Introduction

All countries, regions and cities across the globe are affected by trends in crime, violence and insecurity. Safety concerns have a major effect on peoples’ quality of life, affecting how they live, when they feel comfortable going out, how they travel and where they go. It affects the work environment and business and industry, and the willingness of people to invest in housing and development.

In order to place developments in crime prevention and community safety in context, Part I of this chapter provides a brief synopsis of global trends in crime and some of the significant regional and country differences. It also looks at emerging concerns. Part II considers some of the significant international agreements and meetings which have taken place since 2014 which have implications for the conduct of crime prevention. It looks at recent developments at the regional, national and local level, and provides an update of trends in crime prevention practice and research findings, and debates about crime prevention and its impacts. While Chapter 2 of this report provides a detailed review of the role of cities and local governments in crime prevention, some recent research findings on local government crime prevention practice are also discussed.

Part I – Trends in crime

Global trends in crime

As previous editions of the International Report have stressed, measuring global trends in crime is a complex and difficult process, given that there are many gaps in the availability and accuracy of data collected from different countries and regions of the world. In terms of police recorded crime, people are often reluctant to report crimes to the police for a variety of reasons, and lack of capacity and differences in definitions affect the extent to which data collection systems and police records are accurate or comparable between countries.
The decline in conventional crime is especially marked in some countries. In England and Wales, for example, since the mid-1990s when crime levels were at their highest, the number of police recorded crimes has fallen from 19 million a year to 6.6 million in 2015, or 60% (Home Office, 2016b). As ICPC’s 4th International Report discussed, one of the explanations for the general decline in conventional recorded crime appears to be the widespread increase in cybercrime and internet-based fraud and theft and other offences (ICPC, 2014). Nevertheless, with all types of conventional crime there are wide variations between and within regions, and within countries themselves.

Global trends in homicide and violence

The Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014 published by the WHO in collaboration with UNODC and UNDP (WHO, 2014) looks in some detail at trends in homicide between regions. The report, which is based on data from 133 countries, estimates that in 2012 there were 475,000 homicide victims worldwide, an overall rate of 6.7 per 100,000 people. Over the twelve years from 2000-2012 rates of homicide are estimated to have declined by 16%, although the decline is more marked in some regions than others (WHO, 2014). The decline is evident even in countries in Southern Africa which have had very high rates of homicide, although not in Latin America (see below).

The rate of homicide varies markedly between regions, and especially in relation to levels of income and inequality. For example, as Figure 1.3 below indicates, all high income countries had an overall rate of 3.8 homicides per 100,000, compared with low and middle-income countries in the Americas with a rate of 28.5 per 100,000 people. Over the twelve years from 2000-2012 rates of homicide are estimated to have declined by 16%, although the decline is more marked in some regions than others (WHO, 2014). The decline is evident even in countries in Southern Africa which have had very high rates of homicide, although not in Latin America (see below).

While the great majority of victims of homicide are males aged 15-44, 90% of them are killed by men, and in only 10% of cases are women the perpetrators (UNODC, 2016, p. 8). In Latin America, homicide is the leading cause of death among young men aged 15-29, and guns are a major contributing factor (PAHO, 2016).

Among women who are victims of homicide, intimate partners are often responsible. An estimated 38% of women were killed by intimate partners in 2013 compared with 6% of men (WHO, 2014). Among homicides committed by intimate partners or family members, 60% of the victims are female (and 78% for intimate partners alone). Figure 1.5 below shows that across all the regions, victims of intimate partner or family

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homicide are far more likely to be female than male. Unlike other types of violence there is little variation between regions in the rate at which females are killed by intimate partners, and it is prevalent in all regions of the world (UNODC, 2016).

The WHO report also looks at other types of violence, apart from homicide, which have major impacts on safety in communities, and considerable health and other costs to individuals and society. They include armed violence, gang violence, youth violence, intimate partner violence, sexual violence and elder abuse, but they note that in many countries, key data on the incidence of these different phenomena is not collected (WHO, 2014).

In relation to intimate partner violence it is clear that, as with homicide, it is prevalent across all regions of the world as Figure 1.6 shows. (Chapter 6 of ICPC’s fourth International Report (2014) looked at intimate partner violence and its prevention).

In relation to urban areas which Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, it has long been known that homicide rates are usually higher in cities than in rural areas (UNODC, 2016). In keeping with the overall decline in rates of homicide globally, UNODC reports that there has been a consistent decline in levels of violence and homicide in the largest cities in all regions (UNODC, 2016, p. 11).

### Table 1.1 Estimated numbers and rates of homicides per 100,000 population, by WHO region and country income status, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHO region and country income level</th>
<th>Number of homicides</th>
<th>Homicide rate per 100,000 population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Region, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>98,081</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region of the Americas, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>166,617</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean Region, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>38,447</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Region, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>10,277</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia Region, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>78,331</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Pacific Region, low- and middle-income</td>
<td>34,328</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All regions, high-income</td>
<td>48,245</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>474,337*</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 1604 homicides estimated for non-members states.

Source: WHO (2014, p. 8)

### Figure 1.5 Victims of intimate partner/family related homicide as a percentage of total victims, by sex and by region (latest year)

![Figure 1.5](image)

### Figure 1.4 Intentional homicides per 100,000 population, by level of income inequality, 2003-2014

![Figure 1.4](image)
Regional trends in homicide

In the European Union (EU), Eurostat figures confirm that rates of homicide and violence continued to decrease between 2007 and 2011 in most of the countries (24 out of 34) (HEUNI, 2014, p. 26). Other types of crime also declined over the same period in 20 of the countries.

A new study of homicide in six Balkan countries has recently been set up to map patterns of violence in those countries (Balkan Criminology News, 2016). Along with other regions there has been a steady decline in homicide in these countries since the late 1990’s, belying stereotypical views about the region as prone to violence.

As suggested above, however, the decline in homicide and violence is not evident in many Latin American countries. In a review of the welfare costs of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jaitman (2015, p. 5) notes that this is the only region in the world where levels of homicide and other crimes have remained high, and continued to rise since 2005. Not all countries in the region have high rates of violence; Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica, for example, are well below the regional average. And in all countries there are wide variations in rates of homicide and violence, as the Mexican Peace Index illustrates across the states of Mexico (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016). For 17 of the 27 countries examined, however, rates of violence are endemic, or at the level of civil conflict. Jaitman also notes that levels of theft are very high in the region, and that robbery has increased dramatically in the past ten years, with six out of ten incidents being violent robberies (2015).

Trends in other types of crime and levels of insecurity

Cybercrime is now recognized at international and national levels as a major concern, as discussed in ICPC’s 2014 International Report. Along with corruption, transnational organized crime and terrorism, it was one of the key topics of discussion at the 13th UN Congress in Doha. UNODC now maintains a central database, the Cybercrime Repository, containing information on cybercrime laws as well as ‘lessons learned’. This enables them to continually assess the needs and criminal justice capabilities of countries, and provide technical assistance. Countries such as England and Wales plan to invest £1.9 billion over the next five years to protect Britain from cyber-attacks (Home Office, 2016a).

Concern about terrorist acts in urban centres in many regions has also increased levels of insecurity. There has been an increase in recorded deaths as a result of terrorism since 1970, but there are also wide variations between regions, with South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa experiencing the greatest incidence and increases. Chapter 6 discusses these trends in more detail, and some of the ways in which cities are responding to the increase in recruitment of young people.
Part II – Trends in crime prevention

International developments – a strong preventive turn

In the two years since the last International Report was published a number of international meetings with very significant implications for crime prevention have taken place, and a number of new agreements and goals established.

a) The 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

A major milestone was the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice which took place in Doha, Qatar in April 2015. This marked the 60th year since Congresses began in 1955 (see Box 1.1). Held every five years, the Congress brings together all Member States of the UN and a wide range of policy makers, practitioners and academics to discuss pertinent issues in crime prevention and criminal justice. In 2015 the Congress included over 4,000 participants from 149 countries.

The agenda for the 13th Congress included the promotion of comprehensive crime prevention strategies to support sustainable development, in anticipation of the more recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals; international cooperation to combat transnational organized crime; new and emerging forms of transnational crime, including cybercrime, and the theft of cultural property, wildlife, timber and plants; and national approaches to public participation in crime prevention and criminal justice.

The four workshops which formed part of the official Congress programme provided an opportunity for a more in-depth discussion of policies and practices in specific areas. The first workshop focused on UN standards and norms in justice and prevention, including prisons and the needs of women and children, and the social reintegration of offenders. Workshop 2 looked at trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. Workshop 3 was concerned with ways to strengthen crime prevention and criminal justice approaches to cybercrime and trafficking in cultural property. Workshop 4 focused on public contributions to crime prevention and criminal justice. The Doha Declaration adopted by the Congress sets out the agreed conclusions on the debates and workshops, outlining priorities for action by Member States and the international community.

Workshop 4 on ‘Public Contribution to crime prevention and raising awareness of criminal justice: experiences and lessons learned’ was organized by the Australian Institute of Criminology, and included sessions on public participation in prevention at national and local levels, as well as on the role of social media and new communication technology, and on the media itself. The Workshop was the only one with a strong focus on crime prevention rather than criminal justice matters. ICPC’s contribution was

Box 1.1 United Nations Congresses on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 1955–2015 60 years

“Every five years policy-makers and practitioners working in crime prevention and criminal justice gather for the United Nations Crime Congress to help shape the agenda and standards of the UN on crime prevention and criminal justice. The Doha Congress in 2015, which marks the 60th anniversary of the Crime Congress, will consider how best to integrate crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider UN agenda.

The United Nations Crime Congress is the world’s largest and most diverse gathering of governments, civil society, academia and experts in crime prevention and criminal justice. For 60 years the congresses have had an impact on criminal justice policies and strengthened international cooperation against the global threat of transnational organized crime.

The practice of holding international conferences on crime control matters at five-year intervals dates back to 1872 when conferences were held under the auspices of the International Prison Commission which later became the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC).

The First United Nations Congress was held in Geneva in 1955.

Sixty years later, this tradition continues with the Government of Qatar hosting the Thirteenth United Nations Congress in Doha. The theme of the Thirteenth Congress is “Integrating crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider UN agenda to address social and economic challenges and to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and public participation”.” (UN, 2015, p. 2)
on Public Private Partnerships in Crime Prevention, drawing in particular on the action guide developed in 2011 in collaboration with the World Bank, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce and Instituto Sou da Paz in Brazil (ICPC, World Bank, Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, & Instituto Sou da Paz, 2011). Other contributions included a Canadian presentation on the police–community mobilization Strategy for a Safer Ontario, and the Brazilian Caixa Seguradora Youth Expression Project to promote social responsibility, supported by a private insurance company.11 The contribution by Peter Homel at the end of this chapter provides a synopsis of the workshop and its conclusions.

The agenda of the UN Congress and the annual meetings of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2015 and 2016, reflect current global concerns including the continuing flow of migrants, corruption, transnational organized crime, and terrorism.

b) Sustainable Development Agenda 2030

“The Sustainable Development Agenda ‘reflects a shift in global thinking on development’”12

A second milestone since the publication of the last International Report was the adoption in September 2015 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.13 They include a series of 17 goals and 169 targets to be achieved by 2030. The SDGs are seen as reflecting a global shift in understanding of how development is to be achieved, and one which will require interventions to be ‘holistic, inclusive and backed by multi-stakeholder partnerships...’ all of which are components of effective local crime prevention practice.

As UNODC emphasise a number of the goals have specific implications for cities and crime prevention.14 They include:

- SDG 3 which is concerned with ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being, including promoting a public health approach to substance abuse prevention and treatment;
- SDG 5 which is concerned with gender equality & empowerment, preventing violence against women and trafficking, and developing gender-sensitive justice systems;
- SDG 11 which focuses on making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable;
- SDG 16 which is concerned with promoting peaceful and inclusive societies, including preventing crime and promoting effective, fair and humane criminal justice systems. Among the targets for goal 16 are the significant reduction of violence and related deaths, exploitation and trafficking in persons, and promoting the rule of law; and
- SDG 8 which focuses on promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.

c) UNGASS

A third milestone is the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on drugs, which took place in April 2016. It was only the third General Assembly meeting on global drug policy, and it marks a major shift in drug policy, away from the ‘war on drugs’ and the primary use of repression and deterrence through the criminal justice system, towards a much more overt public health approach. UNGASS is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

d) Habitat III

Finally, the third global meeting on human settlements, Habitat III, takes place in Quito from 17-21 October 2016, following previous meetings in 1976 (Habitat I) and 1996 (Habitat II). The New Urban Agenda (NUA) which will be adopted in Quito, will help to provide guidance and standards for urban development for the next twenty years. It will also see the adoption of new international guidelines on safer cities, which will complement the 1995 Guidelines for Cooperation and Technical Assistance in the Field of Urban Crime Prevention (UN 1995), and the 2002 Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime (UN 2002; UNODC, 2010). Chapter 2 provides a more detailed discussion of these developments.

National, regional and local policies and initiatives

In 2002 the World Health Organization’s groundbreaking World Report on Violence and Health argued strongly for the importance of seeing violence as a public health issue rather than a justice one. It outlined the huge burden of interpersonal violence of all kinds across all regions of the world, and the particular impacts on different groups, including young men, women, children and the elderly, as well as deaths from collective violence and suicide. Since then, a number of countries have accepted the challenge and developed programmes which use a public health approach to violence prevention – one which is very much aligned with international norms on crime prevention. The Violence Reduction Unit set up by the police in Glasgow, Scotland in 2005, for example, was inspired by the WHO approach. Its success in reducing homicides led to the establishment of the Violence Reduction Unit for the whole of Scotland in 2006.15
WHO and its associates continue to build knowledge and practice on prevention, with data collection, tools and resources, such as a recent publication which focuses on the public health approach and summarizes accumulating evidence: *Violence: A Global Health Priority* (Donnelly P.D. & Ward, C., 2016). WHO also initiated the *Global Campaign on Violence Prevention*, and the *Violence Prevention Alliance*, which help to raise awareness, and bring together global networks of governments, practitioners and organizations working on violence prevention. More recently, in collaboration with UNODC and UNDP, WHO published its *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention 2014* discussed above (WHO, 2014) with the primary purpose of assessing the progress made by national governments since 2002 in preventing violence.

The report notes that in the 133 countries surveyed, half of them (51%) had on-going national plans to reduce the various types of violence which affect individuals and communities. These range from gang and youth violence, to intimate partner violence, sexual violence and elder abuse (see Table 1.1). Figure 1.9 shows the types of violence prevention programmes which have been implemented. However, it was evident that national plans are not always supported by good data collection systems. This means national governments are not able to respond to changes in patterns nor to evaluate the impacts of any programmes developed. Similarly, violence prevention activities are not always centrally coordinated or led, so that there may be gaps or overlap in interventions, given the multiple agencies involved.

WHO report concludes that while there is now much greater violence prevention activity than in 2002, the amount of investment by countries is not commensurate with the seriousness of the problem. Countries have indeed invested in prevention programmes, but not at a level which meets the scale of the problems they face. Similarly, the survey suggested that while many countries had enacted legislation to deter various types of violence, it was often inadequately enforced (WHO, 2014).

In relation to women’s and girls’ safety from sexual violence and harassment in urban public spaces, civil society organizations among others have continued to put pressure on governments. Countries such as Chile (2016), Peru (2015) and Portugal (2015) have passed legislation to criminalize sexual harassment, including making it punishable by fines or prison. Other countries including Saudi Arabia and Morocco are discussing the possibility (Kearl, 2016). Nevertheless, while criminalising these behaviours may send a message of validation to victims, it will not change the unequal gender power relations that underpin it. Furthermore, there are some concerns that criminalising street harassment could lead to a potential abuse of the law by criminalizing some racial minority groups (Serrano, 2015).

e) Europe

In European countries there continues to be a focus on the importance of crime prevention policy, increasingly including not only conventional crimes, but various types of cybercrime and issues related to human trafficking and smuggling and to terrorist activities. There have also been shifts in the kind
of emphasis which some governments are giving to different types of prevention approach, while researchers continue to track some of the outcomes of practice on the ground.

The EUCPN

After some sixteen years in existence, the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) appears to be strengthening its presence and support to member states of the European Union. The network was established in 2001 to provide a supportive network for

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### Table 1.1 National action plans by type of violence and WHO region (n = 133 reporting countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of violence</th>
<th>African Region</th>
<th>Region of the Americas</th>
<th>Eastern Mediterranean Region</th>
<th>European Region</th>
<th>South-East Asia Region</th>
<th>Western Pacific Region</th>
<th>All countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed violence</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang violence</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth violence</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child maltreatment</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate partner violence</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual violence</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elder abuse</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan covering all types</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WHO (2014, p. 24)

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### Figure 1.9 Proportion of countries reporting implementation of violence prevention programmes on a larger scale by type of programme (n = 133 reporting countries)

- Life skills/social development programmes (YV) 51%
- Social and cultural norms change (SV) 50%
- Social and cultural norms change (IPV) 49%
- Bullying prevention (YV) 47%
- Caregiver support programmes (EA) 39%
- Pre-school enrichment (YV) 38%
- Parenting education (CM) 38%
- Child sexual abuse prevention (CM) 37%
- Residential care policies (EA) 36%
- Prevention programmes for school and college populations (SV) 35%
- After-school programmes (YV) 35%
- Home visiting (CM) 35%
- Improving physical environments (SV) 29%
- Professional awareness campaigns (EA) 26%
- Mentoring (YV) 23%
- Public information campaigns (EA) 23%
- Dating Violence (IPV) 22%
- Microfinance with gender equity training (IPV) 21%

Key: CM-child maltreatment; EA-elder abuse; IPV-intimate partner violence; SV-sexual violence; YV-youth violence.

While each programme is shown as relevant to a particular type of violence, some of the programmes listed in the figure have shown preventive effects on several types of violence.

Source: WHO (2014, p. 26)
governments in the development of crime prevention policy and practice. It has worked on a rotating presidency system, in common with the European Union itself, so that different countries have been responsible for determining the topics of meetings and initiatives over time.

The network has been very much dependent on the resources provided by individual countries, but it illustrates the growing spread of crime prevention across the EU. Over the past five years the network has worked on topics selected by the presiding country, including domestic violence, cybercrime and trafficking. It has also discussed the notion of establishing an Observatory on crime prevention (EUCPN, 2016). In recent years, the network appears to be better funded than in the past, and with its own permanent secretariat. The new five year plan 2016-2020 suggests that the network aims to become a much stronger organization which will be able to provide assistance to countries and cities, maintain good data and information on prevention programmes and their effectiveness, and help to establish higher standards for prevention programmes across the region (EUCPN, 2015). See Box 1.2.

However, it is interesting to note that in a number of European countries there has been recent criticism of the use of certain types of crime prevention approach, notably to control specific targeted populations, and to control behaviour which is not actually criminal. The contribution by Gorazd Mesko and his colleagues from the University of Maribor in Slovenia at the end of this chapter reflects on what they term a retreat from the use of social crime prevention in a number of countries in the region in recent years. They speculate that the EUCPN itself may have been instrumental in spreading more ‘Western’ systems of social control and deterrent approaches to prevention to Eastern European countries which had traditionally endorsed

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**Box 1.2 European Union Crime Prevention Network**

The European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) was established in May 2001 by Council Decision 2001/427/JHA to promote crime prevention activity in Member States across the European Union, and to provide a means through which valuable good practice in preventing crime, mainly ‘traditional’ crime, could be shared. In 2011 a new Network Secretariat was established to strengthen its profile and impact. The goals of the Network are:

a) To be a point of reference for the target groups of the Network.

b) To disseminate qualitative knowledge on crime prevention.

c) To support crime prevention activities at national and local level.

d) To contribute to the EU policy and strategy of crime prevention and to contribute to various aspects of crime prevention at EU level in respect of the strategic priorities of EU.

The Network target groups are practitioners and policymakers at the local and national level and relevant EU and international agencies, organisations, and working groups.

In 2011-15 the EUCPN Secretariat and Network focused their research on topics chosen by the EUCPN presidencies, including domestic violence, cybercrime, secondary victimization, trafficking in human beings, as well as on the economic costs of crime, cost-benefit analysis, the impact of context on crime prevention, and more theoretical issues concerning the concept of crime prevention. Some of the challenges for the Network include differences between national approaches to crime prevention and concepts of crime prevention, difficulties in assessing the impacts of projects, and working with 23 different languages.

The current EUCPN action plan 2016-2020 aims to raise the profile and strengthen the Network and working methods, including its ties with the European Commission and universities. There has been recurring discussion within the EUCPN about creating an observatory on crime prevention, but the high costs, and the lack of a clear definition about what the observatory would do or how it would fit into national structures of crime prevention organisations has created practical obstacles. Smaller crime prevention organizations and forums have high expectations of the EUCPN as an organisation which can really bring about change at the European level in relation to crime prevention, especially since all Member States are represented in the Board. The current work programme for 2016 chosen by the Presidency Trio (the Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta) will focus on Organised Crime together with Cybercrime and Terrorism, which are also key priorities of the European Commission. Within this topic, the Netherlands will focus on the illegal trafficking of firearms.

Source: EUCPN (2015, 2016)
a welfare approach to social problems, and supported social programmes. What the contribution reflects is the important issue of the range of approaches which is subsumed under the title of crime prevention and how they are employed. In some cases countries may give much great emphasis to deterrence and defensive action – a culture of control – with less emphasis on inclusion and the support of marginalized communities.

In England and Wales, the Conservative government which was re-elected in 2015, announced its ‘Modern Crime Prevention Strategy’ in March 2016 (Home Office, 2016a). Noting the rapid drop in recorded crime in the past 20 years, the report suggests that the drop is in part the result of specific legislation and enforcement (being ‘tough on crime’), and crime prevention measures which involve industry, the business sector and the public. These include incentives offered by house insurance companies to improve home security, and improvements by car manufacturers which make it much more difficult to steal cars. But the strategy also argues that the methods of criminal activity are changing quite noticeably, from traditional and face-to-face methods, to internet-based theft and extortion, which is “faceless, contactless and conducted from a distance” (Home Office, 2016b). The strategy outlines a number of initiatives to strengthen police skills to prevent and detect cybercrime, including increased sharing of data information systems and working closely with business and industry.

The new Strategy is, however, significant in the context of the recent history of crime prevention in England and Wales, and the heavy emphasis since the 1990’s on both situational crime prevention and the controlling of behaviour deemed to be annoying or ‘anti-social’. This includes the controversial 1998 legislation allowing the imposition of civil Anti-Social Behaviour Orders for non-criminal behaviour introduced under the Labour government of Tony Blair (Ashworth, 2004; Garland, 2001). The new Strategy suggests there are six ‘key drivers’ of crime, which move away from the now commonly accepted language of communities and risk factors, or concern with the structural factors which affect peoples’ lives. The key drivers are listed as “opportunity, character, the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, profit, alcohol, and drugs” (Home Office, 2016a, p. 6). The curious choice of the word ‘character’, while citing long-standing developmental research on individual factors associated with deviant and criminal activity, such as self-awareness and self-control, seems to belie much of the evidence-based knowledge about the value of investing in social and educational crime prevention programmes, as well as issues of inequality and poor urban infrastructure. Among other things, the strategy places an emphasis on targeting high risk individuals and their families, and high risk places.

Police-community partnership models

A number of recent studies of crime prevention in European countries have focused on the practice of developing community safety partnerships which has been a feature of government strategies over the past two decades or more. The Nordic model of crime prevention initially developed in the 1980’s and 1990’s, combines situational prevention with social welfare policies, and in Sweden comes under the National Crime Prevention Council, Brå. Since 2008 local authorities, the police, and social and welfare authorities have been encouraged to develop cooperative crime prevention agreements, and 90% of municipalities in the country now have such agreements (Johansson, 2014; see also ICPC’s 4th International Report 2014). A recent study of one regional network in Sweden, Regbrå, provides a detailed account of what the 13 municipalities in the region actually do, and how the network itself supports them (Johansson, 2014). In most cases each municipality has a coordinator for crime prevention, and an executive board at a high level in the municipal organization having ultimate responsibility for prevention initiatives.

The members of the Regbrå network mainly included municipal representatives and the police, with university researchers and others, but excluded civil society and business stakeholders (see Figure 1.10). Network members were in general agreement that prevention was a cooperative process, and that it worked well. However, municipalities often felt their crime prevention work was under-resourced and funded, and that they lacked the necessary training and skills, something which other studies of crime prevention at the local level have also found (see below for Victoria and New South Wales, Australia). The author suggests that cooperation across sectors is a very important aspect of local crime prevention work, requiring changes in

![Figure 1.10 The members of the Regbrå crime prevention network, Sweden](source: Johansson (2014, p. 148))
attitudes and values among the partners, and that greater attention should be given to research and training. She also argues that the current emphasis on applying market principles to the public sector, including reducing inefficiencies and getting value for money through the use of evidence-based practice, for example, risks rejecting important tools in crime prevention. It ignores the value of scientific and empirical local knowledge, and the considered reflection which comes from cooperation between services and sectors.

A comparative study of police-community partnerships approaches in Germany and the UK provides a useful analysis of the different trajectories taken by governments and police organizations in the two countries since the 1990’s (Frevel & Rogers, 2016). In the UK, as discussed above, crime reduction partnerships were mandated by the national government in 1998, requiring police and local authorities to undertake safety audits and to consult the public in developing strategic responses. The result was a strong focus on community-focused interventions and public involvement. Under the current government, however, there is less funding, and expectations that the police should revert to their ‘core role’ of fighting crime, leaving the new elected civilian Police and Crime Commissioners to liaise with the community and civilian volunteers.17

In Germany in the 1990’s, the municipal Crime Prevention Councils established in Denmark and Sweden inspired the federal and state governments to consider their development. Given Germany’s federal structure, the federal government suggested a more open approach, recommending that Crime Prevention Councils and later Public Order Partnerships be established at the local level as seemed fit in different contexts.18 The result has been that the German councils and partnerships work in a variety of ways, include different partners, and see their role in different ways. For the most part they are police-led, with the local authorities playing a less directive role. They tend to be used as vehicles for police-planning and organization. Unlike the UK councils, there is very little public consultation, and private citizens and local communities do not have any formal role (Frevel & Rogers, 2016).

f) Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) continues to support crime prevention through its on-going Citizen Security Initiative launched in 2012, providing grants for project development. The programme has a strong focus on social crime prevention, particularly with the most vulnerable groups including youth at risk and women. They also support projects on the role of police in prevention especially community policing, and on strengthening institutional capacity. Box 1.3 below provides a more detailed outline of the Citizen Security Initiative (2009).

The future plans for the programme continue the focus on these areas, but with an added emphasis on crime in city spaces, and the role of technology in policing. Overall, IDB is especially concerned to help to improve the collection and analysis of data across the region, and the measurement of crime and its impacts, including the costs of crime and the evaluation of programmes (Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán, 2015). Some of the findings of recent innovative studies on the costs of crime in the region have now been published (Jaitman, 2015). IDB also urges the continued development of observatories on crime and social problems in the region; something which ICPC continues to support, with its 5th International Observatories meeting organized in Mexico City in November 2015.19 The contribution by Hugo Acero in Chapter 3 of this report discusses some of these issues in more detail.

A specific report Status Report on Violence Prevention in the Region of the Americas, 2014 has also been published by the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in collaboration with WHO (PAHO, 2016). As with the conclusions of the WHO Global Report, the report finds that 16 out of 21 countries in the region have developed National Action Plans on violence, but many do not collect data to enable them to base policy developments on good evidence. In addition, “less than half the countries surveyed are implementing national social and educational policy measures to mitigate key risk factors for violence” (2016, p. 4).

An innovative development, designed to increase transparency and knowledge about recent and current projects in the region, is the Citizen Security Dashboard, an accessible mapping tool.20 It has been developed by IDB and the Igarapé Institute based in Brazil, and documents over 1,350 citizen security interventions which have taken place in 20 countries in the region since the late 1990’s (Alvarado, Muggah, & Compeán, 2015). Some of the trends which the mapping identifies include the heavy concentration of citizen security interventions in countries with the highest level of violence, notably Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Central America; a focus of interventions at the national level rather than the city level; and a focus on preventing common (traditional) crimes and youth crime. The mapping tool also enables users to track positive impacts from initiatives. Nevertheless, preliminary assessment suggests that very few programmes have been well ‘robustly’ evaluated, again underlining the lack of attention to data gathering and assessment.
Given that gang violence is one of the main factors contributing to the very high rates of homicide in Latin America and the Caribbean, discussion continues on the value of gang truces brokered between governments and gang members (Kan, 2014; Muggah, Carpenter, & McDougal, 2013). While levels of homicide do appear to decrease when a government-gang truce is agreed, they often break down and are short-lived. They may also benefit gangs and organized crime networks when governments are weak and unable to respond to criminal activity. Robert Muggah and his colleagues argue that while there are many differences between the national contexts of gang truces in different countries in Central America, Brazil or the USA, for example, in general they fail to deal with the underlying causes of gang formation such as unemployment and marginalization. The authors suggest that gang truces might be more successful if they were combined with mediation and peacemaking processes, such as those used to end civil wars, together with structural changes addressing underlying causes of gang formation.

g) Africa

UN-Habitat’s Safer Cities Programme was originally launched 20 years ago in 1996 at the Habitat II meeting in Istanbul, and specifically at the request of African Mayors. Since that time, the Safer Cities Programme has worked with many African mayors to help them establish crime prevention strategies and implement international guidelines on urban crime.
prevention. However, urbanization and the rapid expansion of informal settlements have also continued over that period in many African cities. Levels of crime, violence and insecurity continue to present challenges. Currently, Africa is the least urbanized region in the world, but along with Asia the most rapidly urbanizing. By 2050 the world’s population is expected to increase by over two thirds, and almost 90% of that increase is expected to take place in African and Asian cities (UN, 2014, p. 12). This underlines the importance of developing much stronger and inclusive programmes and policies to promote safety in cities in Africa for all their inhabitants.

In anticipation of these developments, a major event to celebrate the Safer Cities Programme was held at the end of June 2016 in Durban, South Africa. The Africities Global Conference 2016 highlighted the challenges and achievements of the Safer Cities Programme, and worked to develop a new vision for the future. It also saw the launch of the African Forum for Urban Security (AFUS), with a permanent secretariat based in Durban, in recognition of that city’s long-standing commitment to safer cities. It is expected that the AFUS will work in partnership with the African Union to implement the SDGs. A network database of cities and civil-society organizations working on safer cities was also established at the conference, and it is expected that an African Institute for Learning will be set up as a regional Centre of Excellence to coordinate better knowledge and evidence-based learning on urban safety. The African Union also launched its Africa Vision 2063 in 2015 (see Chapter 2).

The contribution by Bernardo Perez-Salazar at the end of the chapter reflects on some of the challenges faced by growing cities in Southern Africa and elsewhere, and the development of ‘hybrid order’ governance models. These are rapidly emerging in cities, as the traditional ‘state-centred’ governance model comes under increasing pressure from exponential urban growth.

h) Asia Pacific

In Australia, crime prevention is primarily a state and local government responsibility, and a number of recent studies have been tracking developments on several levels. A study in the State of New South Wales notes changes in how the current State government views crime prevention (Shepherdson, Clancey, Lee, & Crofts, 2014). Interviews with local government Community Safety Officers suggested that the State government’s view of prevention, and as outlined in its 2013 plans, is almost exclusively focused on situational prevention approaches, and especially around responses to local graffiti. This is in contrast to the emphasis on Aboriginal and minority community development, parental support programmes and youth development, which have formed the basis of crime prevention policy in the state since the 1990’s. They also report evidence of cost shifting by the State to local authorities, with the State expecting municipalities to act on safety issues without providing resources. In addition, there were difficulties accessing State data for local safety audits. Community Safety Officers were also expected to take on a heavy administrative load by the State, and one which was unrelated to their main community safety role.

“In Australia, ‘[...] local government has continued to play a key role in crime prevention and community safety efforts for more than a quarter century’”.

In the State of Victoria, Australia, a detailed survey provides valuable insight into how cities themselves perceive their role (Homel & Fuller, 2015). As the authors point out, while cities have been actively involved in prevention for the past twenty five years, little is known about what local governments actually do and how they view their role. As part of a State parliamentary review on drugs and crime prevention, all local governments in Victoria were surveyed to assess local approaches to crime prevention and community safety.

Drawing on a survey originally developed by ICPC, 76 local governments were asked about the kinds of problems they faced, their planning processes, the types of programmes set up, and their assessment and evaluation procedures. For the majority of local authorities alcohol-related problems and domestic and family violence were identified as the most common issues (81%), but few local authorities had set up programmes to combat them. The majority of programmes focused on community safety partnerships with other stakeholders. It was also sobering to learn that almost all the local authorities still saw crime prevention as the responsibility of specialized agencies – notably the police or health authorities – a view which preceded the emergence of crime prevention as an alternative to justice and the law. Nevertheless, the majority of programmes established suggested an emphasis on underlying social and risk factors leading to offending and victimization (Homel & Fuller, 2015, p. 6).

What was also evident is that many local authorities felt poorly equipped to make informed decisions about programme development, both in terms of a lack of funds and the necessary skills and knowledge. Further, only a third had developed a strategic plan based on consultation and data analysis. It was evident that those authorities which had developed a strategic plan were able to establish more tailored programmes. Finally, only 12% of the local authorities
had undertaken any type of evaluation. As the authors stress, given that Australia is one of the most urbanized countries in the world, local governments need to be given much more recognition and support for their role in crime prevention, both in terms of resources, and to build their capacity and expertise (Homel & Fuller, 2015, p. 11).

In relation to encouraging greater evaluation of crime prevention projects, Anthony Morgan provides a helpful discussion of the benefits of research-practitioner partnerships (Morgan, 2014). Based on a number of evaluations undertaken by the Australian Institute of Criminology, he argues that partnerships which involve practitioners and programme developers in the evaluation process throughout the project can be very beneficial. They help in designing the indicators and evaluation to a high standard, such as using quasi-experimental designs, in collecting relevant data, in ensuring that the results are meaningful and that the recommendations are useful and relevant to project or policy improvement. While governments increasingly require funded prevention projects to be evaluated, there is a tendency to continue to require ‘objective and impartial’ external evaluation to avoid bias. His conclusion is that in crime prevention projects, the benefits of close collaboration between the evaluators and the practitioners well outweigh the possibilities of bias.

Recent debates and developments in knowledge-based crime prevention

a) Fragile Cities and Smart Cities

As Chapter 2 discusses in more detail, two concepts now attracting growing attention at the international level are ‘fragile cities’ and ‘smart cities’. Fragile cities are seen as cities with weak governance structures and high levels of inequality and violence, and tend to be located in the global South. The concept, which has many parallels with crime prevention in terms of analysis of the causal factors generating crime and violence in urban areas, has emerged from a development perspective. Some of the rationale for the use of the term relates to concerns that issues of violence and safety have been dominated by research and practice in northern and developed countries, and that south-south knowledge and exchanges may be more meaningful. Nevertheless, as the work of UNODC, UN-Habitat Safer Cities Programme, the World Bank and IDB has demonstrated, a considerable amount of innovative and effective crime prevention has been accomplished in middle and low income countries, and countries in the South such as Colombia and Brazil. Work on the notion of Smart Cities is also being advanced with the goal of helping city governments harness technical advancements to plan for safe and sustainable cities. The work of the City Leadership Initiative located at University College London, for example, responds to many of the concerns raised by those working to strengthen city governance.

b) The benefits of family support for crime prevention

“Bridging the significant gap between needs and resources to reduce youth offending, or more generally to improve children’s lives, necessitates a focus on the whole developmental system, on institutions and social arrangements, not just on the deficiencies of individuals.”

The most recent findings from the seminal Pathways to Prevention Project, a longitudinal study established in Queensland, Australia, in 2002, reinforce the value of early intervention and developmental approaches to prevention (Homel, Freiberg, Branch, & Le, 2015). This research-practice project was set up in a very disadvantaged area of Brisbane with a youth crime rate eight times higher than for the city as a whole, and operated for 10 years until 2011. The overall aim of the project was to assess the impact of participation in family support and in enriched pre-school-based programmes on families and on children’s behaviour and wellbeing over time. Earlier findings from the Pathways project showed that the combination of family and preschool programmes was effective, resulting in improved behaviour by the end of preschool, but also that both approaches were effective on their own.

Reanalysing the data based on almost 5,000 children, the authors found that not only did family support alone reduce the behaviour problems of children in school, but that quite low-level involvement with up to 10 contacts with families over 2-3 months had the strongest impacts. It significantly affected their children’s behaviour at school in terms of social relationships and self-regulation capacities (Homel et al., p. 8). The authors underline that these are important findings, showing that low-level family support is a very cost-effective form of crime prevention which has big benefits for schools and their staff. This is especially the case when school exclusion and suspension have been increasingly used to deal with disruptive behaviour. As they point out, “school disciplinary policies rarely acknowledge the central role of the family circumstances in contributing to a child’s challenging behaviour [...] supporting parents to deal with the challenges of poverty, family violence, being a single parent or recent immigrant and so on” (2015, p. 8).
The importance of investing in support for families at risk is also underlined in a detailed study of Mexico City. The researchers Carlos Vilalta and Robert Muggah tested the applicability of North American explanations for the distribution of crime patterns in the city – social disorganization theory and institutional anomie (Vilalta & Muggah, 2016). They found that both explanations had some applicability, in particular finding that areas with high rates of female-headed households tended to have high crime rates. Rather than increase the policing of these areas, the authors emphasise the need for targeted social development, and social and educational programmes to support families and children in those areas.

In Canada, the early results of a series of prevention programmes targeting 12-17 year olds also suggest promising results (Laliberté, Rosario, Léonard, Smith-Moncrieffe, & Warner, 2014). Eleven promising or model programmes which were funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) were examined. They ranged from programmes directed to school-related issues, aggressive behaviour, personal and social skills, or substance abuse. Overall, most of the programmes showed a positive impact on the behaviour of the young people referred to them.

Another Canadian report examines the implementation of crime prevention projects, based on an external analysis of 71 projects funded by the National Crime Prevention Centre (Currie & Roberts, 2015). Implementation has long been recognised as requiring just as much attention as the content of a programme itself. Even a well-evaluated and tested programme is likely to be unsuccessful if there are major implementation problems. The researchers found, not surprisingly, that over a third of the projects experienced some type of implementation challenge including:

- data management (42%),
- the recruitment and referral of participants (42%),
- partnership building (38%),
- management issues (37%),
- programme content (35%),
- staff turnover (34%),
- participant engagement (31%),
- and planning (30%).

The report noted that successful implementation strategies included the need to invest considerable time in planning all aspects of the project and its goals. It also found that increasing the engagement of parents in projects working with young people and children was very beneficial to the success of those projects. A Guide to the implementation of evidence-based programs: What do we know so far? was published by NCPC in 2014.

The last International Report in 2014 considered some of the global impacts of declining crime levels and economic recession on crime prevention. It suggested that in a number of countries cuts to public services had reduced the budgets of the police, and of social and welfare agencies which provide many of the support services for disadvantaged families and communities. The impact on community policing and citizen-police support schemes was of concern.

Community-based policing remains a central aspect of most city crime prevention programmes, in spite of some of the challenges of reduced municipal budgets. Given that crime tends to occur in particular places in cities, there has been an increasing focus in recent years on the policing of specific places or areas to maintain control and prevent crime. This includes crime ‘hot spots’ for example. One of the concerns about the policing of specific places is that it can be misused and create resentment on the part of local communities, who may legitimately feel unfairly targeted or that racial profiling is being used (eg. Sweeten, 2016; Wästerfors & Burcar, 2014).

Two recent studies have examined how far well-conducted policing, which is fair and respectful of local residents, is effective in reducing crime and disorder in those areas (Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter, & Bennett, 2014; Higginson & Mazerolle, 2014). The first study examined some 25 reports to look at the impacts of community policing in the United States. The authors found that, overall, community policing had a positive effect on citizen satisfaction and trust in the police, and on their perception of disorder in neighbourhoods. However, while there were some reductions in actual levels of crime, they were not sufficiently high to be significant.

“You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar”. The last International Report in 2014 considered some of the global impacts of declining crime levels and economic recession on crime prevention. It suggested that in a number of countries cuts to public services had reduced the budgets of the police, and of social and welfare agencies which provide many of the support services for disadvantaged families and communities. The impact on community policing and citizen-police support schemes was of concern.

“Although the dominant approach to address social ills has been to intervene at the point of individuals, there is a resurgence in research that has examined interventions at the neighbourhood level. The findings also echo the calls by others to conduct research at the community, city, and structural levels that can translate into policy that intervenes at multiple levels” (Medina, 2015, p. 93).

In the second study, Higginson and Mazerolle undertook a systematic review of 33 projects from a range of countries, using what they termed ‘spatially-focused legitimacy policing’. The projects were undertaken between 1980 and 2012, and all included some attempt...
to enhance citizens’ perception of the legitimacy of the police, and use aspects of what is referred to as procedural justice.30 These are projects which use one of four key approaches when they interact with citizens: citizen participation; being neutral in their encounters with the public; communicating ‘dignity and/or respect for citizens’; or demonstrating trust-worthy motives on the part of the police.

“Although the dominant approach to address social ills has been to intervene at the point of individuals, there is a resurgence in research that has examined interventions at the neighbourhood level. The findings also echo the calls by others to conduct research at the community, city, and structural levels that can translate into policy that intervenes at multiple levels” (Medina, 2015, p. 93).

All the studies examined used experimental or quasi-experimental designs enabling the impacts of encounters to be measured against crime levels. The authors found that there were significant reductions in serious crime, and in total crime levels in the project areas, and argue that individuals who are treated well by the police are more likely to cooperate and change their behaviour. Given that the programmes included covered a range of types of interventions, the authors suggest that the legitimacy of interactions with the public may be more important in helping to prevent or reduce crime than the programme itself. They also underline the importance of increasing the training of police to reinforce procedural aspects of their culture and work.

Another study of the links between social capital in neighbourhoods and firearm victimization in the US city of Philadelphia found that good levels of trust were associated with lower levels of subsequent violence later in time (Medina, 2015). The author echoes the work of researchers such as Robert Sampson (2012) who demonstrate the importance of trust between residents, and distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Brewer & Grabosky, 2014, p. 143). While the great majority of neighbourhood watch schemes have been found to be effective and perform legitimate roles in reducing crime, they suggest there is a ‘dark side’ of co-production. In some cases it has been found that levels of fear of crime were increased by neighbour-hood watch programmes, or that the citizens involved felt empowered or encouraged to create divisions between residents, and distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Brewer & Grabosky, 2014, p. 143). The killing of Trayvon Martin in Florida in 2012 by a neighbourhood watch coordinator, represents the ultimate ‘dark side’ of citizen-police involvement, and underlines the importance of careful recruitment, training and deployment of civilians, on the part of the police.

**d) Disadvantages of crime prevention?**

While it is important to discuss good practices and the positive outcomes of crime prevention initiatives, it is just as important to take account of negative outcomes, and of critiques of some aspects of the practice of crime prevention. A number of recent studies consider aspects of this issue, a tribute to the length of time over which crime prevention has become an accepted alternative to the use of the criminal justice system to deter or repress crime.

In a review of police-community ‘co-production’ partnerships in the United States, Brewer and Grabosky (2014) examine the benefits and disadvantages of one of the most common local crime prevention strategies. The ‘co-production’ of community safety and prevention, enlisting of the support of local civil society organizations, individuals and businesses to work with the police, has been a central characteristic of local strategies, and programmes such as Neighbourhood Watch or Crime Stoppers, for the past 30 or more years. This was itself in part because governments in a number of countries recognized that the police and criminal justice system alone did not have the capacity to prevent crime. In academic terms it led to the notion of the ‘responsibilization’ of citizens and civil society to help reduce crime, rather than the state alone.

The authors note that in some cities in the United States, not only neighbourhood watch type programmes, but also neo-vigilante groups have emerged, attempting to take on policing functions, while the use of private security guards is now much more common than in the past. They argue that police-citizen programmes should not go beyond the optimal point when citizen participation is desirable. Past that point it becomes action which threatens privacy or the rights of minority groups. As they suggest, police-citizen co-production “should be used as an instrument for driving social cohesion – not one encouraging divisiveness” (Brewer & Grabosky, 2014, p. 143). While the use of private security guards is now much more common, there is an emerging trend away from community policing initiatives and towards the deployment of civilians, on the part of the police.
'stop and frisk' David Weisburd and his colleagues report that the policy had "a significant but modest deterrent effect on crime" suggesting that such techniques can be commended as effective in reducing crime (Weisburd, Wooditch, Weisburd, & Yang, 2016, p. 31). In response to their research, Sweeten (2016) argues that while they acknowledge the unconstitutionality of 'stop and frisk' policies, the authors still focus on its effectiveness, not whether it is procedurally just. The fact that such approaches may alienate many young people and neighbourhoods is more important in Sweeten's view than questions of effectiveness.

Two other recent articles debate somewhat broader but similar concerns with the dangers of the misapplication of the concepts of prevention by governments (Peeters, 2015; van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014). Both articles base their arguments on the example of the development of crime prevention policy in the Netherlands since the mid 1980's. They draw especially on British and American critiques, and again on the notion of the 'responsibilization' of citizens, and the targeting of risky individuals. In both cases they conclude that immigrant neighbourhoods and families have been those most heavily targeted by prevention policies and interventions. As academic critiques, their analysis is interesting in showing how, in their view, crime prevention strategies have developed in the Netherlands and been applied at the local level in cities such as Rotterdam. However, unlike some of the research discussed above, they do not consider what alternative strategies could be used to ensure that police or social intervention does not unfairly target minority groups, or how the social networks of communities can be supported and strengthened, and community safety maintained.

Conclusions

The downward trend in traditional crime and violence in most regions of the world, which was noted in the last International Report in 2014, continues. It also appears that levels of violence in many large cities have declined. Explanations range from good governance, effective crime prevention and justice systems, and improved design, to the widespread emergence of cybercrime with internet-based theft, fraud and exploitation. However, the decline in crime is with the exception of some countries in Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean, where levels of violence and in some cases, theft and robbery, have increased over the past decade. While there remain very large differences within regions and countries in rates of crime and violence, one form of violence – intimate personal violence against women – remains persistently evident across all regions.

Continuing global trends including high levels of migration, much of it the consequence of conflict, corruption, trafficking and transnational organized crime, and terrorist acts, all remain concerns for countries in all regions. They are likely to continue to have negative effects on perceptions of safety and security, and risk further exacerbating racism and intolerance in cities and neighbourhoods. This creates an increased challenge for governments at all levels, especially local governments.

At the international level there has been some notable affirmation of the importance of prevention – with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 in 2015, the first UN General Assembly session to adopt a preventive approach to drugs replacing the very costly and decades-long ‘war on drugs’ in 2016, and the adoption of the New Urban Agenda at Habitat III in 2016, with its strong focus on safe and sustainable cities. The World Health Organization has also reviewed progress globally in the adoption of its public health approach to violence prevention, finding that many countries have now created national strategies to prevent violence, although implementation lags well behind.

In some countries crime prevention which incorporates international norms and standards has now been practiced for over a quarter of a century, and this provides opportunities to undertake large-scale and long-term reviews of aspects of crime prevention. This includes reviews of the development of national strategies, of local community safety action, community-policing, and police-community partnerships, for example, providing valuable insights for policy makers, practitioners and researchers into the beneficial and the negative aspects of some crime prevention programmes. The importance of training and resources is underlined to ensure that programmes and initiatives are inclusive, and that human rights are respected.

Work on crime prevention continues to expand in all regions, but it is clear that, as always, governments at all levels tend to neglect the monitoring and evaluation of strategies and programmes, or to pay sufficient attention to issues of implementation. This is especially true at the level of local governments who often feel they lack resources, training and skills. While some countries have responded to economic and social pressures by emphasising greater surveillance and regulatory controls, the effectiveness of social and educational programmes, and of neighbourhood prevention programmes which help support families, young people and communities, continue to be very clearly demonstrated.
Introduction

As cities rapidly expand across the world, local officials struggle to control surges of spontaneous urbanization and respond adequately to swelling demands for public goods and services. As a result, local governance models are changing and new forms of public policymaking and implementation are taking shape. Some examples of urban planning and crime prevention initiatives drawing on recent experience in Southern Africa and Latin American illustrate these shifts in different urban expansion contexts.

Rapidly expanding urban areas 2015 – 2050

According to the United Nations (2015), the world’s urban population will record a 60% increase between 2015 and 2050; by then, urban dwellers will total around 6.3 billion. The bulk of this growth is expected to be in Asia and Africa.

Lagging government response

In large cities, this population bulge will be partly absorbed through formal business and government activities, as seen in many Asian cities in the recent past. Yet in the coming decades, the livelihoods of large numbers of new urban households will depend on bundles of informal activities – including selling drugs and other smuggled goods – which will deliver diversified income sources, and enable the urban poor to endure seasonal income fluctuations in cash-strapped environments. Because of the sheer scale and speed at which these activities will emerge and disappear, many will be outside the scope and reach of local government planning and control mechanisms (Lipsky, 2010; Roy, 2005, 2009).

Presently, local social movements in South Africa and Colombia, for example, are already putting pressure on local governments for housing, public services and infrastructure. They resort to a range of options such as seeking patronage of local politicians and their parties; or establishing alliances with rights-based movements to engage governments through judicial actions and orders; or coming to terms with local criminal organizations with “political connections” in exchange for votes, loyalty or sanctuary, among other things (Benit-Gbaffou, 2015; Demarest, 2011).

However “state-centered” mechanisms no longer represent the main option available to meet public needs in expanding cities. Informal mutual help groups have consolidated as safe alternatives to secure loans, instead of “bloodsucking” profiteers or banks; households are building their dwellings incrementally according to resources available to them, while developing management capabilities that enable them to adapt their housing units to respond to local income generating opportunities; local nuisance and petty crime are increasingly brought before customary leaders for sanction and punishment, instead of corrupt and inefficient police and justice officials; households seeking social guidance and service routes to deal with their daily problems look for religious groups, private charities, universities and even corporate social responsibility programs, instead of cutting...
through the red tape to access government services (Arias, 2010; Baker, 2010; Marks & al., 2011; Wakely & Riley, 2011).

E-government is seen by officials as an alternative for keeping in touch with a growing citizen base in urban settings and to assure relevant public responses to their needs. Yet civil discontent is rife and is aired not only by protest but, increasingly, by judicial, fiscal and disciplinary actions against public officials held responsible for not delivering public goods and services satisfactorily. Disturbingly, as a result, government actions are increasingly determined by judicial orders, which in turn increase inefficiencies and hinder the ability of public agencies to deliver their mandates (Tissington, 2012).

Shifting to “hybrid order” governance models

Local “state-centered” governance models are clearly in crisis. Gradually they are being replaced by networks in which local, provincial and national governments have a role to play, but not a “leading role”. Achieving public policy goals in local contexts no longer depends mainly on public administrative rules, regulations, procedures, decisions or resources. Instead, local agendas are set collectively, by a mix of stakeholders. They have resources, as well as connections, and the ability to deliver relevant responses to legitimate citizen demands concerning different issues and geographic areas. Shaped by these “hybrid orders” in which local governments are simply another stakeholder sitting at the table, “hybrid” governance models are replacing the old “state-centered” models (Maria Kyed, 2011; OECD, 2011).

In local hybrid orders, public policy is no longer exclusively under the control or the initiative of state authorities. In Medellín, Colombia, for many years illegal armed groups established their criminal practices in marginal neighbourhoods through violent dominance; they exploited these territories as prisons or graveyards for their victims, as well as for illicit taxation, clandestine manufacture and trade in drugs, firearms, counterfeit ID cards, uniforms, money, and recruitment. Innovatively, responses to counter these illicit practices are not based exclusively on law enforcement; opening slum upgrading projects to participatory prioritization and design has led to construction and maintenance of public facilities that reduce violent territorial fights in these neighbourhoods; dealing with child care for working parents and after school activities has committed joint government and civic resources and efforts to protect youths from violence and recruitment; cable car services now extend the metropolitan public transport system to these previously marginal neighborhoods, opening up educational and job opportunities that were previously inaccessible for residents (Demarest, 2011; Perez-Salazar, 2011).

In South Africa, during the late apartheid period, a focus on the fortification of home and office space led to the construction of increasingly high walls in the suburbs to keep intruders out. Joint research conducted by the Durban Urban Futures Centre and the Durban Metropolitan Police found that, from the perspective of public and private security agencies, high walls and electric fences hinder policing and security management, as well as neighbourly contact and natural surveillance of urban spaces (Marks& Overall, 2015). However, police and private security now face widespread resistance from the public to embrace these counterintuitive conclusions, and reduce excessive fortification. In response, the Durban Urban Futures Centre and the local Alliance Française are now leading a demonstration experiment to bring down the walls of the Alliance Française’s quarters in the city suburbs to test the effectiveness of shifting from the “walls and security” to the “neighbourly contact and natural surveillance” paradigm.

Concluding remarks

Rapid urban expansion is a messy process, and it will increasingly reveal the limitations of the scope and reach of “state-centered” planning and control mechanisms, to adequately respond to growing and increasingly complex demands for public goods and services. As the above cases illustrate, local governments must learn to work in “hybrid order” environments and embrace pluralised arrangements that involve resources and efforts coming from formal state agencies, as well as from civic organizations and the private sector, in order to provide satisfactory responses to public demands. In many cases, non-state actors and informal systems are seen by large social groups as accessible and effective providers of public goods and services, including crime prevention, urban safety and justice. Engaging constructively with these actors and systems can improve the legitimacy of the state and its institutions; repressing them will only succeed in exacerbating tensions in rapidly expanding urban contexts.
Among the different approaches to crime prevention, social (crime) prevention gained a lot of attention in Western and particularly European countries until the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Subsequently, in academic debate as well as in policy, the concept of social crime prevention has played a less important role. With the processes of globalisation, individualisation and neo-liberalism, actively promoting welfare (state) for all has ceased to be a central ambition of governments and policy makers. With the rapid economic, political, social and cultural changes that have taken place during the last decade, it is difficult to make a prognosis about the future development of social crime prevention in neoliberal Western societies. It is necessary to reconsider the importance of social (crime) prevention and to implement it to reduce the “root causes of crime”.

On social crime prevention

Social crime prevention includes preventive strategies that aim to modify social environments and influence offenders’ motivations, preferably with planned and co-ordinated multi-agency approaches. It focuses on interventions that seek to strengthen socialisation agents such as informal controls (e.g. family, peers, school, etc.) and education, employment, and support schemes for ex-prisoners in order to minimize opportunities to (re)offend (Groenemeyer & Schmidt, 2012; Meško, 2002).

Key post World War II developments in social crime prevention

After World War II until the end of the 1970s, the concept of social crime prevention gained attention in several European countries. Initially, it was incorporated in educational, public housing and social policies in the developing social welfare state, and in criminal justice systems which emphasized the reintegration and rehabilitation of convicted offenders and delinquents. While the 1960s and 1970s are considered the ‘golden age’ of social crime prevention, even during the 1980’s it was used to prevent the marginalization and exclusion of vulnerable social groups and their members. According to Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) French sociologists and socialist-oriented policy makers influenced the development of a so-called French social crime prevention model. Drawing on an urban and structural view of social crime prevention, and state-driven policies relating to education, leisure and work, the model aimed at changing the structural conditions for young people at risk of crime. The model was exported to a significant number of other European countries and even other continents. Throughout this period the Nordic model was also developing, based on the Scandinavian concept and practice of welfarism. This model involved social and educational programs aimed at eliminating or reducing the social causes of crime. The third model of the 1980s, identified as the prevalent alternative to situational crime prevention in the UK and other Anglophone countries, was the community crime prevention model, relying primarily on affirmative action aimed at communities and young people in socially deprived areas.

Until the end of the 1980s, social crime prevention was also at the peak of its development in communist countries. In Slovenia (formerly a republic of Yugoslavia), for example, the idea of social crime prevention was somehow integrated into the socialist state’s welfare programs and activities. This period was characterised by a crime policy devoted to re-socialisation and rehabilitation practices, and a critical examination of the role of the police in society. During the democratization process of the second half of the 1980s, social crime prevention was still a part of crime policy and responses to crime (Meško, Kanduč, & Jere, 2012). In Hungary too, a political and professional environment had emerged during the 1980s that clearly encouraged the idea of the prevention-oriented transformation of crime control and a complex system of crime prevention, which included social initiatives and programs (Kerezsi, 2012).

The neo-liberal-inspired “first turn in social crime prevention” of the 1980s in the UK redirected the focus to crime prevention and control through the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system and situational crime prevention, aiming to reduce opportunities to commit crime (Hughes, 2007). These new
developments played a central role in the crime policies of the Conservative administration of the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. According to Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012), under British influence, the “preventive turn” took place in The Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy among others. The dismantling of the social welfare state in these and the great majority of other European countries was, however, less pronounced than in the UK and the United States, their role model countries. In most of these countries, social crime prevention policy remained an integral part of broader social policies. Their respective crime control policies became more flexible and reactive to real and immediate social needs. For example, while the Nordic countries were equally influenced by neo-liberal ideas and introduced situational crime prevention strategies, post-war social crime prevention policies remained the leading component of their social and criminal policies. Throughout the Nordic countries, the concept of the welfare state was maintained, albeit not to the same extent in all of them.

While from the beginning of the 1990s punitiveness became a dominant feature of penal policy in the great majority of democratic countries, there was a “second turn in social crime prevention”. Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) argue that this was in response to the new wave of neoliberal situational crime prevention policies developed initially in the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium. In the Netherlands and Belgium this second turn took the form of “an integrated administrative crime prevention policy”, while in England and Wales it was realised by implementing the concept of “community safety” (Crawford, 2007). Social crime prevention reconfiguration reached its fullest development in the security and safety policies of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour government.

The second turn in social crime prevention also influenced developments in crime prevention in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Greece, and some other “old” European democracies, as well as in some post-communist Central and Eastern European countries. In Hungary (Kerezi, 2012), the prevention-oriented transformations were interrupted by the change of political regime in 1989, so that the idea of a complex crime prevention system was taken off the agenda until the mid-1990s. In contrast, it was not until the late 1990s that Slovenia underwent a “turn” towards a more punitive stance, and a withdrawal from the past “inclusive” orientation in crime prevention practice. Hebberecht and Baillergeau (2012) argue that the transfer of the new Western “safety and security” policies to post-socialist countries was realised, in part, by the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) set up by the European Union, and by incorporation of EU laws into domestic legal systems. Together with other “agents”, this helped to transfer Western social control, and especially deterrence practices, which seem to receive more public and policy-making support than social programmes. The latter remind people of the welfare state, and even more, of the former socialist/communist welfare programmes in Eastern European countries.

Concluding remarks

The latest reconfigurations in social crime prevention policies towards a more individualized, control-oriented and authoritarian crime prevention model in the great majority of European countries prioritises, among other things, the fight against anti-social behaviour and public disorder. These policies incorporate measures aimed at reducing individual motivation to offend via the institutions of socialization, focusing on communities, neighbourhoods and social networks. This neo-classicist and neo-positivist approach to social crime prevention ties in with the individual positivist perspective prevalent in the second half of the 19th century. The neoliberal pressures that cause greater social differentiation need somehow to be reduced. We believe that governments have to implement social policies, which can have a preventative effect on the most disadvantaged people in society, instead of increasing punitiveness even for minor offences.
The role of community members, civil society organisations and the private sector in the prevention of crime and raising awareness and encouraging participation in the criminal justice process.

UN Workshop 4 was part of the formal programme of the 13th United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which took place in Doha, Qatar between 12th and 19th April 2015. The Workshop was developed and run by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), and organized by Peter Homel, then Principal Criminologist at the Institute, in collaboration with UNODC. The Moderator was Adam Tomison of the AIC and the Chair Matti Joutsen (Finland).

The Workshop was specifically designed to demonstrate through practical examples that a programme of active public participation was not only possible, but also desirable for achieving effective and sustainable crime prevention and criminal justice processes, in a variety of very diverse communities and settings.

Workshop 4 addressed the following themes:
- The role of social networks and new technologies,
- public participation at the local level: specifically grassroots initiatives and,
- the role of private sector business in crime prevention and criminal justice.

The development of measures to ensure that civil society organisations have the appropriate skills and knowledge to build confidence, ensure transparency, and prevent corruption was also emphasized in the Workshop. This was an important theme that reflected specific recommendations arising from the Salvador Declaration from the 12th UN Crime Congress in 2010. The Workshop was constructed to give a strong voice to presentations from international experts and experienced practitioners from a range of mostly civil society organisations or academic institutions. Although there were a small number of government officials as workshop panellists, each spoke as international experts in their respective fields, rather than as government representatives.

The panellists came from all regions of the world including Asia, Africa, Europe, and North and South America. Some of the organisations represented included the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, the Centre for Law Enforcement and Public Health, Sydney Institute of Criminology, Avocats Sans Frontières, Soroptimists International, the Quakers, the Latin American Committee for Crime Prevention, the Open Society Justice Initiative, the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime, the International Anti-Corruption Academy, Caixa Seguradora and the African Commission in Human and People’s Rights. Expert government panellists came from the Japanese Ministry of Justice, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (Mexico), as well as from the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services from the Canadian Province of Ontario, Canada. There was also a speaker from the Australian Institute of Criminology and a presentation by a participant in the Qatar World Youth Forum, held in the days before the Congress.

What was made very clear from these presentations is that the task of moving policies and guidelines into effective and sustainable practice at the local and regional level requires significant investment of experience and expertise. Very often this expertise could reside in a range of very different organisations, regardless of whether they are government agencies, non-government or civil society groups, academic institutions or the private sector. What was required to convert these policies and guidelines into effective programmes that produce meaningful outcomes for individuals and their communities, was openness to cooperative and collaborative arrangements that saw the most appropriate expertise and skill bases applied to delivering the most effective solutions to the most pressing problems.
Social networks and new technologies

Three workshop presentations provided some insightful perspectives on the role of the media, social networks and new communications technologies in promoting participation in crime prevention and access to criminal justice processes, based on practical experience from across the world. A panelist from the Sydney Institute of Criminology in Australia demonstrated how police organizations have emerged as leaders in social media application showing best practice for the integration of social media into departmental routines. More than any other state agency, police organizations have managed to successfully harness social media as an effective communications tool recognizing early on its significant potential to meet a range of police public relations objectives. However, police organisations need to develop internal policies and guidance frameworks to support and regulate their engagement with the freewheeling environment of social media, in order to avoid the risk of acting unethically or inappropriately, or abusing the privilege of access into this medium. Being an effective participant in social networks does not always come easily to police officers, and they can benefit significantly from advice and training from professionals with more experience with operating in this medium. Examples of police engagement with social networks has led to increasing levels of confidence and trust at the public level, especially among young people who are generally the most prolific social media users. But this benefit is also seen to extend to the capacity to engender greater trust in the police among some of the most vulnerable groups in the community.

Another presentation by the Mexican Institute INEGI reported on the development of its more open data collection system in collaboration with UNODC. The system works across complex national, provincial and local systems where information availability and stakeholder information needs differ significantly. It has sought to encourage participation and engagement with a wide range of stakeholders and the public, when relevant and available, creating transparent and accessible information portals using new technology and social networking systems.

Social marketing approaches have also been applied to crime prevention including drunk driver prevention, family and domestic violence and burglary prevention. Social networking sites directly interact with and empower the very people they are designed to assist to achieve their objectives. The strong message from this presentation was that as the sophistication of communications technology continue to rapidly develop, and the cost of developing and delivering social network and new communications based interventions becomes easier and cheaper through platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, etc., it is vital to maintain a focus on ensuring that such interventions are research based, and developed in a systematic manner with a clear focus on outcome effectiveness.

Private sector involvement

In relation to private sector involvement in crime prevention, the presentation on the ‘Youth Expression Project’ in Brazil proved an excellent example. Initiated by UNODC in collaboration with the major insurance company Caixa Seguradora, the project was developed and evaluated, and designed to address youth homicide and violence, especially in disadvantaged areas. It worked with over 100 young people on youth-led individual and social capital-building initiatives in satellite cities around Brasilia. The key role and specific capacities of the insurance company were highlighted in the presentation. They contributed to leadership and organisational skills to address this difficult social problem.

The Chair’s conclusions from the workshop were that:

- Rapid developments in media, social networks and new communication technologies bring undeniable potential benefit to society, in particular to law enforcement as means of spreading information, encouraging reporting and cooperation with authorities, building trust, identifying community risks and providing safety tips. Exchanges among states and sharing of best practices are important for addressing common challenges that emerge from these new developments, such as new forms of crime and victimisation and negative impact of the media; and for building national and local capacity to generate and analyse relevant data.

- Public participation can widen and strengthen efforts to prevent crime and deliver criminal justice services. To be effective, inclusive, evidence-based and sustainable, multi-sectorial approaches to public participation should be developed, in line with national laws and circumstances. Top-down approaches to fostering public participation should be combined with a bottom-up approach in order to ensure that community concerns are appropriately reflected.

- Public participation in enhancing access to justice is useful in raising awareness, extending outreach, and empowering members of the community, in particular those members of society recognized as vulnerable, as well as women and children. Members of the community, in line with national law and as appropriate, can play an important role
in national criminal justice systems, for example in victim support, restorative justice programmes, legal aid, probation and reintegration of offenders into society.

- Public-private partnerships in crime prevention and criminal justice have potential benefits, for example in the area of preventing corruption and in empowering local communities to become involved in crime prevention initiatives that aim to improve the well-being of the community as a whole.

- An appropriate regulatory and institutional framework based on clear and targeted policies provides a framework for public participation, and may be complemented by measures to ensure that civil society organisations have the appropriate skills and knowledge, as well as measures to build confidence, ensure transparency and prevent corruption.
Endnotes

1 UNODC also published its second in-depth Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends Contexts and Data in 2014, and this joint report draws in part on that work.

2 In its Global Study of Homicide (UNODC, 2014) UNODC estimated a rate of 6.2 per 100,000. The difference is explained by the use of different data sources, with UNODC using criminal justice rather than public health sources, and different estimation methods (UNODC, 2015a, p. 9).

3 As measured by the Gini co-efficient.

4 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey.

5 World Justice Project maintains an Index on the Rule of Law for 120 countries, including Algeria, China, Korea, Indonesia, and Turkey.

6 http://cybrepo.unodc.org


11 Matthew Torigian, Deputy Minister, Community Safety, Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Province of Ontario, Canada – Community mobilisation – a new approach to community and police engagement; Alice Scartezini, Caixa Seguradora Youth Expression Project, Brazil – Social responsibility and crime prevention: lessons learned from the Expression Youth Programme in Brazil.

12 See UNODC’s response to the SDG’s: Contribution by UNODC in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and a proposed role of the CND and CCPCJ in reviewing the progress of the SDGs. (EN/CN.7/2016/CRP.1) para.1

13 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. GA Resolution 70/1, 25 September 2015.

14 UNODC (2016). Contribution by UNODC in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and a proposed role of the CND and CCPCJ in reviewing the progress of the SDGs. E/CN.15/2016/CRP.1

15 See Violence Reduction Unit www.actiononviolence.org.uk

16 The overrepresentation of municipal officials in the figure can be explained by the fact that municipalities are responsible for numerous services, such as schools, social services, health care, urban planning, etc.

17 One excellent example of volunteer action in the UK is Community Speed Watch which works with the police to reduce the incidence of speeding, and improve safety in cities and rural areas. The organization helps in the recruitment and training of volunteers, and has developed specialized web-based tools to assist the volunteers and the police. See www.communityspeedwatch.co.uk

18 The German Forum for Crime Prevention was established at the same time at the federal level to bring people and institutions together and provide advice and support (Frevel & Rogers, 2016, pp. 139–140).

19 See ICPC’s website for more information on the 5th International Conference on Crime Observatories and Criminal Analysis, Mexico City, November 3-6th 2015.

20 www.citizensecurity.igarape.org.br

21 References included in the quote can be found in Jaitman & Guerrero Compeán (2015).

22 Peter Homel and Georgina Fuller, 2015, p. 1.


24 This includes the work of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), and the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

25 See for example Smart and Safe Cities, 2015, published by the City Leadership Initiative www.cityleadership.net

26 Ross Homel, Kate Freiberg, Sara Branch, and Huang Le, 2015, p. 1.

27 Professor Ross Homel presented earlier findings from the project at the Workshop on crime prevention organized by ICPC at the 10th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Bangkok in 2005 (Shaw & Travers, 2007).

28 The Crime Reduction Programme introduced in the UK in the 1990’s is a prime example of major implementation, rather than programme, failure. See (R. Homel, Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004).


30 In addition to community policing, they included beat policing, reassurance policing, partnership approaches to gun control, neighbourhood watch, and school resource officer programmes (Higginson & Mazzerolle, 2014, p. 449).

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References

CHAPTER 1
Trends in crime and its prevention


to.


CONTRIBUTIONS

“Hybrid order” governance in rapidly expanding urban areas


A Brief Overview of Social Prevention in Europe


