational implementation of preventative actions, but also in their development. As a result, we were able to differentiate systems that are fully decentralized and those that still have strong vertical aspects in the form of decentralisation of institutions.

In the implementation and coordination processes, there is a difficulty in articulating horizontal and vertical processes in an efficient and coherent way. This is particularly true at the local level where different ideologies, agendas and practices can contradict one another. These include, among others, competition between stakeholders, divergent priorities, and confidentiality constraints that hinder effective coordination, particularly at the local level.

Still, at the local level, we see prevention initiatives occur in two ways. They are either diluted with the actions of social services, such as welfare, education, health, or they are concentrated around police-justice initiatives that forms the core actions and conceptions in the field. This results in the relative disengagement of other concerned parties, which take on a secondary role.

Norway, like their Scandinavian neighbours, constitute the exception to this trend. Most notably, they have an organic network with local action that view police-justice initiatives as non-central elements in local coordination systems.

From a conceptual point of view, we have put forward the importance of the notion of ‘interface’ as a contact surface composed of interactions and instances of information exchange. This concept allows a better approach, conceptualization, analysis and evaluation of coordination.
systems, which considers the quality, density and efficiency of interactions among actors within a same system.

Participation-wise, this study has given us the opportunity to emphasize the lack of systemization in participative processes that include a broad range of actors, particularly in regards to civil society and targeted populations. Furthermore, participation processes often only imply a qualitatively limited inclusion of non-institutional concerned parties. It is still only very occasionally that a broad range of actors fully participate in the co-construction of public action, although this is a necessity that has been recognized both at the international level and within scientific community.

Qualitative dimensions of the group of involved parties are often underestimated and rarely considered, both during strategic planning and implementation processes, or even evaluation processes. Among these dimensions, this study has brought to light the primordial importance of collaborative cooperation systems; shared conceptualizations and practices among actors who prioritize cooperation. We have noticed that the formulation of normalized cooperation systems, though it might facilitate a more efficient and functional coordination, does not guarantee full collaboration. Said collaboration can only be achieved through a paradigm change that goes beyond the codification of relationships between different agents.

Last, we have discussed two other qualitative aspects of groups of actors: leadership and consensus, two dimensions that are strongly intertwined. The need for strong and clearly established leadership and a political point of view at the institutional or agency levels is certainly a success factor, recognized by both existing literature and this study. This being, this report has emphasized the complexity in constructing true leadership, mainly in context of multidisciplinary cooperation, where competition issues, power and influence struggles within groups of involved parties can be fuelled by a leadership that does reach consensus. An efficient leadership is a co-construction among different actors who either exert or accept that leadership. This means that the set of involved parties will be able to reach a consensus around key-elements. They will have a shared vision of the issues at hand, a broad agreement on the type of responses to these issues, as well as a common acceptance of necessary systems, mechanisms, implementation practices and daily coordination work.

To conclude, we must make a quick observation on the limitations of our report. The method of comparison requires that the considered dimensions are found within each case of study. However, the six countries we have chosen for our study have very different profiles, making it sometimes difficult to research comparable characteristics. Among these major limitations, we can first find political and institutional systems. This is namely a limitation when the countries have a federal system, like in the United States, where prevention strategies for violence among youth are developed at the state level, without real strategic planning or public policy at the national level. A second methodological limitation resulted from the nature and availability of the collected information for each country. Each has often very different ways of defining issues and concepts, of producing data and of analysing information. It is thus impossible, with the constraints of this study, to apply comparison techniques based on a system of uniform statistic indicators. There are
nonetheless a few exceptions: homicide rates, globally uniformed socio-economic data such as development indicators provided by international institutions. However, these indicators are a small and insufficient basis on which to establish an in-depth comparison. In consequence, we have attempted to construct indicators that are more of the qualitative order, so to carry our project forward. Additionally, we have often had to rely on incomplete information and data, which has limited the extent of our comparison abilities.

Pour conclure, il nous faut ici effectuer un point rapide sur les limites que notre travail a rencontrées. En effet, l’exercice de la comparaison exige de considérer des dimensions qui se retrouvent au sein de chacun des cas d’étude. Or, les six pays que nous avons choisis pour notre étude présentent des profils extrêmement différents, parfois au point de rendre difficile la recherche de caractéristiques comparables. Parmi ces limitations majeures, on peut noter, au premier plan, les systèmes politiques et institutionnels, notamment lorsqu’il s’agit de pays de type fédéral comme les États-Unis, où les stratégies qui concernent la prévention de la violence chez les jeunes sont essentiellement développées au niveau des 51 états, sans réelle planification stratégique ou politique publique au niveau national. Une seconde limite méthodologique réside dans la nature et la disponibilité des informations recueillies pour chacun des pays. En effet, ces derniers présentent tous des façons souvent très distinctes de définir les problématiques et les concepts, de produire les données et d’analyser les informations. Il est donc impossible, dans les conditions de cette étude, de suivre des techniques de comparaison reposant sur un système complet d’indicateurs statistiques uniformes. Quelques exceptions peuvent être trouvées, comme les taux d’homicides, ou encore les données socio-économiques mondialement harmonisées, telles que les différents indices de développement fournis par les institutions internationales. Cependant, ces indicateurs constituent une base bien maigre et insuffisante pour établir une comparaison approfondie. Ainsi, nous avons tenté de construire, pour mener notre projet à bien, des indicateurs plus qualitatifs. En outre, il nous a fallu bien souvent composer avec des données et des informations incomplètes, ce qui a limité la portée de l’exercice comparatif.
Several recommendations can be made in line with these general conclusions. These can be placed in three broad categories: 1) the taken approach and paradigms; 2) coordination systems; and 3) the qualitative dimensions of these systems.

### 1.1 Approaches and Paradigms

First, it is essential to anchor an integrative perspective on violence within national conceptualizations, which considers said violence as a complete phenomenon on its own. This perspective ought to particularly consider:

- The co-occurrence of victimization and perpetuation within the same individual, which would require an integral response.
- The lot of violence-related problems beyond criminality, such as incivility, harassment, intimidation and other components pertaining to psychological or physical violence, in coherent fashion.

This unified vision of violence within national conceptualizations can rely on different tools. This includes strategic plans for violence prevention among youth which would offer a harmonized framework of policies for children and vulnerable youth protection, for prevention among at-risk youth, for victim support, for education, etc. These tools can also take the form of violence observatories, allowing analysis platforms to be established, a production and exchange of knowledge to take place, and thus favoring counselling during the creation of public policies that will have a thorough and complete comprehension of violence-related problems.

Second, the idea of social primary prevention, which seems to be gradually be a shortcoming in public policies, should not be abandoned or diminished. A social approach within the framework of such a systemically-embedded and multidimensional problem as violence is essential in prevention. The responses to this type of phenomena should aim at macrosystemic factors that are favorable to the conditions necessary to originate violence. However, these integral social strategies do not correspond to the current constraints of public policies: they are difficult to evaluate, they have a very wide time-span and thus need consistent investments. They are nonetheless crucial: it is thus imperative that they are submitted to particular conditions, based on a long-term consensus, on an adapted vision of efficiency and evaluation, as well as to the durability and stability of their allocated financial, human and material resources.

### 1.2 Coordination Systems

Several recommendations are necessary pertaining to coordination systems. First, we observe that completely decentralized systems obtain the best results for an effective and adapted prevention.
These provide autonomy and independence to local governance structures allowing them to identify their specific problems, to define their strategic actions and to organize their own local coordination systems. This existence of this autonomy namely requires a resource allocation which possesses two major characteristics: it must be durable (for instance through a variety of funding sources); and it must be undifferentiated, meaning that it should not be submitted to constraints regarding its use for one specific type of project.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to ensure that the autonomy and independence of local systems does not create inequalities, and that the inherent heterogeneity of different territories is counterbalanced through mechanisms that allow systems that are more vulnerable to develop actions that are as complex and efficient as those who are more privileged, namely in terms of financial, human and material resources, as well as in local capacities.

Next, in order to minimize risks of competition between different actors and different organizational mentalities, funding concerns are also an important point. It is indeed important that vertical and sectorial funding does not conflict with an effective cooperation between the different agents involved in multisector policies at all levels. Consequently, it is important to consider specific and sufficient funding for the implementation of strategic plans, policies and programs, rather than to provide funding based on the existing financial resources of each institution. Budget planning is a necessary concerted and consensual step in the creation of policies. A lack of such a step, might result in the increase of the risks of ulterior conflict.

In order to keep counterbalancing the logic of vertical trickledown and to favor a coherent and integrated public action, it is important to envision and think of national coordination as a collaboration that will enable an easy and fluid local implementation. This namely requires a vertical coordination that favors the complementarity of different levels, rather than their interlocking.

Within horizontal coordination systems, several recommendations ought to be emphasized. It should be noted first that bodies of horizontal coordination should be decision-making sites and durable structures. These two conditions require that these bodies are recognized by the law, which will grant them their own financing, a specific decisional role, as well as a long-term existence. It should also be noted that these bodies should operate with network logics, non-hierarchical and based on an efficient information sharing, as well as on an optimal reactivity to different needs. Two main tools will allow this to happen: the implementation of coordinators that will take on the role of emulators of the network and will allow great reactivity from the variety of actors; as well as legal frameworks allowing the derogation of confidentiality obligations imposed to different agents, allowing them a broader range of action in what pertains to the sharing of knowledge. It is of utmost importance to distinguish these two realities (decision structures and information networks) within coordination systems, as their functions are complementary and essential to ensure a proper functioning.

Finally, we recommend that an interface-based approach is used, which will allow considering the relationships between different bodies, actors and policies.
1.3 Qualitative Dimensions of Coordination Systems

As demonstrated by this report, collaboration is an essential condition for the proper functioning of coordination systems. Consequently, one of our major recommendations is the necessity of conceptualizing and evaluating the coordination and collaboration processes in distinct ways. This is particularly important when evaluating the efficiency of coordination systems. To this effect, we recommend using two differentiated evaluation systems; one for coordination processes (structures, mechanisms, operations) and the other for collaboration processes (quality and density of interactions between actors).

In particular, collaboration problems and blocking points that manifest within agent systems are often consequences of a cluster of causes that are beyond coordination mechanisms. They may be the result of problematic interfaces between institutions (conflicts between vertical logic and horizontal priorities, competition or impossibility of sharing information), between different policies and strategies (incorrect integration, competing actions) or between individuals (interpersonal conflicts, high turnover of important actors, absence of personal relationships and trust). To this effect, it is important to ensure that when different interfaces are created, specific problems are considered and that all conditions are met to ensure their proper functioning.

Furthermore, collaboration blocking points within coordination systems may also be the result of a change that has improperly been integrated by actor systems. As a matter of fact, a strategy or a new policy that introduces new conceptualizations, practices, priorities or evaluation methods implies a change within the systems of actors who have to implement it, particularly within institutional systems, administrations, local governance systems, etc. These changes must be considered, predicted and supported. These receiving systems react to change with resilience; by taking on a form of adaptation which engages as little significant changes as possible. They act with what they know, that which is familiar to them. This resilience is thus a cause of inertia in this case, and represents an important failure factor for change processes. The implementation of strategies or policies that seek to introduce changes must then integrate specific supporting mechanisms, allowing different systems to adapt in a guided and controlled fashion.

Finally, our last recommendation regards the place of leadership and the importance of consensus when implementing prevention strategies for violence among youth that are viable and efficient in the long term. Leadership and consensus are an inseparable pair. From a political stance, it is thus crucial to ensure a large political consensus, which includes a majority of influential political actors, on issues that are recognized by all, with shared values and a common direction to maintain in the long term. It is this consensus that will allow political leadership, a lasting will and energy to conduce a coherent and durable course of action. Consensus and leadership are also essential from an institutional point of view. It is indeed indispensable, within a strategic plan of public action, that institutional leadership (the designation of an agency or a structure that will supervise the process) is cemented by a consensus within the group of concerned parties, which recognize the legitimacy of this authority.
This double observation (political and institutional) conduces to our final issue: the necessity of developing and ensuring integrative, active and integral processes of broad participation. In order to be valid, the consensus must integrate the largest number of concerned parties. Said parties should surpass the political or institutional frameworks and include the entire set of actors of society at the forefront, namely three of which are often excluded: civil society, local communities and populations targeted by adopted policies. These three groups must be included and must fully participate in all the creation and implementation steps of policies and programs resulting from public action. Their participation should also be active; it should go beyond a simple consultation that merely includes them in decisional processes. This last point reflects the area among our recommendations that is, by far, the least advanced. To work on this recommendation, an in-depth change in paradigms, practices, legal frameworks and relationships among actors will be necessary. As stated previously, this change will need to be controlled and supported. This is a sizeable challenge for all countries, as it will require a reconstruction of governance and the way of conceptualizing relationships between governors and those being governed.
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